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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the general question of what role can courts play in 
counteracting the potential capture by professional self-regulating bodies, with a 
specific focus on competency-based, entry-to-practice standards.  This thesis will 
make the argument that the current competency-based, entry-to-practice standards 
for Canadian patent agents suffer from several issues which call into question the 
legitimacy of this occupational licensing intervention. Using the Canadian patent 
agent profession as a case study, the thesis will consider whether Canadian 
administrative law can provide a viable mechanism for challenging the illegitimacy 
of the Canadian patent agent regulatory framework.  Accordingly, this thesis project 
asks the following question- in light of important considerations of both legitimacy 
and legality in Canadian patent agent governance, can Canadian courts act as an 
effective counterbalance to potential competency-based, entry-to-practice based 
capture in Canadian patent agent regulation?  The answer to this question extends 
beyond the context of administrative law.  The concept of patent agent ‘competency’ 
in many ways acts as a foundation for a dominant patent discourse, and challenging 
patent agent competency may be an important mechanism for challenging this 
overarching discourse. 
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PART 1: PATENT AGENCY – THE PAST, THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The state of occupational regulation, and particularly, professional self-regulation, 
has undergone profound transformations in commonwealth jurisdictions including the 
U.K. and Australia.  However, for many reasons, this same political movement has yet to 
take hold with the same force in North America.  According to Alice Wooley, Canada 
remains one of the ‘last bastions of unfettered self-regulation in the common wealth 
world’, with the self-regulatory mechanism maintaining its predominance in fields such 
as law, medicine and pharmacy.1 
This is not to say that a North American counter movement has not started to take 
shape.  In the U.S. context, an abundance of recent scholarship pertaining to the legality 
of occupational licensing regulations signals a growing interest in challenging the 
unfettered discretion of self-regulatory licensing bodies.  Several recent high-profile 
cases, including United States Supreme Court decisions, have invigorated a debate 
regarding the legality of allegedly protectionist professional licensing regulations.     
These cases and commentaries highlight a growing dissatisfaction with the 
perceived illegitimacy of professional licensing and self-regulation, which are 
increasingly viewed as being convenient covers for professional protectionism.  Yet they 
also demonstrate that the North American self-regulatory counter movement, unlike the 
political movements of Australia and the U.K., has to date been largely legal, rather than 
political, in nature.   
The emphasis on legal avenues for redress against protectionist self-regulatory 
licensing regimes is a recognition of the challenging situation surrounding regulatory 
agencies generally.  Often people speak of different forms of ‘regulatory capture’, 
wherein a regulatory body serves the interests of the regulated rather than the public’s 
interest.  In the context of self-regulation, regulatory capture may be a consequence of 
                                                           
1 Alice Woolley, Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics in Canada 4 (Markham: LexisNexis, 2011) at 4-9. 
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‘public choice theory’.  According to public choice theory, regulatory agencies and 
enactments which predominantly serve the interests of the regulated as opposed to the 
public are relatively easy to establish and remarkably resistant to political reform.  This is 
because benefits flowing to the regulated group, which typically consist of a small 
community of highly organized individuals, are intensified within a tight-knit group that 
can effectively lobby to secure their political interests at the expense of the public 
interest.  Thus, according to public choice theory, self-regulatory bodies are particularly 
resistant to political reform given the disparity in interests and political organization. 
While one could say that this recent litigation trend has sparked an interesting 
discussion regarding the legality surrounding occupation licensing regulation, this is far 
from saying that these cases have been very successful in invalidating allegedly 
illegitimate licensing regulations.  From an administrative law perspective, courts have 
historically afforded tremendous legal deference to the discretion of self-regulatory 
bodies because “despite public choice insights, courts have historically assumed that such 
laws can be ‘rectified by the democratic processes’.”2  Many U.S. cases have attempted 
to reanimate outdated constitutional principles as a counter-balance to protectionist 
tendencies of self-regulatory bodies.  John Blevins succinctly summarizes the issues by 
stating: 
Why select such contentious and seemingly discredited [constitutional] 
doctrines? One reason is simply that there are no other better options. 
Modern law lacks viable doctrinal tools to invalidate irrational 
protectionist licensing.  A second is that occupational licensing litigation 
has become about more than the individual cases themselves. Instead, 
they are part of a larger attempt to revive dormant economic liberty 
doctrines. In this respect, occupational licensing battles are a new form of 
public interest litigation, not unlike same-sex marriage or desegregation 
litigation.3 (emphasis added) 
                                                           
2 John Blevins, "License to Uber: Using Administrative Law to Fix Occupational Licensing” (2017) 64 UCLA L Rev 
844 at 878. 
3 Ibid at 871.  See also Joseph Sanderson, “Don't Bury the Competition: The Growth of Occupational Licensing and a 
Toolbox for Reform” (2014) 31 Yale J on Reg 455 at 456-457: “So far, the law has not found a satisfactory way to deal 
with state-level protectionist economic regulation… is there anything that can be done to counter the special interest 
laws that restrict entry to occupations?” 
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This thesis is a modest attempt at contributing to the discussion surrounding the 
appropriate balance between courts and professional self-regulation.  Using the example 
of Canadian patent agent regulation, this thesis explores the general question of what role 
can courts play in counteracting the potential capture by professional self-regulating 
bodies, with a specific focus on competency-based, entry-to-practice standards.  This 
thesis will make the argument that the current competency-based, entry-to-practice 
standards for Canadian patent agents suffer from several issues which call into question 
the legitimacy of this occupational licensing intervention. Using the Canadian patent 
agent profession as a case study, the thesis will consider whether Canadian administrative 
law can provide a viable mechanism for challenging the illegitimacy of the Canadian 
patent agent regulatory framework.  Accordingly, this thesis project asks the following 
question: in light of important considerations of both legitimacy and legality in Canadian 
patent agent governance, can Canadian courts act as an effective counterbalance to 
potential competency-based, entry-to-practice based capture in Canadian patent agent 
regulation? 
This thesis begins by discussing general theories of professional regulation with 
an emphasis on regulation of professional legal services.  As self-regulation, at least from 
a North American perspective, remains the preferred professional regulatory framework, 
the review undertakes a historical analysis of Canadian self-regulation.  This historical 
analysis examines several unique factors leading to Canada’s steadfast commitment to a 
broad form of professional self-regulation, highlighting some of the concerns regarding 
the regulation of professional ‘competency’ and how the mechanisms of competency-
based regulation have become disconnected from their historical origins and purposes 
and have become servants of professional interests.   
This historical analysis provides several key insights.  There has been a historic 
shift in professional self-regulation, which developed over the course of the mid-
twentieth century, from a balancing of public and professional interests, including 
flexibility with respect to strict ‘competency’ based entry qualifications, to a commitment 
to the principle that the best interests of the profession somehow automatically align with 
and further the public’s interests. Stemming from this principle, Canadian self-regulated 
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professions have focused considerable efforts on entry qualifications, placing tremendous 
emphasis on competency based standards as the predominant ‘public interest’ priority, 
often at the expense of other important public interest considerations.  However, this 
phenomenon begs the question whether protectionist forces may have taken hold in 
various professional fields under the guise of professional competence.  With respect to 
Canadian self-regulating professions, new political movements skeptical of the public 
interest motives of professions may be returning Canada to a position where reliance on 
professional judgements of expertise may no longer occupy a central role in professional 
self-regulation. 
The thesis will then discuss public choice theory as well as several contemporary 
theories of regulatory capture, with a focus on regulatory capture in self-regulated 
professions.  The discussion of regulatory capture covers various analytic frameworks for 
identifying indicia of capture.  This includes a discussion of Daniel Carpenter’s analytic 
framework, which distinguishes between between ‘regulatory’ and ‘agency’ capture 
(which relate to legislative action and agency action respectively) and his emphasis on 
‘capture mechanisms’.  Other contemporary ‘non-materialist’ theories of capture include 
Cass Sunstein’s theory of ‘epistemic capture’ and James Kwak’s theory of ‘cultural 
capture’.  To translate these economic theories into applicable legal frameworks, and 
specifically, administrative law doctrine, this thesis proposes a clear distinction between 
public choice theory, which operates at the political level, and regulatory capture, which 
operates within the administration of a regulatory framework.  The law of judicial review 
emphasizes the significance of political will as evidenced by legislative intent, and in the 
context of self-regulation, circumstances which might typically be viewed as ‘capture’ 
are frequently authorized by statute.  As such, this thesis clearly distinguishes between 
public choice consequences, for which judicial review remediation is limited, and 
regulatory capture, which is properly within the domain of judicial review.   
The thesis then proceeds to examine the history of the patent agent profession.  
This historical examination will demonstrate that the patent agent profession is in many 
ways unique from other professions.  The origin of the profession at the time of the 
Industrial Revolution is in many ways tied to the historical development of a socio-
 5 
 
economic discourse of technology, a discourse for which patent law is central.  Patent 
agents have been, since the time of the Industrial Revolution, central players in authoring 
this discourse along with their professional role within it.  Thus, the patent agent 
profession is in many ways unique amongst professions, in that they have, and in many 
ways continue to be, authors of their own professional discourse.   
An analysis of patent agent competency will demonstrate that patent agent 
competency is in many ways disconnected from any demonstrable evidence of public 
harm caused by incompetence.  Furthermore, patent agent competency serves as a 
lynchpin for the predominant patent practice narrative; the boundary between who is and 
is not competent defines the boundary of this narrative.  The patent system is founded on 
a public interest theory- a ‘patent social contract’- which states that the patent system 
promotes innovation and dissemination of knowledge by rewarding inventors with 
proprietary rights over their inventions in exchange for public disclosure of invention 
information.  Yet evidence demonstrates that the current predominant practice narrative 
may undermine many aspects of the patent social contract, by limiting independent 
inventors’ access to the patent system as well as failing to accommodate for public 
interest in access to inventive knowledge.  As this international patent narrative is largely 
supported by a hyper-proximity between patent offices and patent agents, through what 
Peter Drahos calls ‘invisible harmonization’, challenging the predominant patent practice 
narrative may require challenging the concept of ‘competency’ that reinforces this 
narrative.  As discussed herein, an analysis of the history of patent agent regulation tells 
us as much about the development of the patent system itself as it does about the patent 
agent profession, as the two are in many ways inexorably intertwined.4 
The historical analysis continues by reviewing the history of the Canadian patent 
agent profession. This analysis demonstrates that the Canadian patent agent profession 
exhibits many of the same phenomenon common to the development of self-regulated 
professions in Canada generally, including the possibility that professional ‘competency’ 
                                                           
4 Anna Guagnini, “Patent Agents in Britain at the Turn of the Twentieth Century: Themes and Perspectives” in Ian 
Inkster (ed.), History of Technology, Volume 31, 2012 (London: Bloomsbury Publishing PLC, 2012) at 146: “the 
analysis of the internal dynamics of this small but diverse group [patent agents] can tell us much not only about the 
profession itself and how the characteristics of the practitioners evolved but also about the changes that took place 
within the network of the other players involved in the patent business.” 
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has become disconnected from its historical origins and has become a capture mechanism 
for the profession.  Historically, regulation of the Canadian patent agent profession 
emerged from factors that, at least at first appearance, were at best tangentially related to 
the issue of professional competence.  However, similar to other Canadian professions, 
the Canadian patent agent governance framework has over time become almost entirely 
focused on ‘competency’, with practically the entire governance framework centering 
around a stringent licensing examination process.  The Canadian patent agent regulatory 
framework is remarkably out-of-step from comparable jurisdictions, with the 
qualification examination pass rate being the lowest in the world. The insularity of the 
profession, the lack of accountability and the dismal exam pass rates all potentially form 
part of what may be a valid capture narrative, centering around ‘competency’ based entry 
qualifications as an effective capture mechanism. 
The thesis will proceed to discuss Canadian administrative law, with analysis of 
recent case law and the challenges associated with relying on judicial review as an 
effective filter against professional self-regulatory protectionism.  The analysis will 
consider both substantive and procedural review. Regarding substantive review, recent 
jurisprudence demonstrates courts have interpreted enabling legislation as granting self-
regulated bodies broad discretion in setting competency-based regulations.  The 
combination of ‘competency’ and ‘public interest’ mandates common to most self-
regulatory legislation entitles self-regulating professions to tremendous deference in 
setting competency-based standards, even in circumstances where any evidence of 
‘public harm’ rationale for such decisions is limited. 
Furthermore, courts have applied a strict evidentiary standard with respect to 
substantive review of the decisions of self-regulating professions, limiting the evidentiary 
record to the material that was before the decision maker in making its ‘decision’.  This 
limits applicants’ ability to construct a ‘capture narrative’, by limiting the scope of 
evidentiary review when challenging regulatory bodies’ ‘policy’ decisions.  As this 
question of evidentiary standards is still very much an open issue, Supreme Court 
guidance, and hopefully reform, with respect to expanding the evidentiary record would 
be beneficial. 
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Procedural fairness, as opposed to substantive review, may provide viable options 
for challenging competency-based, entry-to-practice standards.  Recent jurisprudence 
applying the Supreme Court’s Baker factors have suggested that contextually, in 
circumstances involving entitlement to practice a profession, individuals should be 
afforded a substantially high level of procedural fairness.  In this regard, courts have 
demonstrated a willingness to scrutinize all aspects of professional licensing 
administration, including examination development, setting, marking and the provision of 
reasons.  Furthermore, as matters of procedural fairness are reviewed on a standard of 
correctness, courts have demonstrated a willingness to expand the evidentiary record 
beyond what would be permitted in substantive review, thereby affording opportunities to 
construct an evidentiary ‘capture narrative’. 
Most importantly, this thesis will argue that institutional bias, as an element of 
procedural fairness, may be the most significant legal mechanism for challenging 
regulatory capture in the context of self-regulating professions.  As set out above, when 
translating political/economic theories of public choice theory and regulatory capture into 
‘legal doctrine’, the concern surrounding regulatory capture is in many respects a concern 
with biased decision making.  Accordingly, combatting regulatory capture is essentially 
an attempt to combat biased decision-making within the regulatory framework.  Specific 
to patent agent regulation, as discussed above, if the objective in challenging the current 
patent agent regulatory framework and its over-emphasis on ‘competency’ is to challenge 
the current dominant patent practice narrative, then this essentially translates into 
challenging the over-proximity between the patent office and patent agents in regulatory 
decision-making along with the biases that flow therefrom. 
The unique challenge in self-regulatory professions, as opposed to other 
regulatory frameworks, is that many biases are statutorily authorized.  This is the same in 
the context of the Canadian patent agent profession.  This thesis proposes the adoption of 
Laverne Jacobs’ grounded impartiality approach to institutional bias analysis, which 
advocates for courts conducting a comprehensive analysis into the detailed working of a 
regulatory body in order to locate potential biases that may not be explicitly mandated by 
statute.  Currently, Canadian jurisprudence remains unclear with respect to the nature and 
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extent of institutional bias analysis.  As this discussion will demonstrate, the depth of 
institutional bias analysis that a court would hypothetically be willing to undertake when 
reviewing the current Canadian patent agent regulatory framework will largely determine 
whether the current regulatory framework is invalid due to institutional bias. 
1.2 CANADIAN PATENT AGENCY AND PATENT AGENT GOVERNANCE 
To set the stage for the significance of the discussion set out herein, this Chapter 
1.2 provides background on the nature of Canadian patent agency and the regulation 
thereof.  To acquire patent protection for an invention in Canada, one must file a patent 
application in the Patent Office of the Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO).  
This application is then examined to ensure that that the patent application meets the 
requisite formalities and that the invention claimed therein meets the requirements for 
patentability.  If a patent application meets all legal requirements, a patent is granted for 
the claimed invention, and the owner may, subject to some limitations, exclude all others 
within Canada from practicing the invention. 
Individuals may prepare and prosecute their own patent application before CIPO, 
but given the technical nature of patent office practice, the assistance of an experienced 
professional is often recommended.  Only registered Canadian patent agents may 
represent others before the Canadian Patent Office, and in many instances, individuals 
wishing to conduct business before the Canadian Patent Office, such as institutions and 
corporations, must appoint a registered Canadian patent agent to act on their behalf.5 
Canadian patent agents are granted the exclusive right to “represent applicants in the 
presentation and prosecution of applications for patents or in other business before the 
[Canadian]Patent Office.”6 
Many jurisdictions regulate the practice of patent agency, but, regulatory 
frameworks vary.  To become registered as a Canadian patent agent, an individual must 
complete two years of practical experience followed by successfully passing the 
                                                           
5 Patent Rules, SOR/96-423, R. 20(1) [Rules].  
6 Patent Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-4, s. 15 [Patent Act]. 
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Canadian Patent Agent Examination.7  The current patent agent licensing regime is 
authorized by the Patent Act and Patent Rules.  Section 15 of the Patent Act states that: 
A register of patent agents shall be kept in the Patent Office on which 
shall be entered the names of all persons and firms entitled to represent 
applicants in the presentation and prosecution of applications for 
patents or in other business before the Patent Office.  (emphasis added) 
Section 12(1)(j) of the Patent Act grants the Governor in Council authority to 
make rules and regulations: 
respecting the entry on, the maintenance of and the removal from the 
register of patent agents of the names of persons and firms, including 
the qualifications that must be met and the conditions that must be 
fulfilled by a person or firm before the name of the person or firm is 
entered thereon and to maintain the name of the person or firm on the 
register. 
Rule 13(1) establishes an Examining Board for the purpose of preparing, 
administering and marking the qualifying examination for patent agents.  Rule 13(2) 
states that: 
The members of the Examining Board shall be appointed by the 
Commissioner, and the chairperson and at least three other members 
shall be employees of the Patent Office and at least five members shall 
be patent agents nominated by the Intellectual Property Institute of 
Canada. (emphasis added) 
The Intellectual Property Institute of Canada (IPIC) is a voluntary organization 
that represents the interests of patent agents and other intellectual property professionals 
in Canada.8  The IPIC has a long history in Canada’s intellectual property landscape, 
promoting intellectual property protection and the expertise of its members, as well as 
lobbying to protect its members’ interests.  Since the earliest days of modern patent 
systems, similar voluntary organizations have been active in various jurisdictions around 
the world, and in that respect, IPIC is not unlike its counterparts from other countries.  
However, as elaborated below, several circumstances unique to Canada make IPIC’s 
                                                           
7 Rules, R. 12. 
8See generally, The Intellectual Property Institute of Canada, (Ottawa: The Intellectual Property Institute of Canada, 
2018) <http://www.ipic.ca> accessed on July 2, 2018 [IPIC Website]  
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involvement in the patent agent licensing process an outlier amongst comparable 
jurisdictions. 
As there are no education requirements, no required competencies for the two-
year practical experience period and no ethics guidelines, for practical purposes, the 
entire Canadian patent agent regulatory framework revolves around the Patent Agent 
Examination process.  The current Canadian patent agent examination is a set of four 
papers, offered over four consecutive days, once per year.  The four papers are: Paper A 
covering patent drafting; Paper B covering patent validity analysis; Paper C covering 
patent office practice; and Paper D covering patent infringement analysis.  A total of 100 
marks are available for each paper and to pass the examination, a candidate must obtain a 
total of at least 240 marks (60%) and not less than 50 marks (50%) on each individual 
paper. A candidate who scores at least 60 marks (60%) on a given paper will retain those 
marks towards future attempts to pass the examination.9   
CIPO has only maintained archived examinations and exam statistics since 2005.  
While anecdotal evidence seems to indicate that the Canadian patent agent examination 
pass rate has always been substantially low, the available statistics and context from the 
last two decades paint a harrowing picture.  For example, as seen in Table 1, the overall 
pass rate in 2004 was approximately 32%, with a first time pass rate of 7%.  These 
numbers are no doubt daunting.  However, since 2009, pass rates have decreased 
drastically towards their current abysmal numbers.  Overall pass rates have fallen to less 
than 7% in 2012, with first time pass rates hovering around 1% since 2005.  In 2016, only 
3 out of the 119 candidates sitting for the Paper D examination scored over the 60/100 
pass-mark on Paper D with the highest mark being one individual who scored just over 
the pass score of 60.10 In every year since 2005, with only very few exceptions, the 
average marks for each Paper of the Exam has been a failing grade.11  It takes the average 
                                                           
9  Canada, Canadian Intellectual Property Office, Candidate Guide To Writing — The Canadian Patent Agent 
Examination (Ottawa: Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development, 2018) 
<https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/wr00113.html> accessed on July 2, 2018.  
10  Canada, Canadian Intellectual Property Office, Patent Agent Qualifying Examination — 2017 Report (Ottawa: 
Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development, 2017) <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-
internetopic.nsf/eng/h_wr04382.html> at Table 1 (accessed on July 2, 2018) [CIPO]. 
11 Ibid at Figure 1 and Table 2.  The only exceptions are 2010 Paper C (average mark- 61%), 2015 Paper C (average 
mark- 61%) and 2016 Paper C (average mark- 64%). 
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candidate between five to eight years to pass these examinations.12  It now appears that 
the pass rate for the Canadian patent agent licensing exam is by far the lowest amongst 
comparable jurisdictions.13 
TABLE 1: CIPO 2017 Report – Patent Agent Qualifying Examination 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
12 Ibid at Figure 3 and Table 4. 
13 United States of America, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Registration exam results and statistics 
(Alexandria, United States Patent and Trademark Office, 2017) < https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-
resources/patent-and-trademark-practitioners/registration-exam-results-and-statistics> accessed on July 2, 2018. In 
2017 (which appears to be the most recent data available) the overall percentage pass rate was 43.9%.  Some have 
commented that U.S. pass rates are unfortunately low; see Zachary Kinnaird, 2015 U.S. Patent Practitioner Trends 
(2015) Patently-O <http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/02/current-patent-practitioner.html> accessed on July 2, 2018.  
For European statistics, see Europe, European Patent Office, Statistics on the results of the European qualifying 
examination 2018, pre-examination and main examination (Munich: European Patent Office, 2018) < 
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponot.nsf/0/0B8D505A36857ACEC12582BE00435344/$File/StatisticsEQ
E2018.pdf> accessed on July 2, 2018.  The 2018 overall pass rates per paper were 52% for Paper A, 73% for Paper B, 
47% for Paper C and 33% for Paper D.  However, in Japan, where the patent agent profession (referred to as ‘benrishi’) 
has been notoriously accused of protectionism, the pass exam pass rate has also historically been very low- see Lee 
Rousso, “Japan’s New Patent Attorney Law Breaches Barrier between the Legal and Quasi-Legal Professions: Integrity 
of Japanese Patent Practice at Risk” (2001) 10 Pac Rim L & Pol'y J 781 [Japan] at 789 stating that the pass rate for the 
benrishi exam was “4.9% in 1999”.  This does not state whether this was a first time pass rate and more recent statistics 
are difficult to acquire [USPTO]. 
2018- 05- 31, 3*51 PMPatent  Agent  Qualif ying Examinat ion — 2017 Repor t  -  Canadian Intellectual Proper ty Of f ice
Page 3 of  4ht tps:/ /www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/c ipointernet- internetopic.nsf/eng/h_wr04382.html
under 40 75 24 9 36
highest 72.5% 76.5% 83% 65%
lowest 10% 8% 22% 4%
Figure 1 and Table 2—Average marks for each paper since 2005
Average marks for each paper since 2005
 Average marks for each paper since 2005 - Table
Average marks for each paper since 2005
05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Paper A 52% 52% 55% 53% 50% 44% 40% 38% 36% 45% 41% 42% 37%
Paper B 52% 49% 43% 51% 45% 41% 44% 42% 44% 45% 49% 54% 48%
Paper C 55% 55% 54% 49% 50% 61% 55% 48% 55% 57% 61% 64% 51%
Paper D 47% 38% 38% 51% 50% 47% 47% 49% 38% 45% 43% 39% 45%
Figure 2 and Table 3—Overall and First Try Pass Rates
Overall pass rates and ﬁrst-try pass rates since 2005
Paper A
Paper B
Paper C
Paper D
2018- 05- 31, 3*51 PMPatent  Agent  Qualifying Examinat ion — 2017 Repor t  -  Canadian Intellectual Proper ty Of f ice
Page 4  of  4ht tps:/ /www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet- internetopic.nsf/eng/h_wr04382.html
 Overall pass rates and ﬁrst-try pass rates since 2005 - Table
Overall pass rates and ﬁrst-try pass rates since 2005
05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Overall 16% 12% 28% 17% 15% 13% 10% 7% 15% 25% 19% 12% 20%
First time 3% 2% 5% 4% 4% 2% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1% 3% 2%
Figure 3 and Table 4—Number of candidates achieving overall pass in 2017
by number of attempts (total number of candidates: 26)
Number of attempts to achieve overall pass in 2017
 Number of attempts to achieve overall pass in 2017 - Table
Overall
First time
Number of candidates
Date modiﬁed:
2018-05-24
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Candidates who fail the exam in any given year are entitled to file an appeal 
request.  The grounds for appeal are limited to either an administrative error, such as 
missing pages lost during physical handling of the examination, or that the marks 
awarded do not align with the marks set out in the marking guide.  Appeals questioning 
the accuracy of the provided responses set out in the marking guide are not permitted. In 
response to the appeal, the appealing candidate receives a one-page response which 
simply states that the mark was changed or that the appeal was denied, without any 
further elaboration.  Statistically, a very small percentage (less than 10%) of appeals are 
successful in achieving a mark change, and fewer still result in a change from a failing to 
a passing mark.14 
These requirements are quite possibly the most stringent in the world, and out of 
step with comparable jurisdictions such as the U.S., the European Patent Office (EPO), 
Australia (while it still utilized a qualifying exam) and the U.K.15  The Canadian patent 
agent profession valorizes the low pass rates for the Canadian Patent Agent Examination, 
apparently based on the assumption that the lower the pass rate, the higher the quality of 
services provided to the Canadian public.16  The current system has existed for many 
years, and accordingly, it has become engrained within the accepted culture of Canadian 
patent agent practice.  Not only is the profession boastful of the low pass rate for the 
                                                           
14 CIPO, supra note 10; CIPO’s data indicates that in 2017, “The Examining Board considered requests for review from 
12 candidates for Paper A, 2 candidates for Paper B, 3 candidates for Paper C and 11 candidates for Paper D.  None of 
these reviews resulted in an overall pass.  One partial pass for Paper C resulted from these reviews.” 
15 Wissam Aoun, “Canadian Patent Agent Regulation Reform (Part 1)- (In)Validity Issues Surrounding the Canadian 
Patent Agent Exam” (2017) 99:2 J Pat & Trademark Off Soc’y 1 at 35.  Pass scores for patent agent qualifying 
examinations in the majority of comparable jurisdictions around the world are set at a hard 50/100, with no carry-over 
limits and opportunities for individuals scoring over 50/100 on certain exams to shift marks to other lower scoring 
exams (known as a compensable pass).  With respect to the EQE, the pass score is 50/100, although the marking 
criteria allows for ‘compensable pass’ in some circumstances where candidates score between 40-50/100 on one or 
more of the EQEs. 
16 Wissam Aoun, “Canadian Patent Agent Regulation Reform (Part 2)- Governance, Self-Regulation and Canada’s 
Patent Professional Identity Crisis” (2017) 99:3 J Pat & Trademark Off Soc’y 388 at fn 156 [Aoun].  See also, 
Intellectual Property Institute of Canada,  Consultation: A Governance Framework for IP Agents Part 2: Governance 
Model; Submission to Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada By the Intellectual Property Institute of 
Canada, available online: < https://www.ipic.ca/english/submissions/view/183/governance-framework-for-intellectual-
property-agents.html> at 6 [IPIC].  See also, Adam Kingsley, “Importance of IP agents to innovation ecosystem”, (The 
Hill Times, June 12, 2017) at 17. “Presently, the Canadian Intellectual Property Office, with assistance from the 
profession’s association, the Intellectual Property Institute of Canada (IPIC), administers one of Canada’s most 
rigorous qualification exams, in order to ensure a profession that continuously exceeds expectations.” 
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examination, many from within the profession are openly hostile towards those who 
speak out in favour of reform.17 
The foregoing information and statistics would likely create one or more 
impressions upon an objective reviewer with no previous experience in patent practice or 
knowledge of the patent agency regulatory framework.  Given the extremely low pass 
rates, one would likely assume that patent agency is an extremely challenging field of 
practice, involving tremendous skill and serious repercussions for malpractice, and as 
such, few individuals are able to successfully master the necessary competencies.  One 
might also consider whether certain validation issues have crept into the licensing 
process, thereby contributing to the poor pass rates.  Or, some may simply believe that 
this is a matter of gatekeeping, and that incumbent practitioners are using this licensing 
process to limit supply of practitioners and maintain a healthy market for their services. 
As the following will demonstrate, all the above-referenced factors are at least 
partially involved.  However, none of these issues, either in isolation or combination, 
paints a complete picture.  The circumstances at play in Canadian patent agent regulation 
touch on far more profound issues, cutting to the heart of the patent system itself and the 
role it plays in our society.  
  
                                                           
17 Ibid at 419, fn 151. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORIES OF REGULATION 
2.1 THEORIES OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 
Any discussion of Canadian patent agent licensing must begin with a background 
discussion on licensing generally.  Why do we restrict individual liberty to practice 
certain occupations?  What is the purpose, or purposes, of licensing?  What is the purpose 
of licensing examinations? 
Michael Kane provides one of the most succinct and accurate descriptions of the 
rationale for professional licensing.  According to Kane, professional licensing serves:  
to protect the public by ensuring that candidates who are admitted to 
practice in a profession have met certain basic qualifications... 
Licensure is not intended to provide a guarantee of excellent 
performance, nor does it claim to predict how well candidates will 
perform if admitted to practice. Rather, it certifies that new practitioners 
have met the basic requirements that are designed to provide the public 
with some assurance that they are qualified to practice.18 
Several important points can be derived from Kane’s definition of the purpose of 
professional licensing.  Primarily, licensing is not and should not attempt to serve as a 
guarantor of successful practice, rather, the emphasis is minimal competence within a 
field of practice.  Licensing fundamentally impinges on individual liberty and as such, 
should be approached with some apprehension.  Furthermore, restricting entry-to-practice 
within a given field invariably imposes costs on the public, including increased fees due 
to supply-restriction and potential reduction in access to services.  Accordingly, the 
purpose of licensing should be as minimal regulatory intrusion as necessary to protect the 
public from the risk of loss associated with incompetent practice.   
From a market regulation perspective, licensing serves to reduce market failures 
associated with asymmetry of information.  In various fields of service, consumers lack 
the knowledge to assess practitioner quality in the marketplace, and as such, could easily 
fall victim to incompetent practitioners offer their service for gain.  Thus, licensing 
                                                           
18 Michael T. Kane, “Reflections on Bar Examining”, (2009) The Bar Examiner November at 6, available online: < 
http://www.ncbex.org/assets/media_files/Bar-Examiner/articles/2009/780409_Kane.pdf>. 
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ensures that all practitioners possess a minimum threshold of competence to practice 
within a given field, in order to reduce problems associated with asymmetry of 
information between providers and consumers. 
It is important to reiterate that the focus of licensing must be minimal, entry-level 
competence- the level of competence sufficient to prevent harm to the public.  Licensing 
is not employment testing, where an employer may individually decide what skills and 
competencies are required for successful performance of a job, and, subject to certain 
legal restrictions, go about testing as the employer sees fit.  It is highly-debatable whether 
licensing examinations could develop an objective definition for ‘successful practice’ 
within a given field and then develop fair, standardized criteria for measuring it.19 
The challenge with any debate surrounding the necessity of licensing intervention 
is that it is extremely challenging to measure costs and benefits associated with licensing.   
As such, these debates often remain abstract, without any data to support one side or the 
other on a specific licensing debate.20  However, given the social costs of licensing and 
the impact on individual liberty, economists and psychometricians generally take an 
apprehensive approach to mitigate against the potentially harmful social consequences of 
licensing regulation.  Many experts believe that occupational licensing schemes should be 
disfavored when the presence of market failures is unclear, given that licensing almost 
always produces social costs but only occasionally produces social benefits.21 
Licensing can come in many different forms, and while licensing in the public 
interest may not be controversial, the question of form of licensing may be subject to 
debate.22 For example, licensing may require completion of an accredited educational 
component, licensing examinations, continuing education or any combination thereof.  
Furthermore, the subject matter of exclusion is also variable.  Licensing may legislatively 
                                                           
19  American Educational Research Association, American Psychological Association, National Council on 
Measurement in Education, Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing, [AERA] (Washington: American 
Educational Research Association, 2014) at 178. 
20 William Hubbard, “Razing the Patent Bar” (2017) 59 Ariz L Rev 383 at 396. 
21 Ibid at 397. 
22 Nuno Garoupa, “Regulation of Professions”, in David Levi-Faur (ed.), Handbook on the Politics of Regulation 
(Northampton: Edgar Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2011) at 454-5. 
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define a scope of practice and grant a regulatory body authority to police against 
unauthorized practice by unlicensed individuals.  In contrast, certification models allow 
anyone, licensed or otherwise, to practice within a given field, but restrict use of a 
specific professional title to those who have met specific qualifications. 
Based on the foregoing, licensing can be strongly justified in circumstances where 
the risk of loss due to incompetence is catastrophic, such as loss of life.  Fields such as 
medicine involving significant risk to individual health and/or safety are stringently 
regulated.  Furthermore, strict licensing requirements are justifiable in activities involving 
significant potential external damages to the public, such as public health crises or public 
harm caused by poorly engineered structures.  However, matters involving personal 
property or matters of contract, involving asymmetries of information without significant 
externalities, may be best addressed through certification schemes.  This provides quality 
cues to consumers in the market, while still respecting individual liberty, consumer 
choice and minimizing unnecessary social costs associated with reduced supply of 
service providers.   
Where possible, any different mix of licensing options can be balanced in order to 
best achieve the desired outcome and reduce unnecessary social costs.  For example, the 
accounting, has moved to a mixed certification/licensing model, wherein services having 
no substantial externalities, such as bookkeeping and personal tax accounting, have been 
completely deregulated, and activities involving significant externalities, such as auditing 
of publicly traded companies, are reserved for individuals with certain designations.23  
Furthermore, the accounting profession utilizes a mixed certification model, with 
competing designations (such as CA, CPA and CGA) to further maximize consumer 
choice while minimizing information asymmetries. 
Examination and testing are key elements of many licensing frameworks.  
According to psychometricians, experts in the field of testing sciences, the key to exam 
setting in the licensing context is validation.  For a licensing examination to be valid, the 
                                                           
23 United States of America, Federal Trade Commission, The Costs and Benefits of Occupational Regulation (report 
prepared by Carolyn Cox, Susan Foster ) (Washington, Federal Trade Commission, 1990) < 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/costs-benefits-occupational-regulation/cox_foster_-
_occupational_licensing.pdf> at 43-6 (accessed on July 2, 2018). 
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examination setter(s) must first set the content domain, namely, the knowledge and skills 
indicative of entry-level competence within a given field.  Psychometric approaches to 
content validation have changed considerably over the years,24 but at least several 
identifiable best practices exist.  To avoid perceptions of arbitrariness, the entire process 
should be sound, well-documented, and based on unbiased evidence.25  While subject 
matter expertise is certainly important, care should be taken to ensure that standard 
setting processes are not biased due to over-representation of professional opinions. 
Content validation may be jeopardized if the content of a licensing examination places 
too much emphasis on irrelevant content, including peculiar testing formats and 
inappropriate distribution of mark weighting across tested content.26 
Validation of an examination is a question of interpretation.  A valid examination 
is one that supports the interpretation that one who scores over the pass score is 
minimally competent and one who fails lacks minimal competence. To support 
validation, demonstrable evidence linking the inferences and assumptions underlying this 
interpretive argument is required, including evidence refuting any counter-arguments 
potentially undermining the accuracy of the proposed interpretation.27 
The interpretive argument supporting licensing examination validation depends 
both on content and construct validation.  With respect to construct validity, “Issues such 
as poorly constructed questions (allowing guessing or permitting ambiguity), 
testwiseness, test duration, unreasonable or indefensible pass score and other 
irregularities not directly tied to entry-level practice introduce serious validity issues into 
the examination process, making it more likely that examinees who have mastered the 
content domain might fail the examination due to these factors which are irrelevant to 
questions of competence.”28 
                                                           
24 Benjamin Michael Superfine, “At the Intersection of Law And Psychometrics: Explaining the Validity Clause of No 
Child Left Behind” (2004) 33 J L & Educ 475 at 476-7. 
25 Michael Kane, “Validating the Performance Standards Associated With Passing Scores”, (1994) 64:3 Review of 
Educational Research at 437. 
26 Supra note 15 at 7. 
27 Supra note 25 at 432. 
28 Supra note 15 at 7. 
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2.2 CANADIAN HISTORY OF SELF-REGULATION AND THE PITFALLS OF ‘PUBLIC 
INTEREST’ 
The professions have always held a unique place in civil society.  Some view 
professions as forming one of four essential pillars to social order- the other three being 
community, state and the market.29  Much like public regulatory mechanisms, self-
regulation is based on the premise that the regulated professional activity suffers from 
some form of market failure, and in the case of professions, externalities and/or 
information asymmetries.30  Furthermore, typical private law mechanisms (such as the 
freedom to contract, tort, etc.) are inadequate to correct the market failure.31   
However, the justification for self-regulation over typical public regulation is that 
“self-regulation is a better (cheaper) method of solving the problem than conventional 
public regulation.”32  The foregoing are the two leading, and occasionally, competing, 
theories of self-regulation- the ‘bottom-up’, ‘self-regulation bargain’ theory, where 
professionals are granted privileges in return for acting in the public interest (which is 
entirely served by quality assurance) and the ‘top-down’ theory that professions are a 
way for government to extend governance to certain social areas (i.e. health, justice, 
finance) without using state resources (because self-regulation is self-funded).33   
Since at least the mid-Twentieth century, Canada has adopted a strict adherence to 
the top-down theory of self-regulation.  As stated in the Royal Commission Inquiry into 
Civil Rights: 
The granting of self-government is a delegation of legislative and 
judicial functions and can only be justified as a safeguard to the public 
interest. The power is not conferred to give or reinforce a professional 
or occupational status. The relevant question is not, "do the 
practitioners of this occupation desire the power of self-government?", 
but "is self-government necessary for the protection of the public?" No 
                                                           
29 Tracy L. Adams, “Professional Self-Regulation and the Public Interest in Canada” (2016) 6(3) Professions and 
Professionalism, available online: < https://doi.org/10.7577/pp.1587> at 3. 
30 Anthony Ogus, “Rethinking Self-Regulation” (1995) 15:1 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 97 at 97. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. 
33  Tracy L. Adams, “Self-regulating Professions: Past, Present, Future” (2017) 4:1 Journal of Professions and 
Organization 70 at 72. 
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right of self-government should be claimed merely because the term 
"profession" has been attached to the occupation.  The power of self-
government should not be extended beyond the present limitations, 
unless it is clearly established that the public interest demands it.34 
(emphasis added) 
The discussion of professional licensing and self-regulation raises several 
important, and possibly conflicting, concepts which underlie professional self-regulation, 
namely, professional expertise, professional self-interest and the ‘public interest’.  From 
the initial days of self-regulation in Canada, the earliest statutory enactments defined 
public interest statements primarily in terms of practitioner qualifications.35  Yet this 
alone tells us little about “how, when and why the [Canadian] government legislated 
professionals”, as well as “state-profession relations and professional expertise 
historically.”36 
Examining the earliest Canadian ‘professional regulation’ legislation in Ontario, 
including a plethora of Private Bills for entry into various professions, Tracy Adams 
states that “it is not entirely clear that, in regulating professions, the Ontario legislature 
sought to regulate expertise.”37 (emphasis added) Adams states: 
For instance, occupations such as dentistry and medicine were regulated 
long before their expertise was widely accepted. As noted, the 1869 
medical legislation regulated not only regular practitioners, but 
homeopathic and eclectic medical doctors as well. Hence, the Ontario 
legislature regulated medicine, even without any clear consensus over 
what precisely constituted medical expertise… The provincial 
government’s willingness to legislate for petitioners… who could not 
meet professional education standards, further casts doubt on Ontario 
politicians’ faith in professional expertise – at least, as it was defined by 
professionals themselves.38 (emphasis added) 
Adams arrives at this conclusion through a detailed examination of Private Bills 
during the 1868-1914 era.  During this period, it was not uncommon for individuals to 
                                                           
34 Ontario, Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights, Report Number One, vol 3 (Toronto: Queen’s Printer for 
Ontario, 1968) at 1162. 
35 Supra note 29 at 5. 
36 Tracy L. Adams, “Legislating Professionals: Private Member Bills for Entry to Practice Professions in Ontario, 
1868-1914” (2005) 18:3 Journal of Historical Sociology 172 at 174. 
37 Ibid at 177. 
38 Ibid. 
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petition legislature for exemption from certain professional licensing requirements and 
entry into a profession.  Legislative debates regarding such Private Bills demonstrates 
that members of the legislative assembly were apprehensive about the authority of self-
regulated professional bodies to govern entry to professions- “the feeling of the country 
was against a close corporation like the Law Society having such powers as they had 
enjoyed, instead of leaving the power in the House.”39  While there certainly was debate 
and disagreement regarding the role of professional bodies in governing entry, members 
of the legislative assembly felt that they had a right to legislate professionals directly, 
“having a responsibility to get involved” despite the authority granted to professional 
bodies.40 
This is not to say that members of the legislature were not concerned with 
maintaining levels of competence; in fact, when granting individual requests for entry to 
a profession by way of Private Bill, the number one factor considered by the legislature 
was professional competence.41  However, the legislature was willing to exercise 
flexibility in recognition of competence, waiving formal professional requirements (such 
as apprenticeship period, formal education or professional licensing examinations) for 
individuals who could demonstrate that they were competent.42   
Another factor of key importance in deciding whether to grant an exemption was 
on the grounds of public interest.  The legislature was often prepared to waive entry 
requirements in circumstances where practitioners intended to provide service to under-
serviced areas.43  The Ontario legislature, much like legislatures of other provinces, 
viewed its role, and the role of regulating professional practice, as a political balancing 
act.  With respect to competence, legislatures viewed competence-based entry 
requirements largely as an attempt to protect the public from ‘quacks’.44  But legislatures 
                                                           
39 Ibid at 188. 
40 Ibid.  Furthermore, Adams states at 193 that “In passing individual professional legislation during this era, the 
legislature ultimately showed little interest in undermining professional authority. Nevertheless, its actions did 
implicitly challenge professional organizations’ claims to be the sole judge of competence.” 
41 Ibid at 190. 
42 Ibid at 189.  
43 Ibid at 190-1. 
44 Supra note 29 at 6. 
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were also aware that this threshold could quickly transform into an unnecessary barrier 
that would curtail public access to service, the individual citizen’s freedom to practice 
and consumer choice.45  
In carrying out its political balancing act, the Ontario legislature, when 
considering Private Bills for waiving professional entrance requirements, was largely 
influenced by opposition and/or support for such Bills.  Where there was no opposition, 
such Bills would often pass smoothly through the legislature.46  Professional opposition, 
on the part of professional licensing bodies, was often effective at curtailing such Private 
Bills.47  In some circumstances, the legislature considered both professional opposition 
by professional bodies as well as community support from members of under-serviced 
communities, and in such circumstances, the legislature was willing to pass legislation 
despite professional opposition.48 
The Ontario legislature’s perception of professional bodies’ authority over 
professional competence was ambivalent at best.49  There was undoubtedly concern for 
maintaining professional competence, but such concerns were easily tempered by public 
interest concerns such as access to services and respect for personal autonomy.  
Furthermore, the legislature bended quite easily in favour of, or against, Private Bills 
requesting waivers of entry-requirements based on public support or professional 
opposition respectively. 
However, beginning in the early 20th century, division regarding the benefits and 
intentions of self-regulation began to manifest itself.  According to Adams, “in the 
opening decades of the twentieth century, MPPs became more accepting of professional 
autonomy and professional bodies’ rights to regulate professional practice and 
expertise.”50  Although it is not entirely clear how or why this shift began to take place, 
                                                           
45 Ibid. 
46 Supra note 36 at 190-1. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid at 193-4. 
50 Ibid. 
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several factors could have been relevant.  Primarily, the legislature did begin to recognize 
that a principled approach, rather than an ad hoc approach, to professional competence 
was required, a position vociferously advocated by professional bodies.51  Furthermore, 
the legislature was at best ambivalent regarding professional licensing, and as such, could 
be persuaded in one direction of the other.  Accordingly, with time and increased pressure 
from professional bodies, “politicians increasingly came to accept professional leaders’ 
claims that formal education and established requirements were essential to professional 
competence, expertise, and safe professional practice.”52 
Throughout the early-to-mid 20th century, Canadian regulators were regularly 
convinced that “gains for professionals and their clientele were sufficient for the 
legislature to regulate the field.”53  In some instances, despite vocal opposition, self-
regulatory legislation passed referencing only entry qualifications with no mention of 
public interest.54  In this era, it seems that protection of the professional market was 
sufficient to justify regulation: 
By and large, from the 1860s through the 1950s, most legislation 
establishing self-regulating professions was viewed as being in the 
public interest, because it raised the quality of services provided. Here, 
the public interest was defined primarily in terms of practitioner 
qualifications, so the public’s interest and professionals’ interests were 
seen to go hand-in-hand.55 
For much of the above-referenced period, enabling legislation for self-regulated 
professions defined ‘public interest’ primarily in terms of practitioner qualifications.56  
                                                           
51 Ibid at 189. 
52 Ibid.  Adams states at 177-178: “When passing private bills granting Ontario claimants the right to circumvent 
professional bodies’ requirements for practice, members of provincial parliament appear to have considered themselves 
valid judges of competence and expertise – despite professional bodies’ assertion that only they could adequately judge 
ability. The decline in such legislation in the early twentieth century appears to reflect greater acceptance of 
professional authority and expertise.” 
53 Supra note 29 at 7. 
54 Ibid at 6.  Adams cites the example of 1920’s legislation for the regulation of engineers.  Mining companies, as well 
as the British Columbia Premier, were vocal in their opposition to such legislation, stating that it could prevent the 
“non-professional man… from gaining a living.  According to Adams, “In the end, the bill passed, with a preamble 
stating simply that the engineers had requested that “qualifications be established” and the legislature found it 
“expedient to grant that prayer”. 
55 Ibid at 7. 
56 Ibid at 5. 
 23 
 
Yet once again, beginning in the 1960’s, the Canadian discourse shifted, with legislators 
and policy advisors becoming apprehensive about professionals’ ability to put the 
public’s interest above their own, as well as the definition of public interest expanding 
past the all-encompassing obsession with practitioner competence to include 
considerations such as efficiency, competition and costs.57  Public distrust of self-
regulation led to views that professionals could only be trusted to serve the public interest 
“as long as there were “effective mechanisms” in place for accountability and 
supervision”.58   
Based on a thorough review of commission reports, policy papers, legislative 
debates and legislation, Adams states that between the 1960’s and 1990’s, the definition 
of public interest shifted significantly.59  According to Adams: 
In this new usage of the term public interest, there is a blending of old 
and new meanings. The term appears to retain its meaning respecting 
public safety. Consumer choice and access are still mentioned as 
concerns especially in health professional regulation. However, these 
goals are balanced with a concern for efficiency, flexibility, and 
business growth. Service quality is not entirely forgotten, but it is not 
central to discussions and debates either. Practitioner qualifications are 
portrayed as barriers, more than as standards that protect the public.60 
Adams draws several conclusions regarding the role of self-regulation in 
Canadian society.  Professions were, at least originally, viewed as part of the state 
apparatus, enjoying some level of autonomy yet still being linked to the legislature.61  
                                                           
57 Ibid at 7.  For example, in 1970, the Ontario Committee on the Healing Arts conducts a study of the province’s 
health professions.  In characterizing a ‘sound and socially acceptable health system’ as including “quality services 
(protecting the public against the incompetent), accessibility, co-ordination of services, flexibility, economy, 
complementarity of services, and “a maximum degree of freedom of choice consistent with public safety””, the 
Committee highlighted that while the public’s interest in health care was served by self-regulation’s ensuring of 
practitioner competence, “it was not economical or efficient, and there were problems with accessibility, co- ordination, 
flexibility, and complementarity.” 
58 Ibid at 8.  Also, at 9, more policy reports and commissions were providing harsh criticisms of the overlapping role of 
professional associations, which promoted professional interests, and professional regulators bodies, which promoted 
the public’s interest, demanding a clearer separation between the two. 
59 Ibid at 9.   Also, at 10: “Overall, we can see that from the 1960s to the 1990s, policy advisers and provincial leaders 
supported professional self-regulation, but they argued that professions needed greater oversight to ensure that they 
acted in the public interest. Although not every commission formally defined the public interest, there was continued 
the emphasis on service quality and consumer choice, and new emphasis on fairness, efficiency, accountability, and 
cost.” 
60 Ibid at 10. 
61 Supra note 36 at 193-4. 
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This is evident in the fact that legislatures were willing to grant professional bodies 
authority to establish entry-to-practice qualifications, while maintaining the right to 
intervene when the legislature felt that doing so best served the public interest.  However, 
beginning in the early 20th century, professional bodies acquired greater autonomy and 
separation from the state, including greater authority over regulation of practice and 
professional expertise.62 
Adams further states that “while reliance on professional expertise may have been 
a factor early in the twentieth century, it was not likely the central factor in the nineteenth 
century, and similarly may be less central to professional regulation today.”63  Adams 
concludes by suggesting that in Canada, the predominant theory that self-regulated 
professions’ inability to serve the public has historically led to regulatory change may not 
be entirely precise.  Rather, Adams suggests that the converse may be more accurate- 
“that regulatory change is actually linked to changing conceptualizations of the public 
interest.  When professions’ interests and the public interest were viewed as compatible, 
granting professions self-regulation and considerable autonomy made sense.”64 
With respect to professional competency and entry-to-practice requirements, a 
disjuncture has been created by changing perceptions of what ‘public interest’ entails.  
According to Adams, professional associations have paraded around claims to expertise 
and moral authority, along with passing references to ‘public interest’ tucked into 
legislative preambles, in attempts to win over the public and the state in the goal of 
justifying self-regulation.  But this is not necessarily the same as fulfilling social 
obligations.65  This leads to a situation where professionals do not necessarily respond to 
client needs or self-govern based on accurate reflections of what public interest demands, 
                                                           
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Supra note 29 at 11- “An emphasis on open markets and competition does not appear to be compatible with 
professional self-regulation. Thus, this analysis suggests, it is not so much professions’ inability to serve the public 
interest, but the changing definition of the public interest away from service quality and towards open competition and 
cost reduction, that contributes to the decline of self-regulating professions.” 
65 Ibid at 2. 
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rather, they define and use their professional knowledge guided by a transcendent value 
system as to when and how that knowledge should be employed.66  
Yet despite the foregoing, Canada remains “the last bastion of unfettered self-
regulation” in the world.67  Rising professional fees, professional scandals and 
misconduct have provoked large scale restructuring of professional self-regulation in the 
U.K.68  Soon after the U.K. self-regulation reformation began, Australia followed suit.69 
Professions in the U.K. and Australia are now best described as being co-regulated, rather 
than self-regulated, and professional licensing bodies are now dominated by ‘non-
professional’ members, largely made up of consumers.70 Although similar cracks in the 
self-regulatory political structure have emerged in the North American context, North 
America has not only managed to weather the self-regulatory storm, in fact, it appears 
that the number of self-regulating professions in the U.S. and Canada has been 
increasing.71 
There are number of reasons why the same movements that led to self-regulatory 
reform in the U.K. and Australia have not taken hold in North America. One key 
difference is that professional self-regulation is typically governed at a regional level (i.e. 
State/Province) in North America as opposed to predominantly Federal self-regulation in 
the U.K and Australia.72  The difficulty in policing large numbers of practitioners, spread 
out over an entire country, and attempting to do so with very limited resources, proved to 
be unmanageable for many federally self-regulated professions in the U.K and Australia.  
The U.K.’s system of individual, rather than firm level, regulation, created 
significant governance challenges in addressing the rise of transnational law firms.73 In 
addition to the jurisdictional challenges associated with regulating practice conduct, these 
                                                           
66 Ibid at 3. 
67 Wooley, supra note 1. 
68 Adams, supra note 29 at 1. 
69 Aoun, supra note 16 at 396. 
70 Adams, supra note 33 at 80. 
71 Ibid at 83. 
72 Ibid at 82. 
73 Ibid at 78. 
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transnational law firms exhibit signs of ‘client capture’, a phenomenon where 
transnational law firms predominantly service large, multi-national corporations rather 
than smaller, local clients.  Professionals working under the yoke of client capture are 
“pressured to put the needs of their clients and/or the interests of those individuals in a 
client organization with whom they work closely, ahead of the public interest or 
professional ethics”.74  According to Adams, “even when professionals attempt to resist 
these pressures, and exercise discretionary judgement, their ability to do so without 
encountering resistance and potentially damaging their careers may be limited.”75 
Another distinguishing factor between the UK and Canada is the perception of 
institutional bias in UK regulatory bodies.  As Adams states: 
Traditionally in the UK, some professions’ regulatory bodies were also 
their advocacy bodies. In contrast, advocacy and regulatory duties were 
typically separated in the USA. In Canada, regulatory traditions have 
varied across province, but a separation of advocacy and regulatory 
bodies was historically present, and has been the trend over time. Self-
regulatory professional bodies in the USA and Canada still face charges 
that they subordinate the public interest to professional interests, but 
they may be better able to resist these criticisms. In some UK 
professions, such as law, professional bodies carried on both advocacy 
and regulatory duties; when challenged, they could not convincingly 
deny their self-interest since that was long a core part of their 
organizational mission.76 
Professional unity has also been a key contributor to the ability of Canadian 
professions to maintain their self-regulatory monopoly.  In contrast, in the U.K., the 
professional landscape has historically been characterized by a multiplicity of 
overlapping, and competing, professional bodies (for example, barristers and solicitors).  
As professional unity is an important political element in maintaining self-regulatory 
privileges, the lack of such unity in the U.K. political landscape has contributed to self-
regulatory decline.77 
                                                           
74 Ibid. 
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76 Ibid at 82-3. 
77 Ibid at 83. 
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This is not to say that these same factors have not started to appear in Canada.  
Self-regulatory bodies continue to be dominated by professionals, and when there is 
‘public representation’ on such boards, it is typically far less than a majority.  Both U.S. 
and Canadian self-regulatory bodies have struggled with lack of resources, which has 
caused an inability to effectively regulate practitioner conduct.78 Recent studies 
demonstrate that client capture is also a problem for the Canadian legal profession.79  
Furthermore, Canada has had to tackle the issue of institutional bias due to self-regulation 
and representational advocacy, a problem now affecting the patent agent profession.80 
2.3 PUBLIC CHOICE THEORY, REGULATORY CAPTURE AND SELF-REGULATION 
Regulatory capture is quite possibly one of the most used concepts in social, 
economic, political and legal scholarship, despite being one of the most imprecisely 
defined.  A plethora of different activities are often associated with the term ‘regulatory 
capture’, including: special interest groups using their influence to shape regulation; 
diluting of regulation through amendments; repeal of existing regulation to suit special 
interest groups; manipulation of regulators; and weakened enforcement of existing 
regulatory standards.81  To put it simply, regulatory capture refers to a situation where a 
regulatory body is, over time, influenced to prefer the interests of the regulated over its 
broader public interest mandate, and exercises decision making which benefits the 
interests of the regulated as opposed to the public’s interest.    
There are several reasons to believe that self-regulation is largely the result of 
professionals’ self-interest as opposed to serving the public’s interest, and as such, a form 
of regulatory capture.  It is almost always professionals themselves, rather than the 
                                                           
78  Ibid at 76. (Adams provides the example of medical self-regulation in the U.S.: “Studies of the US medical 
profession in the 1970s similarly criticized regulatory bodies for not responding to consumer concerns (Grad and Marti, 
1979). State medical boards tended to be small and ‘honorific’—senior, professionally active members were nominated 
to fulfil these roles for which they were not paid. Although these boards appeared fairly successful in regulating entry 
to practice, they were too small and underfunded to regulate the professional conduct of tens of thousands of 
practitioners and respond effectively and efficiently to consumer complaints (Grad and Marti, 1979). During this era 
several reforms were introduced, including recertification for professionals, periodic reviews of regulatory boards’ 
effectiveness, and the addition of non- professionals to those boards (Rubin 1980). The result was greater state and 
public oversight of professional activity.”) 
79 Ibid at 80. 
80 Supra note 29 at 17. 
81 Mark Lokanan, “Regulatory Capture of Regulators: The Case of the Investment Dealers Association of Canada” 
(2017) IJ Public Administration 1 at 1. 
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public, who lobby for self-regulation.82 If the licensing intervention is intended to protect 
the public, would we not expect the public to be lobbying for licensing standards?  
Furthermore, if professional licensing supposedly corresponds with a minimal level of 
professional competence within a given field, then why does so much disparity exist 
across jurisdictions with respect to the same profession?83 
Furthermore, tight-knit, highly-focused special interest groups are often most 
successful at capturing regulators.84  This is especially true in consumer protection 
industries, where consumer organization is challenging, and consumer costs are small 
relative to industry gains and spread out across large market segments.85  As discussed 
under Chapter 2.1, professional licensing is in essence consumer protection legislation, as 
professional licensing is often justified on the basis of asymmetry of information between 
practitioners and consumers.86   
Taking a step back from self-regulation and capture, it is important to first 
consider what regulatory capture means.  Although seemingly straightforward, the above-
referenced formulation of regulatory capture is wrought with uncertainty and ambiguity.  
Primarily, should every shift away from public interest and towards industry or 
professional interests be considered ‘capture’?  What about alternative mechanisms 
which may cause regulators to shift over time, most notably, bureaucratic drift?87   
Posner, citing Bernstein, supports the idea that many regulatory agencies undergo a 
typical ‘lifecycle’ culminating with agency maturity, which in many instances results in 
agency policy becoming largely aligned with the interests of the regulated: 
                                                           
82 Paul J. Larkin, “Public Choice Theory and Occupational Licensing” (2016) 39 Harv J L & Pub Pol’y 209 at 226. 
83 Ibid at 219-220.   
84 Garoupa, supra note 22 at 456. “The most successful groups in obtaining wealth transfers are likely to be small, 
usually single issue oriented and extremely well organized.  On the other side, those who bear the cost of paying rents 
are large fractions of the population, difficult to organize and with information problems.  When these conditions are 
met, wealth transfers are expected to take place from the public as a whole to the very-well organized interest groups.” 
85 Rachel E. Barkow, “Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design” (2010) 89 Tex L Rev 15 
at 65. 
86 Blevins, supra note 2 at 853. 
87  Daniel Carpenter, “Detecting and Measuring Capture” in Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds, Preventing 
Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It, revised ed, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Book Press, 2013) at 62-3.  
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perhaps the most marked development in a mature commission is the 
growth of a passivity that borders on apathy. There is a desire to avoid 
conflicts and to enjoy good relations with the regulated groups…. the 
period of maturity culminates in the commission’s surrender to the 
regulated… The commission finally becomes a captive of the regulated 
groups.88 
It is debatable whether such circumstances of ‘bureaucratic apathy’ can correctly 
imply ‘capture’.  Rather, according to Posner, “the deflection of an agency from its 
original goals may accompany the natural tendency of an institution to bureaucratization, 
but it is not entailed by it.”89 
Furthermore, how does one define ‘public’ versus ‘industry’ interests?  One of the 
most immediate questions facing one seeks to allege that regulatory decision-making has 
been captured is how does one know, or presume to know, what public welfare actually 
is?90  This uncertainty is a critical issue for any such ‘regulatory capture’ analysis. 
Daniel Carpenter states that several generations of regulatory capture research 
have provided rather unsatisfactory definitions of what capture is and actual evidence of 
when capture has taken place, challenging those who allege the existence of capture to 
point concretely at the mechanisms by which capture might operate.91  The lack of rigor 
in defining a precise definition (or definitions) for capture runs the risk of generating 
allegations of capture by any party that disagrees with the regulatory decisions made by a 
legislator or agency.92  
Carpenter makes an important distinction between statutory capture, wherein 
regulations sway interest in favour of a special interest group prior to any administrator 
action, and ‘agency capture’, wherein “certain goals are expressed in legislation but 
where the achievement of these goals is distorted, corrupted, watered down or otherwise 
                                                           
88 Marver H. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1955) at 
87-88, 90; Richard A. Posner, "The Concept of Regulatory Capture: A Short, Inglorious History" in Carpenter & Moss, 
supra note 87 at 50. 
89 Ibid at p. 51. 
90 Carpenter, supra note 87 at 60. 
91 Ibid at 57. 
92 Ibid at 64. 
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turned into an industries advantage.”93  As discussed below, this distinction becomes 
significant when analyzing capture from a legal, rather than political or economic 
perspective.  
Statutory capture can be considered the byproduct of public choice theory, an 
economic theory that attempts to define political processes and outcomes as the product 
of economic interests and incentives.  Put simply, public choice theory assumes that all 
humans, are, more or less, motivated by individual self-interest and respond to individual 
incentives.94  From a political perspective, public choice theory assumes that individual 
legislators are primarily motivated by self-interest as opposed to the public interest.95 
Morriss and Nard summarize the basic tenets of public choice theory succinctly: 
The basic public choice insights concerning legislation are deceptively 
simple: small, homogenous organized interest groups have an 
advantage in the political competition to obtain benefits and avoid costs 
because they offer politicians a ready source of both votes and the 
money necessary to obtain votes. The smaller and more homogenous 
the interest group, the less costly it is to organize. As even the most 
publicly-spirited politician cannot advance the public interest without 
being in office, politicians are inevitably drawn to aid interest groups in 
pursuit of the votes and money the interest groups can provide. The 
result is that the political process tends to bestow benefits on 
concentrated interest groups while dispersing costs over the broadest 
possible population. The relatively small number of individuals in the 
interest group thus reaps large rewards while the relatively large 
number of individuals in the unorganized general public bears 
individually small, dispersed costs.96 
Public choice theory provides a powerful tool for predicting not only how self-
regulatory professions come to exist as a matter of professional self-interest disguised as 
public interest, but also predicts that such self-regulatory laws are incredibly resistant to 
reform.97  Tight-knit professional groups can organize and effectively lobby political 
                                                           
93 Ibid at 59. 
94 Andrew P. Morriss & Craig Allen Nard, “Institutional Choice & Interest Groups in The Development of American 
Patent Law: 1790-1870” (2011) 19 Sup Ct Econ Rev 143 at 145. 
95 Larkin, supra note 82 at 233-34. 
96 Morriss & Nard, supra note 94 at 193. 
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decision-makers, especially compared to the general public who may bear the social costs 
of professional licensing.  Furthermore, even after acquiring self-regulatory status, the 
political power encapsulated within self-regulatory bodies becomes far more 
concentrated than dispersed individual interests, allowing self-regulated professions to 
effectively maintain their self-regulated monopoly. Recent studies have demonstrated that 
an astonishingly low percentage of self-regulated professions across the U.S. have ever 
been deregulated.98 
Returning to our distinction between statutory versus regulatory capture, it is 
important to recognize the limits that this distinction places upon judicial review of 
regulatory behavior.  Despite the insight of public choice theory, as discussed below 
under Chapter 6.1(i), one of the basic principles of the law of judicial review of 
administrative action is judicial respect for the boundary between law and politics.  It is 
the proper function of the judiciary to uphold the rule of law, which in many cases 
revolves almost entirely around a self-regulatory body’s enabling legislation.  Thus, at 
least in principle, a line is drawn between the political activities of professional interest 
groups in lobbying and having self-regulatory legislation enacted, a line which the 
judiciary cannot cross, and the regulatory conduct of self-regulatory bodies pursuant to 
such legislation, which is properly within the scope of judicial review. 
Carpenter provides a definition of regulatory capture as “the result or process by 
which regulation [in law or application] is, at least partially by intent and action of the 
industry regulated, consistently or repeatedly directed away from a defeasible model of 
the public interest and toward the interests of the regulated industry.”99  To further 
                                                                                                                                                                              
that public choice theory predicts are most resistant to political reform.' While regulatory critics often invoke public 
choice too casually to oppose any regulation, the theory works well for occupational licensing. These laws provide 
concentrated tangible benefits to organized groups with resources, while the costs of these restrictions are diffused 
among the public as a whole.' Professional organizations also have the cohesion and the resources to lobby for 
favorable laws, to prevent reforms, and to provide information to policymakers.'  Under these conditions, occupational 
licensing laws would be extremely difficult to change through the political process alone.” See also Larkin, supra note 
82 at 225. “The Constitution makes the passage of legislation difficult, so, once enacted, laws do not fade away. Absent 
an expiration date, laws remain in effect until they are repealed or held unconstitutional, giving rise to what has been 
called "the tyranny of the status quo." Problems may be transient, but the statutes passed to remedy them may last 
forever.” 
98 Ibid at 869-70. 
99 Carpenter & Moss, supra note 87 at 60-1. 
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elaborate, Carpenter sets out the following analytic framework for making a case for, or 
against, the presence of agency capture: 
• There exists an identifiable “general interest” or “public interest”, or goal for 
which a regulation was created- the public interest is embodied in the people’s 
welfare; 
• There exists an identifiable interest our goal of the “industry” or “producers” an 
interest of dominant or particular firms, or a special interest group; 
• The people’s welfare and industry interests or special interest group interests 
conflict, in the sense that in applications of regulation or enforcement, the public 
interest for statutory obligations of the agency and the industry/special interest do 
not coincide; 
• There exists some mechanism of undue or disproportionate influence (hereby 
referred to a ‘capture mechanism’) whereby the industry attempts to induce the 
regulator to choose its interests over the people’s welfare; 
• Given a pattern in which the agencies statute and case evidence directs it to 
choose to people’s welfare over Industry interests, and given the capture 
mechanism, the agency nonetheless repeatedly chooses industry interests over 
public welfare- very important, Carpenter makes the point that at this stage in the 
analysis, one must consider that under the same conditions but in the absence of 
the capture mechanism the agency would choose public welfare repeatedly over 
industry interests.100 
Regarding ‘public interest’, one may stipulate explicitly what they believe public 
welfare to be based on any number of sources, including empirical evidence or well 
accepted theories.101  Furthermore, one could use evidence of public opinion based on 
voting patterns of democratically elected officials, but this approach may be jeopardized 
by special interest influence causing statutory capture.102  If certain fields are susceptible 
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101 Ibid. 
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to scientific analysis, such as areas involving public health or medicine, one could take a 
technocratic approach to determining public welfare.103 
Given that providing a precise definition of ‘public interest’ can be challenging, 
Carpenter suggests that the fallback option is acknowledging that one does not know 
what public welfare actually is, and as such, must look for capture procedurally.104  This 
procedural approach requires “(a) identifying the special interests involved and (b) 
examining those institutions and outcomes that would seem consistent with their having 
been advantaged.”105  This approach is the most empirically grounded- “we abandon any 
pretense of knowing the public interest and instead focus on ‘circumstance evidence’ 
consistent with a capture ‘story’.”106   
Carpenter adds that diagnoses of agency capture requires at least some evidence of 
intent.  In the circumstances of agency capture, this requires a demonstration of at least 
some active engagement on the part of the regulated to influence regulatory, that is 
causal in leading to regulation that is favourable towards the regulated as opposed to the 
public.107  Furthermore, what is most often missing from procedural analysis of capture is 
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Administration, “Agency Capture,” and Airline Security” (2002) 10 Am U J Gender Soc Pol'y & L 381 at 393.  Niles 
advocates for a similar approach, as regulatory capture is often no greater than the sum of the parts and is best 
pinpointed within a given set of facts and circumstances. According to Niles, a ‘smoking gun’ pointing directly to 
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none of these studies provide conclusive proof of the specific instances of capture discussed, (nor do many even claim 
to do so) they all provide similar and compelling evidence of regulatory activity that is completely consistent with the 
phenomenon. In all of these cases, we are presented with an agency that is given the authority to regulate a certain 
activity or set of activities and is consequently expected to have its regulatory decisions informed by its own 
articulation of the "public good." We then see evidence that the agency appears to be distracted from this public focus 
by the specific private interests of its regulated community, with its concentration shifting, instead, to these specific 
needs of the dominant private interest. So, while no "smoking gun" has been provided, and some plausible alternative 
explanations for the regulatory choices remain, we are left with the strong (and justifiable) suspicion that safer meat, 
guns, power plants, and a myriad of other public goods have been systematically sacrificed to the various relevant 
private interests, most often the profit motives of the industry representatives that wield the hyper-influence within 
agencies, by an array of agencies charged with the responsibility to regulate and control those interests.” 
107 Ibid at 62-3: “My argument is that, yes, valid capture diagnoses require intent. There must, somewhere, be an 
attempt to lobby, and attempts to offer an implicit bribe or implicit contract and attempt to stack the deck of an 
institutional process, or (as in cultural capture) an attempt to influence frames, assumptions, and worldviews of 
regulators or professionals involved in regulation. Causal and intentional action of industry is necessary because 
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evidence of the capture mechanism, by which the special interest in question can achieve 
its desired policy outcomes.108  
Accordingly, Carpenter concludes that a full diagnosis of agency capture needs: 
(a) to posit a defensible model of public interest, (b) to show action and 
intent by the regulated industry, and (c) to demonstrate that ultimate 
policy is shifted away from the public interest toward industry interest. 
If a capture analysis (whatever its conclusions) is lacking in one or 
more of these demonstrations, then the analyst must accordingly be 
circumspect about what he or she has shown.  To demonstrate all three 
of these conditions – preferably by a combination of quantitative and 
qualitative evidence in which various types of evidence corroborate one 
another – amounts to a gold standard of proof.109 
Carpenter’s ‘capture story’ is important conceptually as it remains open to non-
materialist forms of capture.  Traditional ‘materialist’ capture theories typically search for 
a ‘smoking gun’ in the form of a regulator placing their own, personal material self-
interest in conflict with their public duties.  One example includes the ‘revolving door’ 
between regulator and industry, where high-ranking regulatory officials are induced to 
follow industry promoting conduct with the incentive of high-salaried industry jobs upon 
departing the public sector.   
However, recent non-materialist theories of capture, such as cultural or epistemic 
capture, suggest that regulators may not necessarily be relegating the public’s interest to 
their own individual material self-interest or acting out of a maliciousness or fraud.  
Rather, prolonged proximity between regulator and regulated may create an environment 
where regulators unquestionably adopt the narrative of the regulated along with its 
presumptions regarding public welfare.  James Kwak cites the example of the 2008 
financial crises as an excellent case study of the phenomenon of cultural capture.  Prior to 
2008 financial collapse, four major regulators were responsible for oversight of the U.S. 
banking industry- the Federal Reserve, responsible for managing economic growth and 
                                                                                                                                                                              
“bureaucratic drift” stands always as an alternative mechanism for administrative capture.… In short, valid diagnosis 
ease of capture should be able to show that somewhere, the regulated industry was acting anyway so I asked to bring 
about the observed results”. 
108 Ibid at 61. 
109 Ibid at 63. 
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inflation; the FDIC, responsible for safeguarding its deposit insurance fund; the OCC, 
responsible for safety and soundness of banks; and the OTS, responsible for oversight of 
thrift.110  Prior to passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 and the creation of the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, none of these agencies had a primary mandate of 
protecting consumers.  According to Kwak, this was because regulators, having spent 
many years of close proximity to the regulated, identified with the predominant narrative 
of the regulated that consumers’ interests were best protected by free market competition, 
and as such, regulators viewed their public interest role as being ‘stewards of an efficient 
financial system.’111 
Similarly, epistemic capture occurs when a regulator develops a specific view of 
an issue resulting from the fact that relevant information is provided almost entirely by a 
distinctive group of people.  According to Cass Sunstein, there are concerns caused by 
such asymmetry of information, given that even the most well-intentioned of public 
officials may have their own perspective “shaped by the limited class of people to whom 
they are listening.”112  Such regulators “might be subject to epistemic capture in the sense 
that they will ultimately form a view that fits with what they learn from the particular 
people with whom they speak.”113   
The reality of epistemic capture may be particularly egregious within the self-
regulatory context, wherein insular groups of like-minded individuals are prone to move 
towards extreme positions on issues of professional interest.114 In these circumstances, 
“group members come to rely exclusively on one another to validate new information, 
and everything that they believe is a product of interactions within their enclaves.”115  
Although it may seem counter-intuitive, groups of confident, intelligent individuals may 
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be most susceptible to this phenomenon, with such groups moving to extreme positions 
regarding perceptions of fairness and issues that affect their sense of ‘group 
belongingness’.116  Such insular groups and the debate they foster have a natural built in 
rhetorical advantage in favour of those seeking higher penalties for breach of accepted 
group norms, and as such, may tend towards stringent protection of their group identity 
and insularity.117  Again, it is important to re-iterate that in many ways, these individuals 
are not engaged in a form of fraudulent or deceitful behavior, rather, many social utility 
justifications exist for why many individuals in these circumstances would behave in 
such fashion.118 
Carpenter points out two important research strategies, relevant to his analytic 
framework and identification of causal inferences in agency capture, which are of key 
significance to this study.  First, he advocates for clear demonstration of public interest 
versus industry interest, and “an empirical design that permits rejection of the hypothesis 
that both of these interests are served in a pattern of decisions.”119  Second, he advocates 
for a clear defining and understanding of the regulatory mechanisms of capture: 
if the idea is to improve and not to abandon regulation, then an 
understanding of the mechanisms of capture is critical. It is critical for 
combatting capture, and it is critical for the important work of 
implementing mechanisms that would induce regulators to proactively 
pursue their agency's statutory mission.120 [emphasis added] 
With respect to Carpenter’s first point, professional licensing presents a unique 
challenge for the analysis. In the example of professional licensing, from a conceptual 
perspective, the most basic professional self-interest, namely, pure market protection, in 
and of itself may justify the regulatory intervention.  Market protection is one of the 
means to the end of consumer protection, and as such, the profession’s interest in market 
protection and some level of economic protectionism is justified as a rational basis for 
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120 Ibid at 68. 
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serving the public’s interest.121  In order to expect that professionals will act in the best 
interests of their clients and not their own self-interest, they are afforded some level of 
market protection to mitigate against self-interest tendencies caused by excessive 
competition. As Garoupa states, “self-regulation is not necessarily a sign of rent-seeking. 
Professional regulatory bodies are consistent with public interest theory. Identifying rent-
seeking requires a more detailed analysis of the legal substance than just the legal 
form.”122 
With respect to Carpenter’s second point, as discussed below, the proposed 
capture mechanism in issue in this analysis is competency-based, entry-to-practice 
standards for Canadian patent agents. 
  
                                                           
121 See e.g. David E. Bernstein, “The Due Process Right to Pursue a Lawful Occupation: A Brighter Future Ahead” 
(2016) 126 Yale LJ F. 287 at 288 for a discussion of relevant cases. 
122 Nuno Garoupa, “Regulation of Professions in the US and Europe: A Comparative Analysis” (2004) Tex A&M U 
Sch L 1 at 8, online: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=640502>. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FROM ‘DEMOCRATIZED’ TO ‘PROFESSIONAL’ PATENT AGENCY 
3.1 THE HISTORY OF PATENT AGENT REGULATION 
3.1(i) The Early ‘Patent Agents’ 
The practice of patent agency, in both the U.K. and the U.S., dates to the early 
19th century days of the Industrial Revolution.  In the pre-regulation, Industrial 
Revolution era of patent agent practice, the patent agent profession lacked a discrete set 
of professional services forming the fabric of what could be called a professional identity.  
While preparation of patent specifications was undoubtedly the core of their business, 
their role as an ‘intermediary’ was far broader than just as solicitors of patents.  The 
patent agents of this era acted “as intermediaries between inventors, capitalists, 
innovators and other users of inventive output” which included a wide range of services 
including connecting inventors with manufacturers, brokering licensing deals and serving 
as general commercialization agents.123  Even from a strictly legal perspective, early 
patent agents accumulated a broad scope of legal knowledge and in addition to providing 
patent solicitation services, provided a range of commercial services across the legal 
spectrum.124 
                                                           
123  Harold Irvin Dutton, The Patent System and Inventive Activity During the Industrial Revolution 1750-1852 
(Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1984) at 93. “Patent agents were also in a position to advise inventors 
what to do with their inventions. Since they had close contact with a large number of manufacturers and capitalists, 
they often acted as brokers in the selling, licensing, assigning, and financing of patents. William Carpmael and Joseph 
Robertson introduced many inventors to manufacturers looking out for ways of improving efficiency, and John Farey 
reported to the 1835 select committee that he was frequently ‘consulted on the propriety of seeing interventions after a 
patent has been obtained… And the reason of that course having become very general with me of late years is that I 
have been chiefly employed by capitalists who have consulted me whether they should lay out their money in them. For 
many inventors, especially those without the requisite capital and those in the business of selling their inventive 
outputs, this service had an obvious advantage. It saves them the problem of finding financial support and the trouble of 
hocking their conventions around the various firms and protected them from exploitation by unscrupulous 
manufacturers….’ Users of inventions also benefited. Patent agents reduced search costs, and, since their judgment was 
well respected, manufacturers could be reasonably sure of investing their funds wisely. Patent agents would also 
advertise and promote the goods produced by inventors, contacting retailers, wholesalers and manufacturers to inform 
them of the latest developments.” 
124 “The popular notion of the duties and qualifications of a patent agent maybe shortly stated a thus: he is fully 
informed in respect to the law and practice of patents as exemplified by the judgments of the courts and the decisions of 
the law officers. He is conversant with the several copyright acts, and the mode of securing protection under the same. 
He is also familiar with the trademarks act and the practice under it, the merchandise marks act, the general acts 
relating to gas and water companies, and is competent to advise respecting the establishment of manufacturing and 
trading companies under the limited liability acts. He is necessarily familiar with all the manufacturers of this country, 
not to mention the various industrial exhibitions now so common in London, and the provinces and in foreign capitals. 
Moreover, he has traced the growth of the various branches of manufactures, from the earliest of their inception to the 
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One of the most important roles of the patent agents of this era was dissemination 
of knowledge.  The role of patent agents in contributing to the dissemination of inventive 
knowledge at the time of the early 19th century was a vital contributing force for the 
democratization of invention.  Patent literature was difficult to acquire, and the early 
patent agents obtained patent documents, compiled large libraries of patent literature and 
disseminated this knowledge to clients not only for patentability assessment but also 
education and inventive activities.125  The early patent agents were important agents for 
public dissemination of patent literature; in fact, many of the earliest patent agents were 
also publishers and/or editors of some of the most widely read technical journals of the 
time, within which they regularly included relevant patent literature.126  As discussed 
below, control of the means of dissemination of patent literature also provided the early 
patent agents a powerful means of influencing the development of substantive patent law, 
often times in directions favorable to their own professional interests. 
The culture and atmosphere of the artisanal yards and engineering shops of the 
urban British provinces provides for a fascinating case study of early 19th century patent 
agency.  Outside of the economic and political capital of London, in urban, Provincial 
cities such as Birmingham, the patent agency network was ‘complex’, in an environment 
                                                                                                                                                                              
present time, throughout the printed specifications of English patents, all of which, now numbering 150,000 are open to 
his inspection in the patent office. He will advise as to the practicality of any mechanical contrivance process submitted 
to him, asked to the mercantile value of the same, how best an inventor may introduce his improvement to the trade, or 
to the general public; whether the event of finding someone inclined to take up the invention, a total or partial sale of 
the patent should be affected, or an exclusive unlimited license granted and on what terms…[the patent agent will be] 
familiar with all the foreign and colonial patent law[and]… will also be able to advise how to prevent a manufacturer 
who owns a patent from intimidating the customers of a rival manufacturer by holding up the rival as an infringer… his 
chief duties are to collect the inventors ideas, to arrange them in a specification, which will eventually prevent any rival 
manufacturers from doing anything in the direction of the patent. If the invention is imperfect at the time it is submitted 
to him, the patent agent will readily remove the difficulty… his great experience giving him facilities which no 
ordinary inventor could be expected to possess” (ibid at 91-2). 
125 Ibid at 90-3. 
126 Ibid at 85, 94. See also Morris & Nard, supra note 94 at n 143. “Of note is that the proprietors of Scientific 
American, Orson Munn and Alfred Beach, were, by 1850, the owners of the largest patent agency in the world.”  See 
also David Pretel, “The Global Rise of Patent Expertise During the Late 19th Century,” in David Pretel, Lino Camprubí 
eds, Technology and Globalisation: Networks of Experts in World History (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2018) 
available online: <http://www.econsoc.hist.cam.ac.uk/docs/CWPESH%20number%2031%20Jan%202018.pdf> at 10. 
“During the second half of the nineteenth century, patent agents published their own specialised technical and trade 
journals that provided detailed information about patent procedures and descriptions of patented technology. The most 
relevant examples of patent journals include the weekly Scientific American, edited by the leading American patent 
agency Munn & Co., the Patent Journal and Inventors Magazine, edited by the London patent business of Barlow, 
Payne and Parker, and the monthly publication Le Génie Industrielle published by the French ‘ingénieur-conseils’ from 
the Armengaud family. For Latin America and the Caribbean, the agency Munn & Company published, from 1890, its 
first international edition, La América Científica e Industrial, a mechanical magazine written in Spanish.” 
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“in which scientific, artisan and business acumen mixed freely”.127  In this atmosphere, 
incremental machinofacture innovation was unleashed in an environment of proximity, 
where technical know-how was shared and improved amongst skilled artisans.128 
In this environment, the patent system and an emerging technology discourse 
driven by the Industrial Revolution came head-to-head.  The scientific discourse pre-
Industrial Revolution was dominated by the scientific theorists (or according to some, 
elitists) of the royal academies and institutions.  Along with their role as gatekeepers of 
scientific knowledge and authority came social prestige.  But in the emerging discourse 
of the Industrial Revolution, the ‘mechanics’ of applied arts sought to elevate their own 
social status through the social, economic and political means available to them.  
According to Ian Inkster, this was the era of the ‘rise of artisanal culture’, driven “by 
sharing knowledge through associations and lecture and…. textbooks to share their useful 
knowledge” and formed “in local taverns and pubs as well as coffee houses and assembly 
rooms, that linked a new world of useful and reliable knowledge with artisan skills, 
intersecting with radical social alternatives and fast moving money makers.”129  There 
seems to be little doubt that the patent system led to tremendous social and economic 
benefits within these urban provincial communities.  Individual inventors climbed both 
the social and economic ladder through “the capture and ownership of technological 
knowledge [which] was becoming essential to small-business formation and success.”130   
While patent rights were instrumental in creating a new discourse that improved 
the social and economic status of the skilled artisans, Inkster states that the “associational 
culture that forged together patent agency and useful and reliable knowledge was to 
become the hallmark of Birmingham as an inventors’ emporium.”131  According to 
Inkster: 
                                                           
127 Ian Inkster, “Highly Fraught with Good to Man: Patent Organization, Agency, and Useful and Reliable Knowledge 
in British Machinofacture Circa 1780-1851 and Beyond” in Ian Inkster ed, History of Technology (London: 
Bloomsbury Publishing PLC, 2012) at 132.    
128 Ibid at 93. 
129 Inkster, supra note 127 at 123-24. 
130 Ibid at 125. 
131 Ibid. 
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There seems to be good qualitative evidence that the rise of innovation 
in Birmingham was strongly associated with increased facilities for 
knowledge circulation and testing, and for basic technological training, 
which went well beyond our familiar distinctions between the tacit 
knowledge of apprenticeship and the trades on one hand, and a higher 
scientific training on the other. Between such extremes lay an urban 
culture of information circulation that was constantly tested and 
reformulated by a competitive culture of innovation pursued by those 
intent on rising ‘above the Lathe and File’ within one of the most 
intensive patenting cities in the world. Prior to 1851 this was the 
environment of patent agency. And this was itself a component of a 
wide process of machinofacture.132 (emphasis added) 
In this environment, patent agency was informal, embedded within and acting 
alongside the many organizational, rather than institutional, associations common to 
these urban sites of technical innovation.133  Patent agency during this era was 
“complex”, intertwined with professional associations, clubs as well as an emerging 
series of lecture circuits “in which scientific, artisan and business acumen mixed 
freely.”134  In this environment, “[patent] agency embraced a great deal of business lying 
beyond the formal institution of the patent system”135 and evidence appears to support the 
conclusion that this form of ‘associative patent agency’ was linked to technological 
improvement, diffusion of knowledge and incremental innovation within these urban 
areas.136 
Even more so than Britain, the early 19th century U.S. inventive landscape was 
characterized by ‘democratized invention’137- “a broad range of individuals held patents 
for an equally broad range of inventions.”138  These individual inventors required 
affordable access to secure and reliable patent protection in order to acquire investment, 
manufacturing and to generally commercialize their inventions.139  As in Britain, this 
                                                           
132 Ibid at 129. 
133 Ibid at 115-16. 
134 Ibid at 132.   
135 Ibid at 117. 
136 Ibid at 139. 
137  See B. Zorina Khan, The Democratization of Invention: Patents and Copyrights in American Economic 
Development: 1790-1920, 1st ed (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
138 Morriss & Nard, supra note 94 at 171. 
139 Ibid at 172-73. 
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atmosphere of democratized invention created a class of pre-regulation ‘invention agents’ 
that offered a wide range of services as ‘middlemen’ in the marketing of inventions.140  
These services included acting as intermediaries in the sale of technology, connecting 
inventors to investors and manufacturers, and to a large extent distributing invention 
information for innovation and commercialization purposes.141 
U.S. inventors required access to inventions and sharing was essential to 
incremental innovation.142  Thus, “inventors and consumers were often the same people, 
as invention proceeded in large part through practical adaptation of earlier innovations 
into new and improved forms and products.”143 Accordingly, both inventors and patent 
agents during this era had an important self-interest in ensuring that patent law balanced 
protection with access.  Patent practitioners, as an interest group, were “facilitators of 
commercial transactions generally…[and] had an interest in making sure patents did not 
interfere with the broader commercial sphere.”144   
Although it is well-documented that the earliest patent agents in both the U.K. and 
the U.S. came from the engineering professions, in the case of the urban cities of the 
Industrial Revolution era Britain, the line between patent agency and engineering was 
hardly discrete.  Patent agency and engineering formed a sort of ‘partnership’, wherein 
many of the patent agents who sold what we consider discrete patent services (such as 
preparation of patent specifications) also engaged in technological consulting and 
technical publication.145  Many of the prominent patent agents of this era viewed the 
patent system, dissemination of technical knowledge and improvement of incremental 
technical innovation as all being linked.  As these patent agents were also active 
publishers of leading technological journals, they used their publications to promote 
reform of aspects of the patent system which also connected with improvement of 
dissemination of technical knowledge, such as improving requirements relating to 
                                                           
140 Ibid at 180. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Ibid at 175. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid at 179. 
145 Inkster, supra note 127 at 120. 
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preparation of technical illustrations.146  During this period of technical upheaval and free 
association of knowledge through various forms, “[patent] agency and technological 
journalism went hand in hand.”147 
Thus, the patent agents of the early Industrial Revolution era were better 
characterized as ‘invention agents’, individuals who conceived their role as inventors’ 
advocates broadly, both in legal and commercial terms.  The informal, organizational 
aspects of patent agency, which was intimately connected with professional associations, 
lecture circuits and other avenues of associational dissemination of technical knowledge 
were a key ingredient to the boom of incremental innovation and prosperity of 
communities outside of major economic and political capitals such as London.  While the 
preparation and prosecution of patent applications was no doubt central to their role, they 
viewed this obligation as part of a more holistic inventive endeavor.  This included 
improving the mechanisms of dissemination of knowledge as well as education for both 
inventors and users of invention information. 
3.1(ii) Towards a Reformed Patent System and Refined Patent Agency 
As the Industrial Revolution approached the mid-19th century, the value and 
importance of intellectual property had increased and the ad hoc patent institutions in 
both the U.S. and U.K. required reform.  It was at this time that the basic legal and 
institutional framework for our modern patent systems began to develop, including such 
fundamental concepts as patentable subject matter, novelty, utility, enablement and 
institutions of patent application examination.148  Although these legal concepts and 
institutions have subsequently been fleshed out by courts and legislators, remarkably, for 
the last 150 years, these concepts remain the foundation of our current patent system. 
                                                           
146 The “major journals of patent agency were fully engaged in reforming the institution itself” (ibid at 119). “A 
particular interest in mechanical drawings brought [William Newton] even more firmly into inventor environs, 
especially as a draughtsman to offices where specifications were recorded. This alerted Newton to the need for an 
improved system of information diffusion, especially concerning specifications, as well as they’re very efficient 
character under the ancient regulations…  from 1820 Newton edited the London Journal of Arts and Sciences, and for 
14 years reported all patented inventions from first-hand inspection of rolls in the enrolment office…. Newton and his 
journal became very important in improving the application of British mechanical drawing to patenting (ibid at 116-
17).” 
147 Ibid at 119. 
148 Gregory Reilly, “Our 19th Century Patent System” (2018) 7:2 IP Theory at 12. 
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Also by the mid-19th century, the increasing importance and value of patent rights 
“called forth a class of men that occupy an intermediate position [between inventors and 
the patent office].”149  By 1851, approximately 90% of all patents granted in Britain were 
handled by a patent agent.150  The labyrinth that was the early 19th Century British patent 
office, with its Kafka-esque bureaucracy and opaque technical processes, was in many 
ways the earliest justification for the creation of a patent agency profession- the 
profession’s esoteric knowledge was navigation through the patent office maze.151  In 
Britain and the U.S., the first formal ‘patent agents’, individuals who advertised their 
services distinctly as preparation and prosecution of patent applications, were former 
patent office officials that used their knowledge and experience of patent office 
formalities to guide patent applicants through the process.152 For example, Moses Poole, 
one of the U.K.’s first and most influential early patent agents, held the official public 
position of Clerk of Inventions at the British Patent Office (as did his father before him).  
However, while still in his public role, he offered patent agency services for clients which 
included review of specifications and filings on behalf of foreign clients.153  Most of the 
patent agents of the early to mid-19th century were either former patent office officials or 
practicing engineers who gained their knowledge of patent office procedures through 
their own patenting experience, few of whom were legally trained.154   
While the work of the pre-regulation ‘invention agents’ of the early 19th century 
undoubtedly served a valuable public service, and contributed to the growth of an 
entrepreneurial, innovation-based economy in the Industrial Revolution era, it hindered 
                                                           
149 Dutton, supra note 123 at 86. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Dirk Van Zyl Smit, “‘Professional’ Patent Agents and the Development of the English Patent System” (1985) 13 
Int'l J Soc L 79 at 86. 
152 Dutton, supra note 123 at 86-87.  
153 Smit, supra note 151 at 86-7.  See also Pretel, “The Global Rise of Patent Expertise During the Late 19th Century,” 
supra note 126 at 149. “Studies often present patent agents as driving actors in the growth of efficient markets for 
technology. From this perspective, the presence of expert agents removed constraints in international patenting. 
However, during the late nineteenth century, agents in many countries were accused of carrying out rent-seeking 
activities and maintained privileged relationships with officials and commissioners. A question can thus be raised as to 
whether intellectual property institutions at the close of the nineteenth century were actually open to a broad segment of 
the population or were instead primarily accessible only to powerful social classes and corporations with a large 
amount of capital.” 
154 Dutton, supra note 123 at 87-8, 90. 
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this emerging class of patent practitioners’ ability to ‘professionalize’.  By the 1850s, the 
lack of a discrete domain of professional expertise left many practitioners feeling 
insecure and defensive regarding their claim to an area of exclusive expertise.155  Similar 
to other professional groups of the Industrial Revolution era, the 19th century patent 
agents began to organize themselves, as well society generally (as discussed in detail 
below) to create a regulated market for their own discrete set of professional services.156 
Slowly, the landscape of patent agency began to change, and with it, the patent 
system itself.  According to Morriss and Nard, the development of U.S. patent institutions 
from the early to mid-19th century was very much the “story of the creation and growing 
dominance of the patent bar as an interest group.”157  The U.S. 1793 Patent Act, which 
operated as a registration rather than patent examination system, was largely structural, 
rather than substantive in nature.  Accordingly, early 19th century patent law “open[ed] a 
new avenue for change [and] gave entrepreneurial lawyers a choice in how to shape 
patent law to their, and their clients’, preferences.”158   
It is in this context that the U.S. patent profession developed what Nard refers to 
as its single most important innovation- the patent claim.159 The lack of an examination 
system created the substantive problem of defining and delimiting an ‘invention’: 
The 1793 Act did not provide a means to resolve this problem as it 
merely required the inventor to “distinguish” his invention “from all 
other things before known,” and did not specify how one was to do so. 
Lawyers engaged in the practice of patent law created the means of 
doing so: the patent claim as a component distinct from the 
specification, allowing applicants to separate the new from the old. The 
claim provided guidance for jurors as to the patentee’s invention and 
                                                           
155 Smit, supra note 151 at 83.  See also Guagnini, supra note 4 at 146-47. “After the surge of applicants caused by the 
lowering of fees and passing the 1883 Act, the result was an increase in the demand for expert technical and legal 
assistants, but also a growing competition among the practitioners who offered it. At that point the definition (and 
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underlying theme of the debate on the professional identity of the patent agents, came to the fore. Other closely related 
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existence of well-established models did not make the process any easier; a main problem was the considerable 
diversity and the way in which patent agency was carried out.” 
156 Smit, Supra note 151 at 79. 
157 Morriss & Nard, supra note 94 at 148. 
158 Ibid at 152. 
159 Craig Allen Nard, “Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents” (2010) 90 BU L Rev 51 at 66. 
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called “attention to what the inventor considered the salient features of 
his invention.” An important consequence of the development of the 
patent claim was that the demand for expert legal counsel in preparing 
patent documents increased as technology grew more complex.160 
(emphasis added) 
Entrepreneurial U.S. patent practitioners saw an opportunity to work within the 
open space of the 1793 Patent Act to create a legal mechanism for defining intellectual 
property rights, as well as what would become the central feature of patent agency, 
namely, working with patent claims.  As Morriss and Nard state, “developing the patent 
claim can thus be seen as an entrepreneurial response by the nascent patent bar, providing 
them with a service to offer potential clients.”161 When the patent act was amended in 
1836 and created a statutory requirement for patent claiming, it was merely formalizing 
what the profession had created and customarily practiced for many years prior.162  The 
patent claim thus arose from the practice of U.S. patent agents, and was the result of 
patent agents’ efforts to broadly assert the widest possible rights on behalf of their clients. 
Over the course of the 19th century, the influence of U.S. patent agents continued 
to grow and developed into a highly-effective interest group: “the rise of patent 
specialists produced a relatively concentrated group with both a strong interest in patent 
law’s development and the means to influence it.”163  Within the U.S. it was the legal 
profession, who “possessed considerable social status and market power”, that came to 
dominate patent agency.164  The legal profession, which was coming into its own power 
through effective professionalization efforts, wielded considerable influence:  
the creation of the patent bar produced a group of attorneys with the 
combination of deep knowledge and personal interest in patent law’s 
development that yielded an effective interest group. Unlike patentees 
and technology consumers, the patent bar was not widely dispersed. 
Even the lawyers outside Washington were brought together through 
journals and meetings. The patent bar’s interests lay in creating an 
effective system of patent rights that maximized the value of its 
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services in the acquisition, trading, and defense of patent rights.165 
(emphasis added) 
The 1836 Patent Act also created another powerful interest group: the patent 
examining corps.  By re-instituting a patent examination system alongside statutorily 
mandating patent claims, the patent agent profession found a corresponding group with 
vested interests in maintaining a specialization surrounding patent claiming.  Realization 
of the patent agent professional ideal in many ways depended on the patent office 
maintaining its separation from inventors, as direct connection between the patent office 
and inventors would have meant elimination of the intermediary role filled by patent 
agents.166 There were certainly powerful patent office officials who were critical of the 
idea of intermediaries standing between the patent office and the public it was meant to 
serve.167  The intimate, personal links between patent agents and the early U.K. and U.S. 
patent offices certainly played a strategic part in ensuring a role for intermediary 
professional patent agents.168   
Furthermore, with the institutionalization of a patent examining corps, patent 
agents no longer had to seek reform through courts and/or legislation to benefit their own 
interests and the interests of their clients.  Given the highly specialized nature of claim 
drafting and examination, patent agents and the patent office had in many ways become 
joined at the hip, and patent agents now found that they could lobby for change, such as 
revised patent examination standards and lowering patentability thresholds, directly 
through the patent office.169  This hyper-proximity between the patent office and the 
                                                           
165 Ibid at 181-2. 
166 Supra note 151 at 86. 
167 Aoun, supra note 16 at 400. 
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process, and the Patent Office during the 1840s staffed its examining corps with some of the best scientific talent in the 
country. The examinations that ensued were rigorous, more often than not resulting in an application being rejected. 
Eventually, inventors and their representatives, the patent solicitors, reacted by engaging in a concerted effort to 
influence the Patent Office and its examiners. In particular, this interest group, led by Scientific American, repeatedly 
sought “to induce key politicians and administrators to seek out those examiners who” took too strict a view of the 
patentability requirements. Robert C. Post, “Liberalizers” versus “Scientific Men” in the Antebellum Patent Office, 17 
TECHNOLOGY & CULTURE 24, 26 (1976). Congressional intervention was not needed for this lobbying effort to 
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(emphasis added) 
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agent profession continued into the early 20th century, where by some accounts, as many 
as half of all U.S. patent practitioners began their careers as patent examiners.170  
3.1(iii) The Professional Patent Agent 
It was in the late 19th century, following reform of both the British and U.S. patent 
systems and increasing momentum of professionalization movements, that patent agents 
in both jurisdictions sought to professionalize and regulate entry to their profession.  On 
both sides of the Atlantic, claims of professional incompetence, largely from incumbent 
practitioners and occasionally from the public, were used as justification for the 
establishment of entry-to-practice qualifications.  However, it seems that little evidence 
was ever presented to substantiate such claims.171  Many of the allegations came from 
lawyers/solicitors, who viewed the non-lawyer patent agent profession as competition for 
the growing inventor’s market for services.172  Some inventors argued that “patent agents 
were the only class to benefit from patents”, a complaint more than likely grounded in 
frustration from commercial failure of their inventions rather than any demonstrable 
evidence of negligence.173  In both jurisdictions, there seems to be little in the way of 
evidence of professional incompetence at the time of regulation.174 
The issue plaguing the profession in the late 19th century was more an issue of 
professional ethics than competence.  The public perception of the profession was being 
tarnished by behavior of questionable ethics.  The proximity between the profession and 
the patent office created a strong perception of impropriety. Contingency fee patent 
practice created an impetus for patent agents to push as many patents through the patent 
office as quickly as possible at the risk of sacrificing patent claim scope.175  Other issues 
such as patent agents taking out patents in their own name on behalf of foreign inventors, 
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while serving legitimate purposes, made patent agents easy targets for allegations of 
incompetence and impropriety.176  
Professionalization began in earnest in Britain in 1882, when a group of 
practitioners formed the Institute of Patent Agents, a voluntary association to represent 
the interests of patent agents.177 The Institute maintained strict entry guidelines for new 
Associates, requiring either five years of practice experience or the passing of a rigorous 
set of examinations.178  The Institute of Patent Agents was relentless in lobbying for 
creation of a public register of patent agents along with entry qualifications, which in 
1889, the British Board of Trade established.179  However, the entry requirements were 
limited, only requiring some proof of patent agency experience, and individuals who 
were not entered on the register were merely precluded from using the ‘patent agent’ title 
rather than prohibited from offering patent services.180 
Shortly thereafter, the Board of Trade amended its regulations to create an 
examination requirement for entry to the registry.  At this time, the profession was 
dividing between ‘elite’ patent agency firms, headquartered in London and exclusively 
practicing patent agency for large domestic and foreign corporate clients, and the 
‘outsiders’, the pre-regulation ‘invention agents’ who mixed patent agency with 
engineering consultancy in areas outside of the major cities.181  Even though less than one 
third of registered patent agents were members of the Institute, they accounted for almost 
half of the patent filings in the U.K.182  After receiving a Royal Charter- becoming the 
Chartered Institute of Patent Agents (CIPA)- CIPA continued to lobby for higher barriers 
to entry, but faced stiff opposition from the ‘outsiders’, who viewed CIPA as a small 
group of practitioners attempting to impose their own ‘elitist’ professional standards 
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across the entire profession.183  The main point of contention between the two groups 
revolved around the way patent agency was practiced, with the ‘outsiders’ practicing 
largely in the provincial, urban areas where the demand for patent agency service did not 
justify the same type of exclusive practice as that of the ‘elite’ practitioners in London.184  
These outsiders did not exclusively practice the drafting and prosecution of patent 
applications, rather, as discussed above, these agents practiced a form of hybrid 
engineering/patent agency. 
The debate cut to the heart of what it meant to be a patent agent. More 
importantly, the debate revolved around who was entitled to decide: 
Obviously the interests of the public could hardly be overlooked by the 
parties involved; nobody objected to the necessity to prevent and to 
sanction misconduct.  However, the decision to create a Register had 
other more controversial implications: what was at stake was the 
definition of who was entitled to practice in a publicly recognized and 
therefore legitimized way.  The fact that, along with the Register, the 
Board of Trade established also examinations as a procedure for the 
admission of agents, to be adopted subsequently to the first round of 
enrolments, suggested that they were moving in that direction.  And yet 
neither that body nor the Patent Office took it upon itself the 
responsibility of conducting the examinations: that task, as well as the 
keeping of the Register, were delegated to a private association, the 
Institute of Patent Agents; the same association was entrusted with the 
task of levying registration fees and organizing the examinations.185 
(emphasis added) 
Come the turn of the century, CIPA firmly took hold of the profession, with a 
majority of registered patent agents being CIPA members and CIPA being exclusively 
responsible for setting entry standards.186  By the early 20th century, registration as a 
patent agent required formal education through an accredited program or five years of 
apprenticeship followed by passage of a set of rigorous examinations.187  While formal 
education was an acceptable substitute for apprenticeship, hiring by elite firms in London 
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typically required that newly minted patent agents had completed an apprenticeship at an 
equally prestigious firm.188   
In the U.S. context, the story of the regulation of patent agency was very much the 
story of the growth of the legal profession, which in the early days of its own 
professionalization, sought to expand its scope of exclusivity and professional identity to 
include all who groups involved in any form of legal practice.  With the growth of the 
invention market towards the end of the 19th century, this brought lawyers and non-
lawyer patent agents squarely into conflict.   
While the legal profession was unable to convince Congress to eliminate the non-
lawyer patent agent, it was successful in securing a number of entry barriers to practice.  
From 1869 onward, a ‘‘good moral character and intelligence’ requirement had to be met 
in order for individuals to be entered on the Register of patent agents.189  For various 
reasons, these requirements were loosely, if at all monitored by the Patent Office.190  The 
legal profession continued to push for a closing of the ranks of patent practitioners with 
an imposition of an entry examination, a suggestion which was hotly contested by the 
early 20th century Patent Office.  According to Patent Office Commissioner Thomas 
Ewing, the patent agency problem was one of ethics, not of competency, stating that “it 
was less important that a patent prosecutor be proficient with patent laws and rules than 
that he be ‘in actual touch’ with, and have the trust and confidence of his clients”.191  
However, the growing political influence of the practicing Bar along with the 
ineffectiveness of the Patent Office to enforce ethical regulations, ultimately led in 1934 
to a legislated competency examination requirement in order to practice before the U.S. 
Patent Office.192  
3.1(iv) The Internationalization of Patent Agency  
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The development of the patent agent profession was born not only from the 
growing professionalization phenomenon, but also from the rise of corporatization.  In 
many respects, the transition from a landscape of ‘democratized invention’ towards 
corporate dominance over matters of intellectual property called for the creation of a 
specialized practitioner with specific, specialized expertise in patent office practice.193  
As David Pretel states, “The transition to a modern corporate business model and the 
growing demand for trained experts in patent issues were closely related.”194  The 
internalization of patent expertise through the development of corporate patent 
departments was one reflection of the transition between the late 19th and early 20th 
century from individual to corporate inventive activity.195  At the turn of the century, in 
both the U.K. and the U.S., corporate patent activity replaced the individual inventor as 
the centerpiece of patent practice and the patent narrative.196 
Along with this transition from individual to corporate patentee came the 
internationalization of the patent system.  Here, patent agents were instrumental in 
developing a global framework for global corporate expansion of patent rights, acting as 
the ‘invisible’ agency that shaped international transmission of patents.197  By the end of 
the 19th century, patent agents had become a central and indispensable part of the global 
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patent system, and particularly, outside of the major industrialized nations, in countries 
such Spain, Brazil and Portugal.198 
With the growth of industry, led by such notable inventors as Edison, Marconi 
and Westinghouse, came the need to develop global systems to extend patent protection 
to jurisdictions around the world.  It was here that the patent agent profession began to 
take shape, as a means for the transnational transfer of rights over inventions.199  In fact, a 
study of the development of pivotal treaties for the international protection of patents 
rights, such as the foundational Paris Convention, shows that it was largely international 
networks of patent agents that were instrumental in the negotiation and completion of 
such treaties.200  Global networks such as the International Federation of Patent Agents 
(FICPI) allowed agents from both the major industrial nations, as well as the European 
periphery and the developing world, to meet and form connections, to the point that only 
members of these elite organizations relied on their mutual membership as key indicators 
of trust and recognition of expertise.201  Then, as now, there may not have existed another 
profession with such an international level of connectivity as the patent agent profession. 
Apart from simply acting as domestic agents for foreign corporate interests, patent 
agents outside of the major industrial nations used their control over technical trade 
journals as well as their political connections to push for patent reforms favourable to 
their clients’, as well as their own, interests.202  This served not only the interests of the 
major corporate clients of the elite agents in industrial nations, but also agents’ interests.  
As global patent activity began to increase, the elite agents wished to see as much 
harmonization of patent laws as possible to reduce the risks associated with professional 
negligence.203 
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However, international patent agency at the turn of the century tells a story of two 
worlds- that of the major industrial countries, such as the U.S. and Britain, and those 
outside of the major industrial countries, including peripheral European countries such as 
Spain and Sweden.  In these outside countries, small groups of patent agents 
headquartered in capital cities practically monopolized patent work, most of which came 
from the major industrial countries.204  For example, at the turn of the 20th century, 
approximately half-dozen Spanish patent agent firms controlled about 70 percent of total 
Spanish patent applications and that “the totality of ‘elite’ foreign patents were channeled 
through these leading agencies.”205  In Spain, as in many of the other countries outside of 
the major industrial nations, foreign patents were limited to those who could afford the 
high agent fees.206  In fact, countries such as Brazil, Mexico, Portugal and India had some 
of the most expensive patent agency fees in the world.207   
As in Britain, the story in the European periphery was also one of ‘elite’ versus 
‘outsider’ patent agents defining the terms of professionalization.  However, in this 
context, the internationalization of patent agency played a central role.  In Spain at the 
turn of the 20th century, the country’s patent agency business was becoming consolidated 
by a very small group of patent agents, who functioned mainly as domestic agents filing 
Spanish patent applications on behalf of elite foreign agents and their corporate clients.208  
These agents were mostly headquartered in the capital city, legally trained and highly 
active in the movement to professionalize the practice of patent agency.  However, a 
number of smaller engineering firms devoted part of their professional practice to 
assisting domestic Spanish inventors and industrialists.209  After professionalization of 
patent agency in Spain and the creation of a public register of patent agents, the larger 
elite firms appeared to absorb the smaller firms and consolidate their grasp over the entire 
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profession.210  Thus, Pretel concludes that it was the internationalization of corporate 
patenting along with their elite agents that seems to have given rise to the 
professionalization of patent agency in Spain.211 
It is in relation to these issues, Pretel raises several important points, that are as 
relevant today as they were in the late 19th century.  Primarily, with the growth of 
corporatization and the professionalization of patent agency, patent institutions that had 
been open and designed for a broad segment of the public may have become “primarily 
accessible only to powerful social classes and corporations with a large amount of 
capital.”212  Furthermore, while global patent agent networks were instrumental in 
creating an efficient international framework for transmission of patent rights, they 
themselves remained a barrier for patenting across national boundaries given that in most 
jurisdictions, a domestic patent agent was (and still is) required to acquire domestic 
patent protection.213  Thus, patent agents, especially in countries outside of the major 
industrial jurisdictions, may have become “actors that support an excessive concentration 
of power over technologies.”214 
3.2 DEFINING PATENT AGENT COMPETENCY 
3.2(i) The Purpose of Patent Agent Regulation 
If we fast-forward to the present day, we must ask ourselves, what exactly is the 
expertise forming the professional identity of a patent agent?  More pertinent for the 
purposes of this analysis, the question is better framed as why do we regulate patent 
agents?  What is the justification for regulation?  Considering this justification, and the 
discussion of professional licensing set out under Chapter 2.1(i), what is the minimum 
entry-level competence the public demands of patent agents? 
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Viewing the regulation of patent agents from a state-centric, top-down 
perspective, what is the overarching state interest justifying governance of patent agents?  
In areas such as health, engineering or justice, there exist externalities justifying 
regulation in the public interest apart from asymmetry of information within the 
consumer-professional relationship.  For example, there are concerns with maintaining 
public health, apart from individual health concerns, which justify regulation of health 
professionals.  There is a public interest in ensuring that structures are designed by 
licensed engineers to avoid public injury due to negligence.  A strong justice system, 
many would argue, requires an independent legal profession to ensure separation of 
powers and protection from illegitimate government encroachment on individual rights 
and freedoms.  All these fields involve significant externality considerations justifying 
state governance in the public’s interest. 
It is hard to identify what significant state interest, an essential public service so 
intimately intertwined with public order and safety, is involved in regulation of patent 
agents, necessitating state intrusion.215  There are no immediately apparent externalities 
involved in the patent system as one would encounter in other professions.   Some might 
argue that without necessary regulation to ensure a competent body of domestic patent 
agents offering valuable service, the public will lose faith in the patent system, which will 
in turn effect economic growth and innovation.  This is a dubious assertion at best, one 
with little (if any) empirical foundation.  Generally, in professions involving individual 
property rights and interests with no significant externalities, the lack of state interest 
justifies a certification rather than licensing regime.216  In bottom-up regulation, namely 
where regulation is justified almost entirely on market inefficiency considerations such as 
asymmetry of information, it is the market rather than the state that has a predominant 
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interest in professional regulation, with market solutions such as certification 
designations being the preferred mechanism rather than state imposed licensing.  It would 
seem that the patent agent profession should operate as a certification rather than a 
license.217 
In the European context, entities regularly domiciled within a European Patent 
Convention (EPC) country are not required to appoint a registered European patent 
attorney to conduct business before the European Patent Office (EPO). Foreign nationals 
are required to appoint a European patent attorney to conduct business on their behalf 
before the EPO, the rationale for this requirement being to ensure that there is an agent on 
whom proceedings may be served within the jurisdiction.218  It seems that one of the 
predominant reasons that the EPO regulates European patent attorneys is administrative 
efficiency.  Although the EPO has not been insensitive to the effect that European patent 
attorney regulation may have on cost and access to profession services, by requiring that 
European patent attorneys master EPO practices (through qualifying as a European patent 
attorney), this minimizes administrative inefficiencies associated with inexperienced 
practitioners prosecuting EPO applications.219  In that sense, EPO competency regulation 
appears to be less about market efficiency and more about administrative efficiency.  
Furthermore, many individual European countries independently regulate their own 
domestic patent agent professions.  Again, the true rationales are somewhat questionable, 
given that in most European countries, the majority of domestic applications in these 
countries come through the EPO- once the application is approved by the EPO, the 
domestic agents in various European countries simply act to courier the application 
through the formalities of the domestic patent office.  These European domestic agents 
collect relatively large fees from translations into domestic languages, with some 
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questioning whether these regulatory frameworks exist solely at the behest of patent 
agent special interest lobbying for rent-seeking purposes.220 
Outside of the world’s most active domestic patenting jurisdictions, namely the 
U.S., Japan, China, U.K. and Germany, most domestic patent agent professions simply 
act as patent couriers, filing patent applications prepared abroad with their domestic 
patent office at the behest of foreign corporations and/or patent agents.221  This often 
causes client capture, wherein domestic patent agents act almost entirely on behalf of 
large foreign corporate interests at the expense of domestic interests, particularly the 
interests of small-to-medium inventors.222  Evidence suggests that foreign client capture 
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has left the reputation of domestic patent attorney professions in numerous jurisdictions 
in disrepute.223  Given the precarious regulatory nature of these domestic patent agent 
professions, domestic patent agents often lobby against any forms of patent reform which 
may threaten their livelihoods.224  As domestic patent agents are largely dependent on 
foreign interests for their livelihood, it is not surprising that domestic patent agents in 
many jurisdictions lobby for harmonization of domestic patent laws with that of major 
patent exporting countries (such as the U.S. and China).  Thus, there is also a strong 
likelihood that patent agents from major patenting jurisdictions support stringent 
regulation of domestic patent agents in patent service exporting countries (despite their 
rent seeking behaviour), as these domestic patent agents act as a strong domestic lobby 
for pro-patent legislation.225 
3.2(ii) Defining Core Competencies 
Based on all of the foregoing, how do we define the core competency of a patent 
agent?  According to Peter Drahos: 
The comparative advantage of patent attorneys lies not in their 
knowledge of patent law, but in their knowledge of many hundreds of 
rules and guidelines that make up patent procedure and the drafting of 
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claims that define the invention.  A key part of their work is keeping 
track of the many deadlines that exist for the submission of 
documentation that accompanies the application process, deadlines 
which if not kept to will result in extra fees or in some cases the loss of 
the applicant’s rights.  The tedium of precise time and document 
management over what may be many years in relation to a single 
application, which may end up being withdrawn or rejected, is the price 
patent attorneys pay for the lucrative practices.  Like tax attorneys, they 
help their corporate clients navigate through these rules, delaying, 
speeding up, splitting or redrafting the application as needs be.  
While the foregoing seems straightforward, Samuel Oddi points out the unique 
nature of patent agent practice which makes comparison to other professions difficult.  
According to Oddi, “compared to other professions (e.g., medicine, accounting, or 
engineering), [patent agent] practice standards may be subjective, as opposed to an 
objectively recognized standard that can be documented by reference to an authoritative 
source.”   The standards-versus-rules based nature of substantive patent law is such that 
there are few statutory and/or case law based rules regarding patent practice, and 
specifically, claim drafting and patent prosecution.  
That is not to say that there are no standards, or to down-play the skill involved in 
the art of claim drafting, which has been recognized as one of the most challenging, if not 
the most challenging, of all legal drafting.   The difficulty lies in the fact that there have 
been few attempts to articulate a clear standard or approach to what constitutes good 
claim drafting, let alone minimally-competent claim drafting.  Historically, on an 
international basis, there have been very few university-based programs or 
comprehensive academic attempts to study the art of claim drafting.   There is a distinct 
possibility that the number of accepted standards of professional conduct with respect to 
claim drafting may correspond to any number of different expert opinions on the matter.  
Apart from an abstract discussion of the difficulties associated with drafting 
‘good’ claims, from a practical perspective, how does one distinguish ‘good’ claim 
drafting from minimally competent claim drafting for licensing purposes?  Is it possible?  
More importantly, what objective does testing claim drafting, from a licensing 
perspective, achieve?  According to John R. Thomas: 
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The quality of patent claims varies, of course, because drafters possess 
differing degrees of legal competence and technical foresight. It is 
nonetheless an extremely difficult task to assess the capabilities of a 
particular claim drafter beyond a rudimentary level. .... The long history 
of our patent system suggests that patent professionals have 
consistently failed to draft claims of optimal scope, however, and that 
imposing more onerous obligations upon them is unlikely to enhance 
social welfare.   
Thomas further opines that, contrary to conventional wisdom, claim drafting and 
prosecution may be most challenging for inventions that present only a narrow 
advancement in the art, whereas “pioneer inventions are not always accompanied by such 
difficulty in drafting claims.”   Accepting the validity of the foregoing, and given that the 
majority of patents covering ‘incremental’ innovation, which are the most challenging to 
draft, are owned by sophisticated corporate clients that can effectively gauge practitioner 
quality in the market place, who then is patent attorney regulation intended to protect? 
Of the jurisdictions that still test claim drafting as part of their licensing 
examination process, there is little, if any evidence that any jurisdiction has ever 
completed what would be considered a rigorous, objective validation process to assess 
entry-level claim drafting competence.  Beginning in the early 20th century, the U.S. 
Patent Bar Exam included a comprehensive set of claim drafting questions, a practice that 
was later eliminated in favour of an entirely multiple-choice based examination.  While 
the U.S. is the only jurisdiction that utilizes a professional third-party testing organization 
for examination validation and administration, it is debatable whether any validation of 
claim drafting exercises has even taken place and the reasons for eliminating claim 
drafting exercises being undue subjectivity in marking standards.   
3.2(iii) Patent Agent Negligence  
Assuming that entry-level patent agent competence is synonymous with 
practitioner malpractice, what does this teach us about practitioner licensing? Many 
empirical studies have demonstrated that the overwhelming number of patents have little, 
if any, value.226   Similarly, the likelihood of success in patent practitioner negligence 
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cases is mitigated by the fact that the quantum of damages in patent cases are largely 
speculative- although patent owners always tend to subjectively increase the value of 
their patent rights, in reality, any patent value at all may be difficult to prove.227 It is 
difficult to track actual numbers of patent practitioner malpractice claims, given that 
insurer information is often unavailable, but by some estimates, by 2009, there had been 
only 24 reported patent malpractices cases within the previous two decades, and of those 
cases, only a “handful” have involved malpractice in claim drafting/prosecution.228  The 
overwhelming majority of reported cases involving allegations of patent practitioner 
negligence pertain to procedural rules, including failures to meet certain filing 
deadlines.229  In the few cases involving allegations of negligence relating to patent 
drafting/prosecution, plaintiffs have struggled to prove negligence apart from any issues 
surrounding quantum of damages.230  In the Canadian context, there is very little 
evidence of practitioner negligence and as in the U.S., what few reported cases exist 
almost entirely revolve around procedural matters such as missed deadlines.231 
3.2(iv) Patent Agent Regulation and Patent Quality  
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230 See for e.g Minkin v Gibbons, 3 F (3d) 1342 (Fed Cir 2012). In Minkin, the plaintiff alleged that the patent attorney 
was negligent in drafting and prosecuting a patent application covering a mechanical hand tool, in that the allowed 
claims permitted a direct competitor to easily design around their patented device. During prosecution, in order to 
overcome an obviousness rejection, the patent attorney added 3-to-1 handle to pivot ratio into the amended claim, 
which limitation was contained in the final allowed claim set.  The competitor designed a device without implementing 
the claimed 3-to-1 ratio.  The court, stated that under New Jersey law, in order to prove its case for negligence, the 
plaintiff would need to that a patentable alternative claim set exists (as well as that the attorney, but for their 
negligence, would have obtained such a valid claim set of sufficient scope that competitors could not easily avoid) (ibid 
at 1347-1348).  The plaintiff’s expert proffered at least two alternative claims sets, which did not include the 3-to-1 
ratio limitation.  While the plaintiff’s expert alleged that these claim sets would have been patentable, the expert 
conceded that he could not provide a definitive opinion that the claim sets were non-obvious, and as such, any 
definitive statement that the USPTO would have granted the claims would have been speculative.  As the plaintiff 
failed to demonstrate the likelihood of patentability of their proposed alternative claim sets, the Court of Appeal upheld 
summary judgement in favour of the defendant patent attorney.  
231 Canada, Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, Access to Information Request No. A-
2017-01275 (Gatineau: Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, 2017).  According to the 
material provided pursuant to this Access to Information request, CIPO has received few, if any, documented report of 
patent agent negligence.  Most Canadian reported decisions revolve around procedural matters, such as failure to 
respond to patent office communications.  See e.g University of Alberta v. Canada (Attorney General) 2018 FCA 36 
aff’g 2017 FC 402. 
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Based on all the foregoing, it is only natural to question the justification and 
effects of the regulation of patent agents. The work of Port, Hjelle and Littman (“Port et. 
al.”) challenges the alleged ‘truism’ that “high, reified standards…for individuals to 
become patent attorneys is somehow connected to the ‘quality’ of American patents.”232  
According to the authors, countries have “for good or bad reasons (or for no reason we 
can discern at all), established a uniquely reified class of individuals who can become 
patent attorneys” under the apparent assumption that doing so maintains a level of quality 
in patent practice.233  Tracing U.S. history of patent practice, Port et. al. state that the 
establishment of technical requirement was “meant to serve as a proxy for possession of 
the technical knowledge necessary for a practitioner to ‘render applicants for patents 
valuable service,’ therefore insuring the quality of patents applications.”234  However, as 
discussed above, historical evidence of practitioner incompetence is sparse. 
Nicholas Matich summarizes the origin of United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) patent practice regulation, stating that “the primary purpose of the 
USPTO's regulations, ratified by Congress, was to prevent fraud, not to regulate 
professional competence. The USPTO specifically cited fraud as the justification for the 
rules, and the rules imposed no new requirements on attorneys because they were 
presumed to be competent and adequately regulated.”235  Furthermore, according to Port 
et. al.: 
This reified standard, created by one person to avoid fraud on the 
public, has rendered today a very valuable monopoly for those admitted 
to the patent bar. Today, it is said that this monopoly is required to 
ensure American patent quality instead of avoiding fraud on the public. 
That is, one rhetoric has been replaced with another.236 (emphasis 
added) 
                                                           
232 Kenneth L. Port, Lucas M. Hjelle & Molly Littman, “In Pursuit of Patent Quality (and Reflections on Reification)” 
20 Marq Intell Prop L Rev 79 at 81. 
233 Ibid. 
234 Ibid at 86-87. 
235 Nicholas Matich, “Patent Office Practice after the America Invents Act” (2013) 23 Fed Cir BJ 225 at 234-5. 
236 Supra note 241 at 87. 
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Accordingly, “although the high price of entry is a positive for subsisting patent 
attorneys as they understandably protect market share”237, Port et. al. question the merit 
of the assertion that this new, dominant rhetoric is necessary to ensure patent quality.  
Adopting the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
definition and data regarding ‘patent quality’, they examine the patent quality of various 
jurisdictions around the world with disparate levels of patent agent standards of practice.  
The authors conclude: 
If reification of admission standards impacts patent quality, there 
should be disparate levels of quality between the disparate countries. In 
fact, we see no significant difference in patent quality between the 
countries of the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, France, 
Canada and Germany, even though these countries have very disparate 
standards regarding admission to the patent bar…. all of these countries 
have essentially the same rate of patent quality as determined by the 
OECD.238 
Substituting ‘patent enforcement’ statistics as a measure of patent quality, as 
opposed to OECD definition and data, the authors find that “reified patent bar admission 
standards, at best, have a dubious, if any, correlation to quality if quality is defined as the 
win rate of the respective patentees.”239 Although the definitions used for ‘patent quality’, 
as any definition of ‘quality’ generally, can be debated, the authors’ analysis seems to 
correspond with studies from other jurisdictions which appear to demonstrate that 
deregulation of respective domestic patent agent professions has not lead to an influx of 
incompetent practitioners into the market.240  The authors frankly conclude that “there 
                                                           
237 Ibid at 83. 
238 Ibid at 113.  Also, “this is a very hard argument for subsisting patent attorneys to accept because it is against their 
economic self-interest. Naturally, subsisting patent attorneys want to maintain the levels of reification to minimize 
competition. … it is against subsisting patent attorneys’ self-interest to share the monopoly”.    
239 Ibid at 114-15. Moreover, the authors provide a statistical breakdown- “Many people believe that the quality of a 
patent can be demonstrated by whether patentees prevail in enforcing those patents… Even using this standard of 
quality, the reification levels of patent bar admission do not clearly correspond to an expected increase in patentees 
prevailing. The United Kingdom, for example, as a far more reified patent bar admission process than Japan, but the 
United Kingdom’s win rate of patentees is lower than Japan’s win rate. Further, France has a comparable level of 
reification of patent attorneys to Germany, but France’s win rate is significantly lower than Germany’s win rate.” 
240 Aoun, supra note 16 at 427-8. 
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appears to be no evidence to support a causal connection between quality of admissions 
to the patent bar and patent quality.”241 
3.3 CANADIAN PATENT AGENT REGULATION – A CASE STUDY IN CAPTURE? 
3.3(i) From Pre-Confederation to Regulation (1867 - 1948) 
The history of Canadian patent agent regulation is in many ways similar to the 
history of many other self-regulating professions in Canada as well as the historical 
development of patent agent regulation in other jurisdictions.  However, several features, 
unique to Canada, have led Canada down a path towards its own distinctive style of 
Canadian patent agent regulation.242 
Similar to the U.K., the earliest patent agents were accomplished engineers, 
largely coming from the civil and mechanical engineering disciplines, who were 
businesspeople, engineers and patent agents.243  Canada has historically had a small 
domestic invention base compared to many of its major trading partners, and prior to 
Canada’s adherence to the Paris Convention244, Canadian patent agents depended largely 
on work from foreign patent agents in order to maintain their practices.245  Then, as now, 
the overwhelming majority of Canadian patent filings, perhaps as high as 90%246, are 
prepared in other jurisdictions and Canadian agents act as ‘patent post office’ for foreign 
patent associates responsible for actual patent application preparation.247  Quite often, this 
required and still requires nothing more than filing the identical foreign application in 
Canada without any need for an in depth knowledge of the invention or strategy in 
                                                           
241 Supra note 241 at 115, 118.  Furthermore, “although the desire to improve patent quality is one of the more 
compelling motivations to artificially inflate the qualification requirements for patent practitioners, there appears to be 
no empirical support for the notion that reified admission standards necessarily lead to higher quality patents.” 
242 In Aoun, supra note 16 at 401-05, under the section entitled “Regulation of Patent Office Practice – Canadian 
History”, I have comprehensively covered the history of Canadian patent agent regulation. This Section 3.3(i) is largely 
summarized and paraphrased from this previously published section of the referenced piece. 
243 Robert E. Mitchell, Gareth E. Maybee, History of the Patent and Trade-mark Profession in Canada (Ottawa: 
Intellectual Property Institute of Canada, 2006) at 1-2. 
244 For a summary of the Paris Convention, see “Summary of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property (1883)”, World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), available online: 
<http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/summary_paris.html.>  
245 Supra note 252 at 23. 
246 Ibid. at 25. 
247 Ibid.  
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preparing the application.248  This reality has created a profitable arrangement for the 
majority of Canadian patent agents: 
The result of all of this, so far as Canadian practitioners were 
concerned, was that many of them were merely acting as a post office 
for patent applications prepared and prosecuted by someone else.  To a 
certain extent that is still the case today, because roughly 90% of patent 
applications filed in Canada originate somewhere else, but under 
present rules most of them are handled by Canadian agents who have 
some control over and often considerable input in the filing and 
prosecution of the applications, not to mention a modest profit.249 
(emphasis added) 
The early Canadian patent agent firms maintained U.S. based offices, in addition 
to their Canadian offices, in order to service the U.S. based market of patent attorneys 
seeking Canadian patent protection on behalf of their clients.250  Then, much like now, 
Canadian patent agents depended largely on maintaining relationships with foreign patent 
attorneys, and U.S. patent attorneys in particular, as referrals from these attorneys made 
up an overwhelming percentage of many Canadian patent agents’ practices.251  However, 
this created an environment of severe competition between Canadian practitioners for 
foreign work from the U.S. market, and several early Canadian patent agents aggressively 
marketed to U.S. based customers, to both U.S. based patent agents as well as to 
inventors directly, in order to acquire Canadian filings.252  This threatened to upend the 
delicate balance that most Canadian patent agents had struck with their U.S. counterparts, 
potentially causing U.S. patent agents to begin filing directly into Canada on behalf of 
their clients, thereby eliminating the need for a Canadian patent agent. 
                                                           
248 “Having no knowledge of the invention they could only copy the American patent and hope that it would satisfy the 
requirements of the Canadian Patent Office which it usually did” (ibid at 24). 
249 Ibid. 
250 Ibid at 8-9, 13-4, 17.  
251 Canadian Intellectual Property Office, “IP Canada Report 2017”, online: (2017) IP Can Rep at Figure 1, Figure 6, 
Figure 7, Figure 8 < https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/h_wr04333.html>. It appears that 
generally speaking, foreign applicants file approximately 4 times as many Canadian patent applications as do domestic 
Canadian applicants. 
252 Mitchell & Maybee, supra note 252 at 23-4. “… firms such as Harold C. Shipman & Co. and Ramsay started 
sending circulars to inventors in the United States whose names had been obtained from the U.S. Official Gazette…. 
The most prolific and imaginative of these soliciting agents was Harold C. Shipman…. Shipman concocted a number 
of imaginative advertising circulars, letters and cards which were distributed to various United States patent attorneys 
in particular… Some circulars included a coupon for the U.S. patentee to fill out and mail to his new found patent agent 
in Canada.” 
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The ‘advertising war’ of the late 1800’s, caused by increasing competition 
between the relatively small pool of Canadian patent agents, led to many Canadian patent 
practitioners engaging in advertising of questionable ethics.253  The advertising war took 
on new dimensions after Canada’s adherence to the Paris Convention in the 1920s.  As 
foreign countries now had a convenient mechanism to acquire Canadian patent 
protection, the number of foreign-based Canadian patent applications nearly doubled.254  
Many Canadian patent agents began closing their U.S. offices in order to avoid 
competition with the U.S. based agents who were responsible for such a large majority of 
their work.  The aggressive marketing conduct had the potential to destroy these valuable 
relationships: 
The profession itself was in disarray…the direct solicitation of business 
from American patentees by some Canadian patent agents was 
adversely affecting the standing of the profession and the business of 
practitioners who acted as Canadian agents for American attorneys and 
were therefore not about to solicit business from a patentee who might 
well be a client of one of their American associates.  Moreover, since 
foreign attorneys could practice in Canada, many of them did so.  Some 
so-called international agents, such as B. Singer dealt directly with the 
Patent Office and even after an address for service in Canada was 
required, they would merely notify a Canadian agent who permitted his 
address to be used for a nominal fee.255 
Protection of this foreign filing market was one of the driving forces behind 
formation of the Canadian Institute of Patent Solicitors (the “Institute”), the predecessor 
to what is today the Intellectual Property Institute of Canada (IPIC)256, and the first steps 
towards regulation of the Canadian patent agent profession.257  One of the first acts of the 
Institute was to establish a set of mandatory advertising restrictions and the imposition of 
                                                           
253 Ibid. For example, some practitioners took made underhanded jabs at their competitors- Harold Shipman ran a series 
of advertisements stating that “A good name is better than riches”, an underhanded swipe at competitors George and 
Harold Riches (co-founders of what is today Riches & McKenzie). Others boasted proximity to the Patent Office as a 
commercial advantage, and some practitioners advertised an allegedly, and ambiguous, ‘unbeaten’ record in court 
cases. 
254 Ibid at 25. 
255 Ibid. 
256 IPIC Website, supra note 8. 
257 Mitchell & Maybee, supra note 252 at 21, 25. “To a large extent it was these problems that prompted Alex. E. 
MacRae…and Russel S. Smart… to invite all Canadian practitioners to a meeting to organize an association whose 
main purpose would be to improve the law and practice relating to patents of invention and promote and maintain high 
standards in the profession.” 
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a tariff of fees on its members, controversial acts which led to the refusal of several 
prominent practitioners to join the Institute and several high-profile founding members 
resigning.258 
Similar to the U.S. situation, as the Canadian patent agent profession began to 
grow, it soon ran into the boundary disputes with the Law Societies of the provinces.  
Much to the dismay of the Provincial Law Societies, the early patent agents had 
interchangeably used titles such as ‘patent attorney’, ‘patent solicitor’ and ‘patent 
agent’.259  With the fear of an escalating dispute between the lawyers and ‘patent agents’, 
then acting president of the Institute, Harold Fox, brokered an agreement between the 
Provincial Law Societies, the Institute and the Patent Office, wherein the Rules would be 
amended to allow for the use of the term “patent agent” by non-lawyers and at the same 
time the Law Society conceded the right of the Patent Office to require all individuals to 
pass an examination in order to practice before the Patent Office.260  Thus, in 1948, the 
Canadian patent agent examination was born, and thereafter all individuals, lawyers and 
non-lawyers alike, were required to first pass this examination to both represent 
individuals before the Canadian Patent Office and to use the ‘patent agent’ title. 
3.3(ii) From Regulation to the Present (1948-2018) 
There is very little documented history of the Canadian patent agent profession 
from the time of regulation to the present.  From what little information is available, it 
seems that the Canadian profession exhibits the same sort of historical over-proximity 
between the profession and the patent office as in other jurisdictions.  In fact, the hyper-
influence of the current Canadian profession over the patent office has at times been so 
                                                           
258 Ibid at 21, 36. In 1955, Gordon Gowling (founder of what is now international law firm, Gowlings WLG), who was 
then president of the Canadian Bar Association, resigned from the Institute primarily due the imposition of a minimum 
fee schedule.  At 17, Howard C. Shipman was expelled from the Institute in 1933 for failure to abide by the Institute’s 
advertising limits, and despite this fact, successfully continued his practice until his death. 
259 Gareth E. Maybee, “The Patent Profession in Toronto” (1981) 15 LSUC Gaz 257 at 267. 
260 Ibid. 
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extreme that at one point it appeared as if CIPO sought the approval of the profession for 
suitable locations of a new patent office prior to moving.261 
Similarly, as discussed below, there exists very little documented history 
pertaining to the licensing of patent agents.  It appears that Canada has maintained a 
licensing examination from 1948 to the present, although unlike in other jurisdictions, no 
one has maintained a historical archive.262 While the available evidence does indicate that 
the nature of the exam, in terms of scope, duration and content, has changed over the 
years, unfortunately, the nature of these changes has largely been lost to time. 
There is little documented history of the Canadian patent agent profession, and 
regulation thereof, between 1948, when the examination requirement was established, 
and the early 2000s.  Regarding regulation, there is practically no evidence of how the 
patent agent examination was set over the course of this time, if it had ever been 
validated, how it was administered or any other pertinent information.263  This is more 
than a matter of mere historical curiosity; it speaks to a series of validation issues 
currently plaguing the examination process and the regulatory framework. 
As we have seen, the historical origin of Canadian patent agent regulation 
demonstrates a concern for advertising regulation and preventing a hostile market place 
rather than a careful analysis of public protection and practitioner incompetence.  The 
advertising wars of the late 1800s and early 1900s created fierce competition over the 
lucrative U.S. foreign patent market.  While both market control and ethical business 
practices are both important professional considerations, these are separate considerations 
from professional competency. Despite the allegedly fierce competition between the early 
                                                           
261 See e.g R. V. Jackson, “Patent Institute of Canada” (1957) 39 J Pat Off Soc'y 845. For an interesting discussion of 
the lively debate at the 1957 Patent Institute of Canada annual meeting regarding appropriate locations for the “much 
needed” new Canadian Patent Office. 
262 See e.g. Patent Office Studies, online: <http://www.law.uh.edu/patentofficestudies/> accessed on July 8, 2018.  This 
online archive is maintained by several U.S. legal scholars to maintain historical records pertaining to U.S. patent office 
practice, including a historical record of patent bar exams. 
263 Canada, Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, Access to Information Request No. A-
2016-00068 (Gatineau: Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, 2016) [Ministry of 
Innovation].  The documentation provided in response to a request for all information regarding historical validation 
and development efforts for the Canadian Patent Agent Examination included some statistical information regarding 
exam administrations from 1999-2009 and a short memorandum regarding some IPIC initiatives during the late 1960s 
and early 1970s.  No other information was provided. 
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patent agents, there seems to be little, if any, evidence of incompetent practitioners 
causing harm to an unsuspecting Canadian public.264  
From the available information, it appears that the last (and possibly only) time 
between 1948 to the mid-2000s that the Canadian patent agent examination development 
and administration process was reviewed was in the mid-1970s.  At the request of then 
CIPO Commissioner Andre Gareipy, IPIC conducted a review of the examination 
process.  This review was conducted entirely by IPIC, with practically no information 
available regarding the nature of this review other than a list of recommendations 
presented to CIPO. 265  This mid-1970’s review resulted in IPIC recommending, and 
CIPO implementing, increasing the ‘carry-over’ pass mark from 50/100 to 60/100, a 
minimum 240/400 score on all 4 exams to receive a ‘universal pass’ and enacting a carry-
over limit for the number of years a candidate can carry over a pass grade on one or more 
patent agent exams.  Approximately 8 years after adopting these reforms, the carry-over 
limit for patent agent exams was rescinded.266 However, again during the 1990’s, IPIC 
successfully convinced CIPO to institute a carry-over limit, requiring that candidates 
must pass at least 3 out of the 4 exams with a cumulative average of at least 60% in order 
to carry over these passing marks for only two years.  This carry-over limit was rescinded 
several years later. 
The only documented comprehensive review of the examination process in the 
last two decades took place in the mid-2000s.  The IPIC Exam Revision Committee, a 
committee entirely organized and operated by IPIC, upon its own initiative undertook to 
review examination administration and development with an intention to reform the exam 
process.  Although the IPIC Exam Revision Committee is an independent IPIC 
committee, in no way affiliated with the Patent Agent Examination Board or CIPO, the 
Board and CIPO have no knowledge or information of the workings of the IPIC Exam 
                                                           
264  Aoun, supra note 16 at 404. regarding Harold Shipman, who was expelled from the Institute for violating 
advertising restrictions, “Shipman’s crime does not    appear to be one of incompetence as a practitioner, as little 
evidence exists to show that Shipman lacked the relevant expertise to practice before the Canadian patent office. 
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markets.” 
265 Ministry of Innovation, supra note 272 at 38-9. 
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Revision Committee or any details regarding the nature of the mid-2000s ‘exam 
revision’.267  This review followed what was a dramatic increase in the numbers of 
candidates writing the patent agent exams, which began in the early 2000s and reached 
historical record numbers in 2004.268 In 2008, the IPIC Exam Revision Committee 
completed its ‘reform’ of Papers A, B and D and beginning in 2009, the newly reformed 
examinations were put into effect.269  Since then, pass rates have continuously dropped, 
with the most drastic decline demonstrated in the first time pass rate.   Furthermore, with 
exam pass rates drastically decreasing, the number of candidates writing the Patent Agent 
Exam have dropped close to their pre-2000 numbers.270  Given the perceived futility in 
attempting to pass the examination, the number of candidates aspiring to write the exam 
has dropped considerably over the last several years.271 
3.3(iii) Patent Agent Examination - Validation Issues 
IPIC has taken responsibility for all aspects of development and marking of 
Papers A, B and D of the patent agent examination, with no oversight of the Board.272  
Each year, exam questions and responses for Papers A, B and D are developed by a small 
number of individuals (between 3 to 4) selected by IPIC who among themselves are 
responsible for all aspects of development, validation and marking of each paper.  The 
                                                           
267 Ibid. 
268 Ibid at 4; CIPO indicates that the record number of candidates writing the exam in 2000 would likely by eclipsed by 
the 2001 examination, wherein 172 individuals had signed up to write the exam.  According to CIPO, at 7, in 2004, 257 
candidates, the largest number in history, wrote the exams. 
269 Ibid at 11-12. 
270 Canadian Intellectual Property Office, “Become a Registered Patent Agent- Reports on Previous Exams”, online: 
(2016) Gatineau: Can Intell Prop Off) <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-
internetopic.nsf/eng/h_wr02066.html>.  According to CIPO’s statistics, in 2012, a total of 231 candidates wrote the 
exams.  In 2014, that number had dropped to 196 candidates, 2015 to 149 and according to most recent numbers at the 
time of writing, for the 2017 exam, 147 candidates. 
271  Yuri Chumek, “Canadian Patent Agent Exam Results – 2012”, (28 May 2013), iPatents (blog), online: 
<http://ipatents.tumblr.com/page/2>. “[In 2012], 71% of all candidates did not pass any of the papers that were 
attempted...  It’s no wonder that so many candidates get discouraged from writing the exams held annually in April, 
even after spending a year in the field to be eligible to sit for the exams (soon to be two years). In fact, the number of 
candidates this year was 10% less than last year.” 
272 Canada, Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, Access to Information Request No. A-
2016-00065 (Gatineau: Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, 2016).  This Access to 
Information request pertained to all Industry Canada – IPIC contracts for services relating to development and 
administration of the Canadian patent agent exam, for years 2004 to 2016.  The contracts indicate the IPIC has been 
responsible for development of Papers A, B and D of the patent agent exam for the relevant years.  Furthermore, 
Access to Information requests pertaining to members of the Patent Agent Examination Board for years 2014, 2015 and 
2016 shows that only CIPO employees have been appointed to the groups responsible for development of Paper C in 
these relevant years. 
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work of these individuals is entirely confidential, even to and the Chairperson of the 
Patent Agent Examination Board.  There are no external validation efforts- these 3 to 4 
individuals, alone, are responsible for all aspects of preparing and validating the exam 
entirely amongst themselves.  This validation process is out of line not only from other 
Canadian professional bodies, but also other patent agent licensing examinations from 
other jurisdictions.273  Little, if any, evidence exists to demonstrate how and why the 
Canadian pass score has been set at its current level and there is no available documented 
evidence justifying the historical assertions, by the profession, for the need to increase the 
pass level for the examination.274 
CIPO has remained responsible for development and administration of Paper C, 
although, as discussed below, IPIC also exercises influence over development of this 
Paper as well.  Paper C, covering practice before the Patent Office, can be considered the 
core component of patent agent practice- as set out under Chapter 3.2(ii) above, this is the 
only activity covered by the Canadian patent agent exam that only registered patent 
agents may engage in.275  Pass rates for Paper C have historically been much higher than 
Papers A, B and D and have been trending upward over the last decade.276  Meanwhile, 
Papers A, B and D under responsibility of IPIC have continued to drastically trend 
downwards with respect to pass rates.277  This fact is even more concerning considering 
that these papers, and especially Paper D, cover knowledge and skills that are peripheral 
to the core competency of patent agent practice.   
The lack of serious validation efforts have undoubtedly contributed to the very 
poor pass rates.278  For example, the subjective nature of Paper A, which uses a 
hypothetical invention scenario for a constructed response problem, has over the last 
                                                           
273 Supra note 15 at 36. 
274 Ibid. “The passing scores that seem more arbitrary are those that are not based on an accepted policy.” 
275  Supra note 20 at 415. “Much of the work of patent agents and attorneys in the USPTO centers on patent 
prosecution, including drafting patent applications, responding to patent examiners' rejections and critiques, and 
amending applications.” 
276 Canada, Canadian Intellectual Property Office, Patent Agent Qualifying Examination — 2015 Report, online: 2018 
https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/h_wr04001.html>. See Figure 1 and Table 2. 
277 Ibid.  
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decade suffered from serious issues involving subjective solution guides and substantial 
lack of consistency from year-to-year.279  In the recent 2016 Paper A examination, the 
solution guide implemented a new marking score sheet, which scoring included an 
entirely unprecedented ‘-10 mark’ reduction for candidates’ inclusion of an erroneous 
element in their solution.280  For the previous ten years prior to the 2016 examination, the 
Paper A examination, along with corresponding solution guide, had used practically the 
same format in each year.  Furthermore, for at least the last 3 years, the Paper D 
examination has suffered from severe validation issues involving inclusion of incorrect 
questions/answers.281 
Adding to the issues surrounding lack of exam validation and content/construct 
problems is the fact that there are practically no real preparatory programs for individuals 
wishing to write the exam. CIPO makes available previous years’ exams, but regular 
format changes severely limit the usefulness of such material.  Other than a handful of 
IPIC tutorials, patent agent education is almost entirely non-existent.  The existing IPIC 
programs provide no comprehensive curriculum, as would be expected of a typical 
Canadian professional licensing program.282 There is substantial disconnect between the 
available IPIC programs and the actual content and format of the patent agent 
examination.283  The lack of curricular validity between the available IPIC programs and 
                                                           
279 For a comprehensive discussion, see ibid at 14-24 and fn 154.   
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281 Wissam Aoun, “2+2=5: The Canadian Patent Agent Examination Board and the Doctrine of Essential Elements” 
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internetopic.nsf/eng/wr00113.html.  This guide does not provide a comprehensive curriculum, rather, it is a list of 
topics.  IPIC guides provides candidate guides, located online: http://www.ipic.ca/english/the-profession/careers-in-
ip/guides-to-writing-the-patent-agent-examination.html.  The Guides for Papers B, C and D at 3, each provide a very 
basic ‘legal’ and ‘analytical’ competencies description, and list of items which are explicitly stated as “NOT 
comprehensive”.  As discussed at Supra note 63 and 78, the Paper A competencies are more elaborate, but still fall 
short from being a robust and clear list of expected competencies, as would be expected in a professional curriculum. 
283 Supra note 15 at 36-8. 
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the actual exam is concerning given the substantial role IPIC plays in setting exam 
content and format on an annual basis.   
Patent agent candidates have also reported perceptions of poor exam validation in 
the Canadian patent agent qualifying process.  Following the 2014 patent agent 
examination, CIPO conducted an analysis of the patent agent licensing process, which 
included feedback from patent agent examinees, and produced the “2014 Patent Agent 
Qualifying Examination Evaluation High-Level Analysis.”284  A respectively large 
percentage of respondents (74%) chose to provide detailed qualitative feedback.285  The 
analysis summary states that candidate responses typically projected a sense of frustration 
on a number of reoccurring themes, including poor exam setting, lack of viable training 
programs and perceived conflict of interest.286  Following the 2016 patent agent 
examination, CIPO conducted a follow-up analysis to the 2014 analysis and produced the 
“2016 Patent Agent Qualifying Examination Evaluation High-Level Analysis.”287  
Similar to the 2014 analysis, numerous candidates again highlighted many of same 
validation issues surrounding the examination, which indicates that validation concerns 
are an ongoing problem.288   
3.3(iv) Professional Judgement or Institutional Bias? 
The validation issues surrounding the examination, viewed alongside the 
historical over-proximity between the profession (and specifically, IPIC) and CIPO, 
creates potential for apprehension of bias. For over 20 years, CIPO has outsourced 
administration and development of the patent agent exam to the IPIC, the voluntary 
professional association responsible for advocating for the interests of Canadian 
intellectual property professionals including patent agents.  Although Rule 13(2) of the 
                                                           
284 The 2014 High Level Analysis was not published- rather, it was acquired through Access to Information Request.  
Canada, Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, Access to Information Request No. A-
2017-01078 (Gatineau: Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, 2016). 
285 Ibid at 12-3. 
286 See Appendix ‘A’. 
287 Similar to the 2014 Analysis, the 2016 Analysis was not published and was acquired through Access to Information 
request. Canada, Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, Access to Information Request 
No. A-2017-01270 (Gatineau: Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, 2016). 
288 See Appendix ‘B’. 
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Patent Rules stipulates that the chairperson of the Patent Agent Examination Board shall 
appoint at least five IPIC members to the Board, it is important to distinguish the precise 
nature of IPIC’s involvement vis-à-vis development and administration of the Exam.  
Primarily, the outsourcing of examination development is to the IPIC organization 
directly.  IPIC is not a regulator, rather, it is the voluntary association responsible for 
lobbying and advocating for the interests of the profession.289 This outsourcing comes 
with a relatively large sum of public money, in recent years as much as $62,000.00/year, 
which CIPO pays directly to IPIC for ‘development and administration of the patent 
agent examination’ and for which IPIC is in no way accountable to CIPO for how such 
funds are used.290  
In addition, CIPO has, for the last several years, publicized that it works with a 
psychometric expert with respect to Patent Agent Examination development and 
administration processes.  However, it is in fact the IPIC organization, rather than CIPO, 
that directly retains this psychometric expert.  Despite CIPO’s many mixed messages 
regarding the work of this psychometric expert, the reality is that the work of this expert 
is entirely with, and pursuant to, IPIC’s instructions, and no one from CIPO, including 
any CIPO appointed members of the Patent Agent Examination Board (as well as the 
Chairperson of the Patent Agent Examination Board), have participated in any session 
with this expert or have any knowledge of the nature of his retainer with IPIC.291 
Any and all available documentation regarding the history of the Canadian patent 
agent licensing process, including any mention of exam development, only references the 
work of IPIC committees and yet does not include any details regarding the role or work 
of these committees.292  For example, available documentation states that “IPIC appoints 
a liaison officer (the “IPIC liaison”) and IPIC employees (e.g. the Director of 
Professional Development) that work closely with the Examining Board, as well as the 
                                                           
289 See IPIC Website, supra note 8. 
290 Supra note 281. 
291 See Appendix ‘C’. 
292 Canada, Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, Access to Information Request Nos. 
A-2015-00626, A-2016-00068, A-2016-00793 (Gatineau: Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development 
Canada, 2015-2016). 
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IPIC Standards Committee that works with the Examining Board to monitor and improve 
the examinations.”293 Furthermore, the instruction document outlining the official duties 
and responsibilities of Members of the Patent Agent Examination Board states that all 
members of the Examination Board are required to “adhere to the guidance provided by 
the ‘Templates for exam setting and marking’ prepared by IPIC for each of the papers” 
(emphasis added).294   
All of the above-referenced ‘Confidential Templates for Exam Setting and 
Marking’, other than for the Paper C exam (which Paper CIPO Board Members develop) 
are confidential and inaccessible.295 Furthermore, practically the entirety of the accessible 
Paper C template is redacted.  Interestingly, the headings in the ‘Confidential Template 
for Exam Setting and Marking’ for the Paper C exams, without anything else, tell an 
intriguing story.  For example, the heading for Section 3.0 is labelled ‘Mark 
Distribution’, Section 4.0 is labelled ‘Scoring’ and includes a heading ‘Sample 
Conversion Table’.  These headings appear to include charts/graphs, all of which have 
been redacted.  Although the redaction makes definite conclusions difficult, this does 
raise the appearance of the possibility that marks are being scored and converted to reach 
an ideal mark distribution pattern.  Such an approach could, in theory, be used to limit or 
increase passage rates depending on an ideal mark distribution pattern.296 
Patent agent candidates have also reported a perception of conflict in the 
Canadian patent agent qualifying process. In CIPO’s 2014 High Level Analysis report, 
examinees expressed their frustration regarding their perception of conflict of interest 
created by the involvement of the profession, through IPIC, in the development and 
administration of the Patent Agent Examination.297  Similarly, in the 2016 High Level 
                                                           
293 A-2015-00626, ibid at 3. 
294 Ibid at 4. 
295 A-2016-00793, supra note 301.  The provided ‘Confidential Template for Exam Setting and Marking’, for the 2014 
Patent Agent Paper C exam, which is the only Paper of the Exam for which CIPO retains responsibility for 
development.  No information or documentation was provided for Patent Agent Papers A, B and D exams, including 
but not limited to the ‘Template for Exam Setting and Marking’ for Papers A, B and D, which papers remain under the 
responsibility of IPIC for development.  Based on the lack of information provided in response to this request, and 
CIPO’s obligation to provide any documents in its possession, it is clear that CIPO does not possess the Templates for 
Exam Setting and Marking’ for Papers A, B and D and does not have access to these documents. 
296 See Appendix ‘D’. 
297 See Appendix ‘E’.  
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Analysis, several candidates again highlighted the significant perception of bias created 
by IPIC’s role in the exam process.298  
3.3(v) Epistemic Capture in Canadian Patent Agent Licensing 
In light of the low Patent Agent Examination passing statistics and the influence 
of the profession in setting entry-to-practice standards, it is easy to simply conclude that 
the current licensing examination process has been commandeered by incumbent 
Canadian patent agents who seek to limit new entrants to the profession to protect their 
own material self-interests.  While there may be some element of protectionism involved, 
this conclusion, alone, does not paint a complete picture.  The reality is far more 
complex. 
As discussed under Chapter 1.2, many within the Canadian profession genuinely 
believe that the current regulatory framework is not only adequate, but should be 
celebrated as a necessary and commendable program for protecting the public interest 
and promoting innovation.  Those outside organizations that have reviewed the current 
licensing framework, such as the Canadian Bar Association299 and the Federation of Law 
Societies of Canada300, have commented that the current framework creates a serious 
potential for apprehension of bias.  Furthermore, jurisdictions such as Australia and the 
U.K., that have previously conducted external reviews of their patent agent governance 
frameworks, frameworks which at the time of review were very similar to the current 
Canadian framework, highlighted concerns regarding perceptions of bias and the effect of 
                                                           
298 See Appendix ‘F’. 
299 Canadian Bar Association, letter from Mala Joshi, Chair of CBA Intellectual Property Section to Mr. Denis Martel 
regarding the Consultation on a Governance Framework for IP Agents, August 5, 2016, available online: < 
https://www.cba.org/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=4392e1bc-58a0-4c7e-8e57-f98d9d24b280>: “The CBA Section 
notes that entities that regulate their members in the public interest should be distinguished from those that advocate for 
the interests of their members. In the legal community, this distinction characterizes the role of law societies and bar 
associations. The same distinction holds for medicine, architecture and many other regulated professions.  The CBA 
Section believes that modernization of the IP agent profession should be guided by the same principles.” 
300  Canada, Federation of Law Societies Canada, A Governance Framework for Intellectual Property Agents, 
Submissions to Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada and the Canadian Intellectual Property Office, 
dated August 31, 2016.  The Federation of Law Societies of Canada has pointed out similar concerns to those of the 
Canadian Bar Association. For example, the Federation has pointed out that a key element of the good governance is 
maintaining a clear distinction between the function of a regulatory body, that must serve and protect the public’s 
interest, and voluntary associations of members of a profession, which speak for and represent the interest of their 
members.  The Federation cites the separation of Law Societies and the Canadian Bar Association as an example.  With 
respect to the relationship between IPIC and self-governance, the Federation states that separation is “fundamental to 
ensuring that the public interest prevails over the interests of IP agents in case of conflict”. 
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the regulation on inhibiting access to services and inflated professional fees.301 One 
commentator has referred to current patent agent regulatory framework as a “behind the 
scenes arrangement between government and the profession.”302   
Yet to the individuals within this system, everything seems normal.  CIPO 
officials regularly attend IPIC events, sometimes to the exclusion of practically all other 
public presentations.303  Despite all of the critical comments received as part of the 2014 
and 2016 High-Level Analyses, CIPO sought IPIC’s direction and guidance on how best 
to proceed.304  Despite external comments regarding perceptions of bias, IPIC boasts of 
its independent governance of the profession.305  This sort of hyper-proximity between 
patent agents and patent offices has existed since the foundation of modern patent 
                                                           
301 “Review of the Regulation Regime for Patent Attorneys”, A Report to the Hon. Peter J. McGauran MP Minister for 
Science and Technology, June 1996 (Australia).  In Australia, in the late 1990s, a committee of experts conducted a 
thorough review of regulation and qualifying examination in the Australian patent attorney profession (the “Australian 
Review”).  At the time of the Australian Review, the Australian profession was regulated in an almost identical fashion 
to the current Canadian regulatory scheme, including the administration and development of the patent agent qualifying 
examination (See Aoun, supra note 16 at 412).  Specifically, Australia’s professional association of patent attorneys, 
the Institute of Patent Attorneys of Australia (IPAA), played an almost identical role in the Australian patent agent 
qualifying exam process vis-à-vis Australia’s exam board, the Patent Attorneys Professional Standards Board 
(PAPSB), that IPIC currently plays in the development and administration of the Canadian exam vis-à-vis the Board.  
Even though the IPAA’s role was not nearly as involved as IPIC’s current role in Canada, the Australian committee 
still found that the IPAA’s role created problems with the patent agent exam and with the public image of the patent 
agent examination process, creating an image of self-interest, perceptions that the patent agent exam may be used to 
limit numbers of new entrants to the profession and a lack of educational expertise in patent agent exam training and 
development.  The Australian committee found that the PAPSB should be concerned with its operations and public 
image, and recommended that a new examination body be created to “change the public perception of the overlap in 
activities between PAPSB and the IPAA”. 
302 G. Bruce Doern, The Regulation of Patent and Trade-mark Agent Qualifications: Institutional Issues and Options 
(Ottawa: Canadian Intellectual Property Office 1995) at 118.  Doern states that “there is certainly no volunteered view 
that [IPIC] should take over the examination process itself, an issue that would inevitably have to be coupled with other 
aspects of a full self-regulating profession” (ibid at 48). 
303 Canada, Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, Access to Information Request No. A-
2017-00847 (Gatineau: Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, 2017).  The information 
disclosed in this document indicates that as of early 2017, CIPO’s current CEO, Johanne Bélisle, had only participated 
in what appears to be three public events, the 2016 IP Statistics for Decision Makers Conference, the 2016 WIPO 
General Assembly and the IPIC Annual Meeting. 
304 See Appendix ‘G’. 
305 IPIC, supra note 16 at 7,8, 27, 41, 190, and 196.  IPIC’s public comments openly acknowledge this overlapping role 
between IPIC and CIPO in regulation of the profession.  In its recent government submission in support of its goal of 
full self-governance of the profession, IPIC asserted, as a highlight of the profession’s ability to regulate itself, that 
IPIC itself hires an expert in measurement and evaluation of competency to “assist with the preparation of the exams” 
and that “in its participation in the examination process [IPIC] currently calls upon the services of [an] expert for its 
current work on the exams.”  Furthermore, IPIC states that it “has been working with an expert on contract to IPIC for a 
number of years to develop the templates for the current exams, train the examiners, and continuously improve the 
exams. IPIC also has exam standard committees that have worked on improving the exams.  IPIC also states that “with 
the help of measurement and evaluation experts, such as the one currently under contract with IPIC, the [proposed self-
regulatory body] can always monitor the effectiveness and efficiency of the whole admission process.”305 Furthermore, 
all its “expertise would be transferred to the [proposed self-regulatory body] to implement [IPIC’s] recommendations.” 
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systems.  In a jurisdiction like Canada, where intellectual property in general has never 
been a major public priority, the current regulatory framework has managed to exist 
without any tension or serious consideration for almost 100 years.  Individuals on both 
sides, the profession and CIPO, have enjoyed a frictionless relationship and have likely 
developed deeply entrenched, self-interested reasons to maintain the status quo if for no 
other reason other than convenience. 
The unique nature of patent office operations contributes to this phenomenon.  
Patent offices are exceptional amongst government agencies.  As most patent offices 
derive their budget from filings- and in some jurisdictions to surplus levels306 -  it is 
natural for such patent offices, under a customer service mentality, to view the person 
filing the application as their customer and to whom their duty is owed.  The resulting 
changes in organizational behavior have created a system where the needs and desires of 
the ‘customer’ begin to overshadow other duties and obligations.307  In a jurisdiction such 
as Canada, the overwhelming majority of applications are filed from abroad, and a 
Canadian patent agent must be appointed to file and prosecute such applications.  In most 
circumstances, CIPO is only speaking to patent agents, as these are the only individuals 
legally entitled to correspond with CIPO with respect to any patent office business.  This 
creates a one-way channel between patent agents and CIPO, and CIPO’s rational view of 
its mission becomes bounded by this insularity.  The historical over-proximity between 
the Canadian patent agent profession and CIPO has caused CIPO to view the patent agent 
profession, rather than the Canadian public or inventors, as their primary customer.308 
                                                           
306  “The EU Agency That Has Too Much Money”, euobserver, March 21, 2016 online: < 
https://euobserver.com/institutional/132723> accessed on July 8, 2018; commenting on the EU IPO’s substantial 
budget surplus, and the concerns regarding use of such surplus to fund general EU activities. 
307 Drahos, supra 214 at 36. 
308 “Sylvian Laporte, Canadian Intellectual Property Office: Inventors, Not IP Agents”, Managing Intellectual Property, 
(13 July 2012), online: <http://www.managingip.com/Article/3060569/Sylvain-Laporte-Canadian-Intellectual-
Property-Office-Inventors-not-IP-agents.html> accessed on July 18, 2018.  This article is a feature on former CIPO 
Commissioner of Patents, Sylvain Laporte.  The article tagline reads “Laporte’s priority is innovation, not patent 
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understood our customer- the paying customer, the innovator…We have a fantastic relationship with our IP agents to 
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innovator and agent priorities, the article states “So, when faced with recommendations to reform regulation, [Laporte] 
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improvement that would be good for CIPO or the IP agent community in terms of reduced red tape or bureaucracy?”  
Laporte is quoted as saying “Those two categorizations can lead to very different priorities…One is aligned with the 
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Much like other Canadian professions, the patent agent profession governs itself based on 
model that places considerable emphasis on competency, to the exception of practically 
all other relevant considerations.  Given the esoteric nature of patent practice, and its 
extreme insularity, it is not surprising that the profession has drifted towards a position of 
extremity with respect to competence, despite a lack of rational, objective justifications. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                              
government’s priorities to move innovation, and the other is more administrative in nature.  The priority for me is 
aligned with the government priority to improve innovation.  In the past, those lines were blurred.”(emphasis added)   
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CHAPTER 4 
THE FUTURE OF PATENT AGENCY 
The foregoing Chapters set out an analysis of the necessity of patent agent 
regulation and an intriguing historical account.  This certainly makes for an interesting 
academic case study, but likely leads to questions as to the practical significance of this 
analysis.  To put it simply- why should we care about the regulation of patent agents 
beyond satisfying academic curiosity? 
The following Chapters will demonstrate that as we move forward into a new era 
of technological advances and changing public perception regarding the delivery of 
professional services, the impact of patent agent regulation can no longer be overlooked.  
As with all regulated professions, we must question what effect the regulation of patent 
agency is having on access to services.  However, from a more fundamental perspective, 
the historical effect of patent agent regulation on influencing the patent narrative will 
likely come to the forefront as technological disruption and changing public expectations 
regarding the patent system begin to take shape.  As such, the regulation of patent agency 
is now moving into an era where it can no longer be considered in isolation, but as being 
intertwined with the objectives of the patent system itself. 
4.1 THE RETURN OF DEMOCRATIZED INVENTION: DEMOCRATIZED PATENT 
AGENCY? 
4.1(i) Professionalization of Patent Agency and the Patent Discourse 
Inkster poses an intriguing question: in the early days of the first Industrial 
Revolution, where artisanal culture and circulation of useful knowledge mixed freely 
with inventive activity and production, where did patent agency begin and where did it 
end?309  Should all support within this inventive environment be considered as part of 
patent agency, or only those who directly sold their patent application preparation and 
prosecution services for gain?310  To reformulate the question, how do we differentiate 
knowledge from technique and ‘urban savvy’ when examining inventorship, 
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entrepreneurship and patent agency in the pre-formalized patent landscape of the 
Industrial Revolution era?  In the democratized world of invention during this era, within 
the industrial hubs where technical information flowed freely “amid patent agency widely 
defined but closely proximate”, many of these inventors “could command his own 
agency as well as receive it from others” when engaging in inventive and 
commercialization activity.311  If it is the case that during this era, “agency [lay] beyond 
the patentees and patent agents of formal institutions”, then how have external factors 
affected the development of formal patent institutions and what lessons might this teach 
us for the future?312 
Academic scholarship of various disciplines has overlooked the patent agent 
profession, and this inattention may create an incomplete picture of how our current 
patent institutions have developed.  Specifically, what effect has the professionalization 
of patent agency had on the development of patent law institutions? According to 
Guagnini: 
The changes and the profile of the patent agents at the turn-of-the-
century and in the early twentieth, and the process by which their 
professional interests and agenda were negotiated and defined, deserve 
to be examined on the basis of a more systematic empirical research. So 
does the way and the extent to which their interests were brought to 
bear, along those of the other ‘players’, on the evolution of the ‘rules of 
the game’- the patent system as an institution…313 (emphasis added) 
The role of patent agents, and the professionalization thereof, in influencing the 
development of the patent system as an institution begins at a more fundamental level.  
According to Smit, the conceptual core of a patent agent’s esoteric knowledge was 
founded on the ability to define ‘units of technology’ following the growth of 
technological innovation in the Industrial Revolution.314  From the early 19th century, 
patent agents “contrived to profit” from the development of patent law and practice, and 
undertook an active role in “the preservation of a strong legal element [which] ensured 
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that the ‘professional’ skill of patent experts would remain important in the delineation 
and defense of units of new technology.”315   
Fundamentally, the Industrial Revolution was more than a technical revolution, as 
it ushered in philosophical debates over the control of ‘technology’.  The emerging 
entrepreneurial middle class, empowered by new reforms directed towards the 
dissemination of knowledge, hostility towards ‘patronage’-domination of government 
bureaucracy and the creation of labor rights, was the site of a growing philosophical 
debate over control of technology.  While many within this emerging middle class 
staunchly supported the idea of property rights over the product of intellectual labor, they 
also viewed monopolies as a vestige of patronage governance and as such were hesitant 
to fully embrace strong property rights for patents.  Even those who supported property 
rights for inventions had mixed feelings regarding administration of such rights, whether 
by way of examination or automatic creation (similar to copyright). 
The ambiguities of the middle class ideal regarding control of technology is what 
provided the early patent agents room to maneuver.316  According to Smit, it was here 
that the early patent agents “not only marshalled and deployed ‘ideological resources’ but 
went further and themselves created such resources, particularly through their conceptive 
work in the legal sphere.”317  Once these patent agents were able to author the conceptual 
discourse, from there they could move to shape patent legislation and institutions which 
ultimately resulted in the authoring of the discourse of their own professional identity.318  
As many of the patent agents of this era were also entrenched within the network of the 
most widely read technological publications of the time, they were able to publish pieces 
arguing for “sophisticated ideological justifications” for a patent system that ensured a 
central role for patent agents.319  With the rise of corporatization and the pursuit of global 
corporate patenting strategies, patent agents within the European periphery also became 
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vocal advocates for patent reform.  In countries such as Spain, domestic patent agents 
used their political influence and control over technical publications to lobby for patent 
reform, which reforms aligned both with foreign corporate strategies as well as 
streamlined patent processes involving a central role for domestic patent agents.320 
In the emerging discourse surrounding control of technology during Britain’s 
Industrial Revolution era, the entrepreneurial middle class wished to see an ideological 
construction of the control of technology that in many ways would have involved no role 
for professional patent agents to play at all.321  The early pre-regulation ‘invention agents’ 
were not a discrete professional group in and of themselves, rather, as discussed above, 
patent agency was latent and homogenous within the inventive community.  In this 
regard, the significance of the active exercise of power by a newly ‘professionalizing’ 
patent agent group cannot be discounted- their “position of trust” as a professional group 
was in many ways authored by the profession itself and achieved through their own social 
and political action.322  The nascent profession mastered the ability to “disagree with 
fractions of the middle class without having to move outside of the middle class ideal”, 
thereby allowing the early patent agents to harness the ideological power of middle class 
ownership of the product of its labour while circumventing middle class hostility towards 
bureaucracy, professionalization and monopolies.323 
In Britain, patent agents used their political influence and connections to build 
institutions that required their specialized form of legal expertise.  In many respects, this 
same influence not only developed institutions, but also furthered a political ideology that 
justified those institutions.  Although many during the pre-1850’s era accepted the 
rationale for a patent system, disagreements regarding the formal institutions of this 
system still existed.  One major ideological battleground involved the debate surrounding 
the role of ‘scientific’ versus ‘legal experts’ in assessing the scope of invention and patent 
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rights.  Influential members of the scientific community believed that the assessment of 
inventions was a scientific question, and should be assessed by members of the scientific 
community, while the patent practitioners argued that patentability was essentially a legal 
question.  The position of the scientific community, which might have effectively 
eliminated the professional independence of the patent agent profession, were vigorously 
disputed by the profession.324  The political saavy of patent agents compared to the 
scientific community was so dominant that even the establishment of examination by 
scientifically trained patent examiners was viewed as a compromise on their part.325 
The political savvy of patent agents extended across different forums.  For 
example, in 1848, a British Treasury Committee was tasked with review of the 
administration of the patent system and options for reform of the costly, convoluted and 
at times, opaque patent system.  While the subsequent reforms were commendable, in 
that they largely eliminated the system of patronage that had until then dominated the 
patent system, that patent agents of the day still managed, where possible, to turn the 
discussion to their advantage and increase the need for their scope of expertise.326  The 
mid-19th century British patent agents largely dominated this reform discourse: 
The domination of the findings of this Committee by patent experts was 
complete.  Not only was the evidence of the traditional administrators 
rejected, but no evidence was placed before the Committee from 
entrepreneurs or inventors who were primarily interested in the 
exploitation of their inventions.  Therefore, the only version of the 
possibilities of reform came from the patent experts.  Their strategic 
occupational position had led them to being accepted by the Committee 
as the only witnesses with the necessary expertise.  They were thus able 
to ensure that their version of how the patent system ought to be 
changed formed the basis of later debates in the subsequent phase of 
legislative reform.327 (emphasis added) 
In the early 19th century U.S. patent landscape, the patent practitioners of this era 
fought their ideological battles within U.S. courts.  Here, much like in Britain, judges 
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across the U.S. geographical landscape remained torn between respect for the middle 
class ideal, along with the empowering effect the patent system could have on the lives 
and fortunes of individual inventors and small enterprises, and apprehensions towards 
growing corporatization and abusive monopolies.328  Slowly, over the course of the early 
19th century, the patent bar not only gained judicial recognition for their practical 
innovations (such as the patent claim) but also a growing body of judicial precedent 
favouring stronger patent rights and enhanced scope of patent protection.  This judicial 
recognition was symbolic of an ideological shift, one that the growing patent profession 
was eager to capture.  Accordingly, the passage of the U.S. 1836 Patent Act was more 
than simply a statutory recognition of previous customary patent practice.  It was in many 
ways the securing of an ideological foundation, one which enhanced efficiency of the 
patent system for an emerging class of corporate patentees and secured the livelihood of 
patent agents.329 
It is here that Smit distinguishes patent agent professionalization from other 
professions.  In other professional disciplines, the profession is defined by “a segment of 
social reality”, and in that respect, are an agent of such social classes to achieve certain 
political and economic goals.330  While to some extent this was the case during the 
professionalization of patent agency, for the patent agent profession, the profession itself 
actively shaped the domain of their participation- the patent system itself- and with it 
their role as professionals within that system.  This shaping took place on an ideological 
level, by actively participating in the defining of a discourse of technology, as well as 
through various institutional engagements.  Patent office rules and court decisions did not 
simply define the identity of the early patent agent profession, rather, these decisions 
were assimilated and redeployed by patent agents to further influence the gradual 
transformation of these institutions.331  
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The professionalization of patent agency is no doubt intertwined with the 
establishment of the underlying ideology that has served as the foundation of our patent 
system in its current form. Numerous studies have examined the various socioeconomic 
impacts of corporate patent activity, but few have questioned the impact of patent agency 
on either furthering or hindering the objectives of the patent system.  Furthermore, fewer 
still have questioned the impact of professionalization of patent agency.  As Guagnini 
states:  
However the issue I want to highlight here is more narrowly focused: it 
is the impact that the introduction of the examination had on the profile 
of the registered agents. It is not unreasonable to assume that this 
procedure, not only the examination as such but also the formation by 
apprenticeship before and after the examination, favored a growing 
homologation in the characteristics of the new, post 1883 generation of 
patent agents. If that was the case, did such homologation extend not 
only to the characteristics of their profile but also more generally to 
their approach to the profession? And did that have an impact on the 
evolving pattern of patents procedures and specifications, favoring the 
emergence of distinctive and possibly more homogeneous standards?332 
Guagnini cites the example of the pre-regulation ‘invention agents’, those 
individuals who took a more holistic role in the inventor (rather than corporate) 
dominated landscape of the early Industrial Revolution era.  As discussed above, these 
individuals played a variety of roles in the patent services market, including assisting in 
introducing inventors to manufacturers and acting as patent brokers.  At the turn of the 
century, when patent agent regulation was beginning to take shape in Britain, a lively 
debate existed amongst patent agents regarding the propriety of agents acting as patent 
brokers.333  The more ‘elite’ agents of London were strongly against any such conduct, 
viewing an agent’s role in the narrow sense of preparation and prosecution of patent 
                                                           
332 Ibid at 154-5. 
333 This debate was not limited to Britain or to the late 19th century.  For a discussion of this debate in the U.S. context, 
see Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “Intermediaries in the Market for Technology, 1870-1920” (2002) 
NBER Working Paper No. 9017, 1 at 16 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w9017.pdf>. “Of course, patent lawyers could 
not all be trusted to be reliable intermediaries. Just as advice manuals cautioned inventors not to use intermediaries who 
advertised in trade publications, there were warnings to be wary of unscrupulous patent agents and attorneys. Indeed, 
some practitioners themselves took the extreme position that it was improper for members of their profession to 
function as intermediaries.”  In more recent times, there has been considerable concern regarding ‘invention promoters’ 
who offer to assist individual inventors in marketing their technology. See Robert J. Thomas, “Invention Development 
Services and Inventors: Recent Inroads on Caveat Inventor” (1978) 60 J Pat Off Soc'y 355 for a discussion of deceptive 
practices of these entities and legislative attempts to curtail their behaviour. 
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applications.  However, many agents felt that such practices may not be entirely 
improper, provided that adequate steps were taken to eliminate any conflicts of interest 
between agent and client.  While this debate was, and in many ways still is presented as a 
question of ethics, Guagnini views this from the perspective of the effect of patent agent 
professionalization: 
the different attitudes among the practitioners seems to bring back the 
problem outlined before, namely that also their involvement in 
intermediation might somehow relate to specific characteristics and 
professional interests of different segments of the professional 
community, into what they regarded as the prevalent interests of their 
clients…. The attitudes of patent agents whose portfolio was closely 
associated to particular sectors might have reflected or responded to the 
interests of their particular clientele.334 
Where professionalization draws distinct boundary lines between occupational 
groups, any crossing of these lines is viewed as a competency and/or ethical breach.  But 
in the pre-regulation era, prior to the drawing of such professional boundary lines, where 
broad notions of patent agency, technical innovation, dissemination of knowledge and 
business acumen flowed freely, it is hard to draw such clear-cut distinctions. It is possible 
that in this environment, the organization of patent agency was intertwined with the 
needs of individual inventors and the combination of corporatization and the 
professionalization movement may have institutionalized patent agency and created 
artificial barriers between individual inventors and the delivery of patent agent services.   
Admittedly, these questions raise a chicken/egg dilemma- did professionalization 
limit individual inventors’ inventive activity and access to the patent system, or was 
professionalization an effect of the growing corporatization of the patent system and thus 
a natural response to changing socioeconomic landscapes?  Similarly, was the effect of 
patent agency on the development of patent institutions and substantive patent law a 
natural reflection of changes in the socioeconomic landscape, or was it the combined 
result of the over-influence of corporate and patent agent professional interests, and if so, 
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has institutionalized patent agency in some ways disconnected the patent system from its 
earliest foundations?335 
A detailed review of the origins patent institutions and patent practice is of far 
greater significance then both satisfying historical curiosity and illustrating the precarious 
foundation of patent agent regulation.  Rather, as Morriss and Nard state, “[e]xplaining 
the origins of nineteenth century American patent institutions is thus crucial to 
understanding twenty-first century American patent law, the current debates concerning 
patent reform initiatives in developed countries, and the appropriate patent law 
institutions for developing economies, which today are positioned similarly to the United 
States in the nineteenth century.”336   
Furthermore, viewing the patent agent profession as an interest group in and of 
itself, along with other key interest groups (such as inventors, corporations, the patent 
office, the public), provides key insights into the development of future patent law 
institutions: 
The past … holds important lessons for the future…. Moreover, 
focusing on the choice of institutions by interest groups offers insights 
into the evolution of the institutions as well as the law that they 
produce. …The question of institutional choice in the development of 
patent law is as important today as it was 150 years ago.337 
Accordingly, the future of the patent agent profession, and the challenges that lie 
ahead, must be placed within proper context dictated not only by the present and future, 
but also the past. 
4.1(ii) Regulation and Access to Services 
A critical examination of any professional licensing regime typically begins with 
the question of the effect of regulation on access to services.  With respect to patent agent 
regulation, the lack of rational correlation between entry-standards and patent quality 
                                                           
335 Supra 127 at 140. “It might be that as institutional reform intended to formalize and regulate the forms of agency 
within patent systems, so too it may have separated the patent system from its earlier information base.” 
336 Supra 94 at 144. 
337 Ibid at 143 
 90 
 
may have serious negative economic effects, in that “reified standards are driving people 
away from the job of patenting.”338  In the U.S. context, statistical analysis demonstrates 
that as Patent Bar eligibility remains stringent and Patent Bar pass rates continue to drop, 
the aggregate size of the patent agent applicant pool will shrink drastically.339  This may 
lead to excessive specialization of services, with current patent agents focusing greater 
and greater effort on high value services such as drafting and prosecution as opposed to 
general IP strategic services, and with large corporate clients capturing the available 
market for services at the expense of small-to-medium sized inventors.340  The impact on 
small-to-medium sized inventors may be significant:  
As the number of patent attorneys shrinks, the cost per patent is likely 
to increase to pay for the salaries of existing patent attorneys that will 
ultimately be in higher demand. As the cost per patent increases, it will 
discourage inventors from filing patents. This is precisely the opposite 
incentive provided by the American Invents Act, the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office itself, all law schools with any interest in 
intellectual property, and inventor-support groups across the country.341 
Viewed in light of these statistics, it is difficult to understand how and why so 
many recent initiatives to further include small-to-medium inventors into the patent 
system have seemingly neglected a regulatory framework with impacts that appear to 
undermine the objectives of those initiatives.  It appears that, at least in the U.S. context, 
much of the regulations surrounding entry-qualifications to the patent agent profession 
have been “established through the unfettered discretion of the Director [of the USPTO] 
                                                           
338 Supra 241 at 136. 
339 “We have established elsewhere that new entrants to the patent bar are in free-fall decline.4 By 2018, new patent bar 
entrants will be “one half of what they were in 2008.”5 One reason for the decline of the number of new patent 
attorneys is the reified standard for entry to the patent bar. There is a certain and looming crisis in America because the 
number of patent bar qualified individuals is in decline and it will decline sharply in the near future. This is not a 
prediction. It is a certainty” (ibid at 81). 
340 Furthermore, “Although the minor and hypothetical positive consequences are beyond the scope of this article, it is 
important to point out that as patent attorneys become busier, they will likely have less time to devote to non-patent 
matters such as trademark and copyright work, litigation work, and licensing work as they have done to date. Today, an 
average patent attorney’s portfolio of work usually includes many non-patent aspects of intellectual property law” (ibid 
at 81-82).  
341  Wherein Port et. al. demonstrate that current entry standards may contribute to the significant underrepresentation 
of women and minorities within the patent bar and that there has been little effort to date to remedy this situation- 
“Efforts to date to include women and minorities have been a failure.156 The nature of the reified business of patenting 
will have to become more inclusive if subsisting patent attorneys have any hope at keeping up with demand and if 
innovations are going to be developed, encouraged and protected and the American economy is to continue to excel. To 
date, the motivation to include women and minorities has been, more or less, altruistic, but has not been enough to 
affect the makeup of patent bar. However, by 2018, it will be an issue of economic survival” (ibid at 82, 121-22). 
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in years past and this has only been continued out of disinterest or the fallacy that the 
reified standards somehow contributes to the quality of [patents].”342  While much of the 
recent patent law reform discourse revolves around improving access to the patent system 
for individual inventors and small-to-medium enterprises, there has been surprisingly 
little effort to connect with these groups and only minimal effort to connect with 
academia.343 
In Europe, debate has long existed whether regulation of European patent 
agents344 has contributed to poor inventive output, at least compared to the U.S. (where 
patent practice is not as strictly regulated).345  There is very little written about the topic 
of regulation of European patent practice and less still regarding economic impacts of 
regulation.  The EPO has acknowledged a shortage of practitioners in new European 
Patent Convention member states, such as Albania and Bulgaria, and has launched a 
Candidate Support Project to encourage and support the training of new practitioners 
within these states.346  However, the EPO provides very little information regarding this 
program or its outcomes. 
Turning to the Canadian context, Canada continues to lag its peers in various 
innovation criteria, including patent application filings.347  Recent studies demonstrate 
                                                           
342 Ibid at 91. 
343 “There will be many consequences to the United States patent bar and its economy for having fewer and, perhaps, 
too few patent attorneys to do patent application work. All of these consequences are cumulative, and the aggregate 
sum of these consequences will result in a less than optimal situation for the American economy, the American patent 
bar, and, most importantly, American inventors. The latter is a class of individuals that the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO or PTO) has worked hard to support and encourage. The PTO has encouraged Congress to 
adopt legislation to their advantage and is working hard to make patenting more accessible to inventors. Of the 
numerous stakeholders the PTO routinely consults with, there is no indication that they ever have considered consulting 
with law school admissions offices. Hearing from a limited number of professors from self-proclaimed elite law 
schools would not give an accurate picture of the state of patent bar-eligible prospective and subsisting law students.” 
(emphasis added)   
344 In the European context, patent agents are referred to as European patent attorneys. 
345 Joff Wild, “There are 40,000 patent attorneys in the US and under 10,000 in the EU. That can't be right”, (10 Januar 
2010), iam-media (blog), online: <http://www.iam-media.com/blog/detail.aspx?g=e32cb875-ccc2-45ed-836a-
9297a74be4de>.  
 
346 The EPO’s ‘Candidate Support Project’ is not well publicized, see for example: <  
https://www.indprop.gov.sk/swift_data/source/images/novinky/2017/03/4%20CSP-2017-Application_Form-
v2017.02.13.pdf > accessed July 8, 2018. 
347  The Conference Board of Canada, “How Canada Performs: Patents Index” (April 2013) < 
http://www.conferenceboard.ca/hcp/Details/Innovation/patents-index.aspx?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1>, noting 
 92 
 
that segments of the Canadian population, specifically, individual inventors and small-to-
medium enterprises, lack access to meaningful intellectual property services.348  Canada 
has a historically had a problem with mobility of patent agents across the country, a 
problem that some have pointed to as a contributing factor to lack of access to patent 
services in various market segments.349  While no specific study has directly linked these 
issues to regulation of the Canadian patent agent profession, studies from comparable 
jurisdictions raise a presumption that regulation may be a contributing factor.  A study of 
the Australian profession, which at the time of the study was regulated in almost identical 
fashion to the current Canadian regulatory framework, found a correlation between 
regulation, limiting access to services and excessive professional fees.350  Furthermore, 
U.S. studies long ago demonstrated that U.S. licensing standards, which are far less 
stringent than current Canadian standards, contributed to an environment where 
competent practitioners are spread out across the U.S., providing inventors across the 
country with meaningful access to services .351 
4.1(iii) Regulation and an Emerging Patent Discourse 
Along with technological advances and changing societal attitudes regarding 
professional services, the public’s expectation regarding delivery of patent services has 
drastically changed in recent years.  Although the patent system has existed, largely 
unchanged, for almost two centuries, it was not until only recently that intellectual 
                                                                                                                                                                              
that “Canada ranks 14th out of 16 peer countries on this report card, with a corresponding grade of “D.” Canada’s 
patenting index is 0.42, suggesting that its importance in patenting within the OECD is less than it should be given the 
relative size of its economy.”. 
348 Myra Tawfik, “Addressing a Gap in Canada’s Global Innovation Strategy”, online: (2016) Centre for International 
Governance Innovation <https://www.cigionline.org/publications/addressing-gap-canadas-global-innovation-strategy>. 
See also Myra Tawfik & James Hinton, “To Support Canadian start-ups, Over Pro Bono Legal Clinics”, Globe & Mail 
(June 17, 2015) online: <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rob-commentary/to-support-canadian-
startups-offer-pro-bono-legal-clinics/article24984676/>. 
349 Ontario, Parliament, by Erica Fraser, Standing Committee on Industry, Science and Technology, Sessional Papers 
No 036, (2012). According to Fraser (then Manager, Technology Commercialization, Engineering/Sciences, Industry 
Liaison and Innovation, Dalhousie University), “a second challenge faced by our office, as well as the SMEs with 
whom we work closely, is the limited availability of registered patent agents outside major centres such as Ottawa, 
Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver. Further, the legal fees associated with obtaining legal services through lawyers and 
patent agents from these centres are higher than legal fees in smaller centres. I would submit that if more patent agents 
are distributed across the country, accessibility would be improved.”  
350 Supra note 310 at 39-40. 
351 Sperry v. Florida, 373 US 379 (1963). 
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property became a Canadian policy priority.  As such, the Canadian experience and 
expectations regarding patent service delivery is still very nascent. 
In the early 1990s, a shift in perception of the patent office’s passive ‘examination 
and patent publication’ role to an active ‘customer service model’ began to emerge.352  
According to Bruce Doern, this new climate emerged due to intellectual property issues 
having “moved from the sidelines to the front lines of what used to be a narrow part of 
industrial policy and framework law.” 353  But as Doern highlights, as intellectual 
property “moves into the limelight, it does not move into a realm with totally clear 
ideas.”354 
As Doern pointed out in the late-90s, the natural outgrowth of the different roles 
of the profession, the patent office and the public’s expectation could lead to important 
misunderstandings in the future if these new, emerging realities were left unaddressed.  In 
the Canadian context, in the late-90s, confusion began emerge between the patent agent 
profession and the patent office as to objectives of the patent system and each group’s 
role in furthering those objectives: 
[T]here are some differences between CIPO and [the profession] as to 
just what the key features of the regime are in the late 1990s.  CIPO is 
giving far greater priority to those clients who are users of intellectual 
property or who are potential or unreached inventors than in the past.  
The [profession], in my view, sees the regulatory regime much more 
exclusively in terms of the protection of the creators of intellectual 
property.355 
Fast-forward twenty years, and the public’s expectation regarding the objectives 
of the patent system and delivery of patent services has drastically changed.  Again, 
Doern effectively foreshadows the nature of these forthcoming changes: 
consider the issue of CIPO’s desire to offer services to the two clients it 
often feels it has ignored by, in the past, thinking of itself only or 
primarily as a regulator.  The desire to serve inventors who are “out 
                                                           
352 Clarisa Long, “PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law” (2009) 157 U Pa L Rev 1965 at 1973. 
353 Supra 311 at 118. 
354 Ibid at 118. 
355 Ibid at 118. 
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there” is one such client.  They are persons who are not aware of what 
they need to do protect inventions.  The other client is the more diffuse 
and more numerous users of patent information and hence those most 
interested in the circulation of such information rather than only in the 
protection of inventions per se.  Can or should CIPO carry out such 
roles vis-à-vis these clients?356 (emphasis added) 
Today, as predicted, the respective roles and lines between educators, agents and 
the patent office have begun to blur. CIPO, driven by a customer service mentality, has 
launched a series of comprehensive intellectual property educational programs along with 
positioning numerous intellectual property advisors across the country with the intention 
of assisting Canadian entrepreneurs in capturing value through intellectual property.357   
This begs the question- is this within CIPO’s public interest mandate?  What is 
CIPO’s public interest mandate?  Should CIPO be engaging in a campaign to encourage 
individuals to protect intellectual property? Does this pose a conflict of interest?  Some 
are beginning to question how much a patent office, tasked with being the protector of the 
public interest while also being largely self-funded through user fees, should be actively 
appealing to ‘customers’?358  Similar ‘mid-level’ intellectual property jurisdictions (i.e. 
developed countries outside of the U.S./Japan/EPO major patent filers) have taken this 
customer service mentality even farther, setting up patent office owned corporations to 
assist individuals with commercialization of technology.359  These are all no doubt 
difficult questions to answer, but regardless, these issues are indicative of the realities of 
an emerging patent discourse in which the nature of patent agency is a central 
consideration. 
More important is the question of who, within this melting pot of interest groups 
and confused objectives, is responsible for advocating for the public’s interest.  Peter 
                                                           
356 Ibid at 99. 
357 Supra note 10. 
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Patent: Turkish Patent & Trademark Attorneys <http://www.metemercan.com/en/news.html>. 
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Drahos has pointed out that Universities, with their public interest mandate and goal of 
dissemination of knowledge, are one of the top options to take on the task of refocusing 
patent practice towards a broader public social contract mandate.360  Many developing 
countries are now examining new modalities of patent service offerings, largely housed 
within institutional settings, and specifically, on university campuses. Several developing 
countries have, with the assistance of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), established innovative and progressive programs for the delivery of intellectual 
property services and education. WIPO has assisted in the establishment and 
development of Technology and Innovation Support Centres (TISCs) on university 
campuses and research institutes throughout the developing world, which TISCs provide 
many important and diverse intellectual property related services to both the research 
community and public at large.361  This has led to suggestions for creating novel, 
international, university-based technology transfer networks between developed and 
developing countries.362  However, entitlement to practice issues have already come up in 
some developing countries, threatening to possibly derail promising and innovative 
movements.363 
Furthermore, University based intellectual property clinical programs have 
become a growing phenomenon across North America.  USPTO certified patent clinics 
are now emerging on campuses across the U.S and are starting to form part of a large 
entrepreneurial eco-system that includes a menu of legal services.  Clinical programs are 
                                                           
360 Drahos, supra note 214 at 291-2. 
361  “Technology and Innovation Support Centers”, online: (2018) World Intellectual Property Organization, 
<http://www.wipo.int/tisc/en/>. Including patent information reports, advanced intellectual property education and 
general intellectual property services. Furthermore, TISCs assist universities with technology/knowledge transfer 
activities through the provision of patent services and support, and several commentators have highlighted the key role 
that TISCs may play in supporting knowledge diffusion.  See Patent Landscape Reports”, online: (2018) World 
Intellectual Property Organization, <http://www.wipo.int/publications/en/series/index.jsp?id=137>. 
362 Nefissa Chakroun, “Using technology transfer offices to foster technological development: A proposal based on a 
combination of articles 66.2 and 67 of the TRIPS agreement” (2017) 20:4 J World IP 103 at 107. “Coordination 
between WTO and WIPO in terms of transfer of technology programmes should be further enhanced. WIPO’s 
development agenda includes a variety of recommendations related to technology transfer. These are in line with the 
aims and objectives of the TRIPS Agreement.” 
363 Morocco, for example, has recently entered into a validation agreement with the EPO, thereby implementing a 
number of legislative requirement to bring Moroccan IP law in alignment with EPO standards- see “Validation 
agreement with Morocco enters into force”, European Patent Office news release (1 March 2015), online: < 
https://www.epo.org/news-issues/news/2015/20150302.html> accessed on July 8, 2018.  Despite Morocco being a 
new-comer to the world of IP and innovation, Morocco has already imposed registrations requirements for practitioners 
to become registered Moroccan patent attorneys and offer patent services to the public. 
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now experimenting with university technology transfer office (TTO) collaborations to 
create novel forms of university-based innovation ecosystems.364 
There exist very few institutional educational programs relating to Canadian 
patent practice, a point that Doern long-ago critically highlighted.365  In Europe, where 
the profession is regulated in very similar fashion to the Canadian profession, the EPO 
long ago recognized that “everybody has been able to agree that better training 
possibilities are necessary” in order to better service a European market of small-to-
medium enterprises and counteract the fact that “the education of patent agents in all 
countries fundamentally still has the character of the traditional master apprenticeship 
known since the guilds of the Middle Ages.”366 A nascent Canadian intellectual property 
clinical movement is beginning to take shape.  This clinical movement would provide 
education and training for future practitioners within a non-profit driven setting, along 
with providing patent assistance to individuals who would not other be able to access 
such services.  Thus, university based clinical programs seem like a natural conclusion- 
there is a need for intellectual property service delivery for traditionally under-serviced 
market segments along with a need for greater institutional educational programs for 
professional training.  Intellectual property clinical programs are perfectly situated to 
satisfy both needs. 
However, Canadian patent agent regulation already seems to be developing into a 
barrier against such innovative programs.  In the profession’s recent bid for greater self-
regulatory powers, the proposal clearly stated that there is no intention to incorporate a 
university/institutional education component as part of the licensing agenda and at least 
one commentator seems reluctant to embrace a university component despite the fact that 
many comparable jurisdictions have already done so.367  Part of the Canadian patent 
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agent profession’s desire for expanded self-regulatory powers is to police against 
unauthorized practice of patent agency, creating tension regarding a possible turf war 
between the profession and clinical programs in the near future.368  Since the Federal 
government recently announced support for intellectual property clinical programs as one 
component of its Intellectual Property Strategy, the profession has not publicly 
acknowledged support for clinical programs.369  Even CIPO has made relatively modest 
statements regarding intellectual property clinical programs, advocating for a form of 
clinical programs with far less capacity and scope from those in the U.S.370 
A new IP profession requires a new re-orientation to refocus on the public’s 
needs, specifically, the needs of individual inventors and small-to-medium enterprises in 
the broadest sense.  Several leading academics are calling for the creation of a new breed 
of patent practitioner.  Nefissa Chakroun has called for an enhanced emphasis on creation 
of a ‘patent information specialist profession’, to provide small-to-medium inventors with 
assistance in locating and using patent invention information for incremental innovation 
purposes.371  Port et. al., espousing concerns regarding a possible serious shortage of 
patent practitioners in the upcoming years, which shortage will disproportionately impact 
small-to-medium enterprises, have suggested the creation of a new ‘patent drafting’ 
profession to service market needs.372 
Each of above-referenced suggestions circle around the same unspoken issue, 
namely, that regulatory exclusivity surrounding patent office practice remains an 
impediment in the chain of patent service delivery, one that continues to stifle access to 
                                                           
368 Salvatore Guerriero, “Certification or licensure? Charting the move toward self-regulation for patent and trademark 
agents”, (2005) available online: < http://www.peo.on.ca/index.php/ci_id/21277/la_id/1.htm>.     
369 See for example, Intellectual Property Institute of Canada press release, “Canadian Government Releases their 
National IP Strategy, Including the Creation of a College of Patent and Trademark Agents”, available online: 
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370 Canada, Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, Intellectual Property Strategy (2018): 
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372 Supra note 241 at 135. 
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services and innovation in service delivery.  Technological development (as discussed 
below) is set to disrupt and unbundle many patent services, including searching, 
preliminary patentability assessment and patent drafting.  Yet when all is said and done, 
inventors must still engage with a registered patent agent to have their application filed 
and prosecuted in the respective patent office.  Hence the seamless web of activities is 
broken for this part of a much larger comprehensive set of service offerings.  The most 
logical question becomes ‘why is this regulatory intervention required’?  When the 
services are all unbundled, the sore thumb sticks out, calling the necessity of the 
regulatory intervention into question. 
4.1(iv) Technological Disruption, Professional Services and Patent Agency 
The reality facing the future of the patent agent profession is in many ways the 
same reality that all legal service providers will need to confront in the upcoming years.  
Technological advances in service delivery are challenging the ways in which we 
conceive of not only professional competence but also how professional services are 
delivered.  These technological advances have empowered the ‘unbundling’ movement, 
wherein delivery of professional services are viewed not as a holistic continuum leading 
to one output, but rather a fragmented collection of numerous inputs/outputs possibly 
delivered by various services providers.373 
Technological advances have slowly started to chip away at the professional 
knowledge/service gap between patent agents and their clients, as well as between patent 
agents and other service providers.  As discussed above, for many years, one of the main 
professional activities of patent agents was dissemination of patent knowledge. Searching 
and dissemination of patent knowledge was one of the first casualties of technological 
advance.  Patent office records are now freely published and accessible through a 
plethora of free and subscription databases.  Search companies now offer comprehensive 
search services at affordable rates.  Law firms hire full time ‘searchers’, who may or may 
not be patent agents.  
                                                           
373 Richard Susskind, Tomorrow’s Lawyers: An Introduction to Your Future (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017) at 
32-3. 
 99 
 
The potentially disruptive effect of technological advance to patent agent practice 
was not entirely unforeseen.  One of the EPO’s earliest Directors, Lise Dybdahl 
Osterborg, long ago recognized the link between patent agents, regulation and the ‘chain’ 
of patent agent services. Specifically, Osterborg foresaw that the coming storm of 
technological advances and specialization of services could have a disruptive effect on 
patent agent professionalization: 
It is certain that action has to be taken here and now.  If not, we are 
likely to experience other professions’ arrogating the patent work for 
themselves.  Solicitors, accountants, technical consultants, computer-
based payment firms and private novelty search agencies immediately 
come to mind.  It is also possible that industry, which in the past years 
has increasingly merged into bigger units, will find out that employees 
in their patent departments, after having received some education, are 
by and large able to handle the task themselves without assistance from 
a patent attorney’s office.374 
Furthermore, Osterborg recognized the potential effect that this delicate tension 
between regulation and provision of services, if not properly balanced, could have on 
individual inventors’ and small-to-medium enterprises’ access to services: 
It stands to reason that to some extent patent attorneys’ fees may be 
detrimental to the patent system as a whole.  This is the case if the fees 
charged are on a level which by social standards are too high and can 
remain so only owing to measure from the profession restricting 
competition…If in the future European patents are still largely applied 
for and obtained by small-to-medium enterprises, one of the links in the 
price-raising chain has to be broken… (emphasis added)375 
Doern also foresaw the oncoming ‘unbundling’ movement and its potential 
disruptive effect on patent agent regulation and practice: 
if one thinks literally of the potential unbundling of activities in the 
patent and trademark application process… then some activities 
potentially come to mind.  One already exists in that some firms, which 
otherwise do not do patent and trade-mark work, do patent and 
trademark ‘search’ work.  In other words, they carry out a specialized 
form of initial research at the front end of the application cycle.  To the 
extent that some of the front end work in the regulatory cycle is a kind 
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of ‘form filing’ activity, there is potential for some other suppliers to do 
perhaps routine aspects of this kind of activity.  But almost immediately 
comes the rub! There may well be no obvious or practical discrete cut 
off points between routine form-filing activities and those closely 
connected activities that involve mixes of procedural knowledge, 
extremely real science and technology, and detailed knowledge of the 
law.  Hence the notion of a seamless web of activities quickly emerges 
and hence…the notion of numerous unique outputs of service must be 
confronted. (emphasis added)376 
The ‘rub’, as Doern has eloquently characterized it, with respect to patent 
agent/attorney regulation, unbundling, technological disruption and access to services is 
the central dilemma at the heart of an emerging challenge to patent agent regulation. This 
in many ways is a dilemma facing all professions generally, the fragmentation and 
automation of professional services caused by emerging technologies.377  Technology 
splintered searching from the patent agent identity and it has now taken on a life and 
identity of its own.378  Are other patent services far behind?  Will new automated and AI-
driven technologies for patent drafting create a new ‘patent drafting’ service provider?   
For example, new automated patent drafting software can, in a matter of minutes, 
automatically prepare an entire patent application specification based off one or more 
draft patent claims. 379  New AI driven software automates the specification drafting 
process, using a sophisticated system for claim charting, illustration labelling and 
connection to the detailed description. 380  These programs also automate the process for 
                                                           
376 Supra note 311 at 99. 
377 Richard Susskind, The Future of the Professions: How Technology Will Transform the Work of Human Experts 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) at 157. “Readers may call us radical, but if we can foresee a day when the 
average laptop has more processing power than all of humanity combined, then it might be time for professionals to 
revisit some of their current working practices…Our main claim is that we are on the brink of a period of fundamental 
and irreversible change in the way that the expertise of these specialists is made available in society.  Technology will 
be the main driver of this change.” 
378 Supra note 380. 
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responding to patent office communications, by connecting with patent office databases, 
scanning communications, and preparing template responses.381 
New programs also automate patent office strategy and analysis.  By uploading a 
sample of a patent application, such as draft claims and portions of a specification, 
available software can conduct a USPTO patent search, provide a listing of relevant prior 
art, map out prosecution path (such as likely Art. Unit and examiners) and provides fairly 
detailed feedback on novelty and obviousness.382   
AI-driven software now provides comprehensive searching based on rudimentary 
invention disclosures.383  New cloud-based patent file management software automate the 
entire patent file management process. 384  These programs connect to the patent office 
network and automatically downloads documents and self-update anytime patent office 
correspondence or deadlines are released or activated respectively. Furthermore, these 
providers are now exploring cost-effective pricing models, making them accessible for 
practitioners and/or clients who may not have large patent portfolios to manage.   
Patent offices are now exploring possibilities for automating administration.  Both 
the USPTO and the Japanese Patent Office (JPO) has already launched pilot projects 
testing the use of AI-driven software for automating several patent office procedures, 
including examination, and other domestic patent offices are not far behind.385 The World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has developed an AI based tool for translating 
patents into any of the official languages of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), with 
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the Korean Intellectual Property Office having adopted this technology for domestic 
use.386   
All of this begs a challenging question- how long before AI driven software can 
interact with inventors and automate the entire patent drafting process?  In a recent debate 
hosted by CIPA, the majority of panelists seemed to believe that such technology may be 
operable by as soon as 2025.387  New providers are already lining up to develop this 
technology.388  Along with all of this comes the inevitable debates regarding entitlement 
to practice.  The border skirmishes have already begun between the licensed profession 
and new forms of mass-market intellectual property service providers.389  As the patent 
agent profession begins to feel the disruption caused by these new technologies, it is 
inevitable that the issue of regulation will move to the forefront. 
4.1(v) Democratization of Invention, Democratization of Patent Agency and the 
Patent Discourse 
The patent system has served many objectives- “systems of intellectual property 
right, mechanisms of technology transfer and blockage and information systems, and at 
different times and places succeeded or failed on each of these levels.”390  In its earliest 
days, broad dissemination of knowledge was a central feature of the patent system and 
practice, and in recent years, it can doubtful whether this is a key objective (if it is 
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achieving this objective at all).391  These changes are the result of fluctuating 
socioeconomic conditions and technological advance.  But socioeconomic changes and 
technological advance also have a profound impact on patent agency, which in turn 
impacts the patent system itself. 
We are now entering a new Industrial Revolution.  Access to information, access 
to means of production (such as 3D printing), access to source material (such as file 
sharing) and AI are the driving forces behind this new revolution.  The on-campus 
hackathons and maker-spaces of the current industrial revolution are similar to the 
artisanal yards and engineering shops of the first industrial revolution.  Here, education, 
experimentation, ‘tinkering’ and invention all intermingle, each equally important to the 
creation of a new atmosphere in this new industrial revolution.  Within this atmosphere, 
we are returning to the democratization of invention. 
In the days of the first industrial revolution, patent agency and the patent narrative 
organized itself around the culture of democratized invention.  The seeds of the patent 
narrative grew from the inventive spirit and liberty of the individual inventor, and patent 
agency served this humble master.  As Inkster states, “patent agency owed little 
obligation to elites, whether political or cultural.”392  However, the rise of corporate 
domination over the patent system, internationalization of the patent system, 
professionalization as a mechanism of organizing labour and the emergence of patent 
agents as a distinct interest group have all contributed to the disconnect between the 
patent system and the individual inventor.  Patent agency, in many ways, became elitist. 
The centuries old stability in our patent system may lead us to believe that the 
core elements upon which it currently rests are somehow mandatory and permanent.  
However, as demonstrated herein, much of the current system was developed during an 
era of “significant change, experimentation, and development in the nature of patent 
rights, the patent system’s institutional structure, and the basic doctrines of patent 
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law.”393  Thus, according to Gregory Reilly, “recognizing that the roots of our patent 
system lie in the 19th century can provide useful insights into on-going debates about 
whether, and to what extent, long-standing foundational aspects of the patent system 
should be altered.”394  The technological challenges likely to result from the new 
industrial revolution will pose new challenges to our patent system, and the question of 
what foundational aspects require altering are also likely to follow. 
Some have begun to question whether essential aspects of substantive patent law, 
such as term and scope of protection and standard of obviousness, require substantial 
revision in light of disruptive technologies such as 3D printing395 and AI driven 
invention.396  And while it is important that we remain cautious about making significant 
changes to the patent system that might “disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing 
community”397, if the nature of the inventive community itself is being disrupted, then 
change may be necessary.   
In recent years, the effect of patent law administration on the development of 
substantive patent law has gained academic prominence.398  As Clarisa Long states, the 
USPTO’s considerable discretion “to establish regulations that ‘govern the conduct of 
proceedings in the office,’ that ‘facilitate and expedite the processing of patent 
applications,’ and that ‘govern the recognition and conduct of agents, attorneys, or other 
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persons representing applicants or other parties’” and the “seemingly mundane 
procedural changes” flowing therefrom may “have resulted in the most profound changes 
in U.S. patent policy and practice since 1836.”399  Several recent studies have raised the 
possibility that biases inherent in patent office administration processes, such as patent 
office funding, patent examiner hiring, and routine patent examination frameworks may 
have significant impacts on the development of substantive law.400  Yet few to date have 
comprehensively examined the effect of patent agent practice, and the regulation thereof, 
on the development of substantive patent law. 
Coincidentally, as we re-enter a period of democratized invention, many scholars 
are also beginning to propose changes to the patent system that mimic many aspects of 
early 19th century patent law and practice.  Some have proposed that standards of 
patentability should be increased through patent application examination by individuals 
of exceptional technical expertise401 or incorporating aspects of scientific peer review402, 
elements that the scientific community lobbied for in the early 19th century.  Along with a 
renewed interest in use of patent information have come suggestions on how to improve 
access to, and use of, patent disclosures.403  It has also been suggested that we begin 
engaging in forms of patent experimentation, changing various patent law variables 
assess their impacts on promoting, or hindering, innovation.404 
Despite a return to democratized invention, the return of original utility functions 
of the patent system and a variety of reform suggestions which re-invigorate early 19th 
century patent law practices, the question of patent agency remains overlooked.  This is 
surprising given the substantial impact of patent agency on the development of patent law 
over the course of the 19th century.  Much of substantive patent law evolved through the 
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“learning by doing” of the patent practitioners.405  Indeed, what patent law currently 
looks like was largely discovered through the interaction of stakeholders- inventors, 
investors, manufacturers, agents - and the intermediaries cannot be overlooked in this 
equation.406 As Morriss and Nard state: 
Why did these principles and procedures evolve through practice rather 
than through legislation (between the 1793 and 1836 Acts)?... how to 
change patent law was something patentees, patent lawyers, and patent 
agents had to first figure out. Indeed, lawyers and others had to first 
discover that they were patent lawyers and patent agents – the 
discovery of a specialized role for these intermediaries was itself the 
result of entrepreneurial activity.407 (emphasis added) 
As we enter the new industrial revolution, where we have started to see the return 
of democratized invention as well as the slow erosion of the discrete boundaries of 
professionalization in many fields, including patent agency, it seems that democratized 
forms of patent agency may be returning.  Thus, the question of regulation of patent 
agency can no longer be avoided.  Considering new forms of patent agency, including 
rethinking the form and scope of regulation, may be one of the simplest mechanisms of 
change, requiring very little in the way of variations to substantive law.  The disruptive 
results may be more political then legal, potentially disrupting the political power of one 
very influential interest group – patent agents – and facilitating the coalescing of new 
interest groups surrounding independent inventors, users of inventive information and 
small-to-medium enterprises.   
The significance of this cannot be overstated.  What is at stake in the 
democratization of patent agency is more than providing access to services for 
traditionally under-serviced market segments.  New patent practice processes and 
institutions, serving an emerging class of historically under-represented clientele, will 
likely lead to substantive developments that benefit this emerging interest group.  The 
main substantive aspects of what patent law looks like today was co-developed through 
patent practice, between patent practitioners and the patent office in the early days of 
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patent agent practice. These practices were recognized by other institutional decision 
makers, such as courts and legislators, and influenced development of international patent 
law treaties, networks and institutions. Thus, like Escher’s famous painting of one hand 
drawing the other, patent agency has shaped the major patent institutions and those 
institutions have defined patent agency, and together, they have historically co-evolved 
the patent system.408 
4.2 THE (IL)LEGITIMACY OF PATENT AGENT REGULATION 
4.2(i) The Global Patent Discourse and Patent Agent Governance 
Examining the global patent system from within the unique perspective of patent 
offices around the world, Drahos witnesses first-hand the narrative created by what he 
calls a ‘private governance network’.  According to Drahos, the patent system is “patent 
law as administered by various actors such as patent offices, courts and the patent 
attorney profession.”409  Viewing the patent system from the lens of these stakeholders, 
one sees that much of the harmonization of the global patent system takes place not 
through international treaties, but through a form of ‘invisible harmonization’, which is a 
“quiet technocratic cooperation” between patent offices and agents around the world. 410  
The large corporate users of the patent system have a very strong incentive to encourage 
uniformity and cooperation between patent offices, in order to maximize efficiency in 
obtaining global patent protection.411   
Thus, corporate users of the patent system, their patent agents and patent offices 
form this insider, private ‘governance network’, a network that harmonizes international 
patent practice outside of the traditional mechanisms of public accountability.412  From 
this perspective, international patent practice might be one of the most entrenched forms 
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of regulatory capture, resilient against many of the typical forms of political and legal 
accountability.  Drahos’ summary of the situation is worth quoting in its entirety: 
There are of course public accountability mechanisms for patent 
offices.  As we have seen in preceding chapters, they are part of public 
service department structures and the heads of patent offices are 
ultimately answerable to politicians, such as ministers who in 
parliamentary systems are responsible for government departments.  
However, the formal mechanisms of public accountability that operate 
here are meaningless.  Patent rules do not get decided at the ballot box.  
Tax, law and order, and public health services are the stuff of election 
campaigns.  Patents are not.  The patent system is so densely 
technocratic that politicians do not take the lead on patent policy unless 
an industry lobby dictates a clear direction…The real accountability of 
patent offices lies with the private governance network of the large 
businesses that dominate patent applications…. Every patent office 
proposal for reform is carefully scrutinized by the patent attorneys that 
represent the large players.  The business networks that surround the 
patent offices are amongst the most watchful and expert in the world. 
The displacement of public accountability mechanisms by private 
networked power is, in the case of patent offices, not a new 
phenomenon.  Business networks have been co-evolving with patent 
offices for at least 100 years.  Public accountability mechanisms are the 
convenient front men of legitimacy.  They help hide the fact that an 
organization created to represent the public under a social contract has 
become deeply intertwined and absorbed by a private governance 
network.413 (emphasis added) 
How is it that this entrenched form of capture has come to exist, and why is it so 
difficult to challenge this system?  As we have seen, for several reasons, what happens in 
the patent office is just as important to the development of patent law as what happens in 
courts.414  In this regard, patent agents, as an interest group itself, have, along with patent 
offices, been able to ‘co-evolve’ the patent system in directions favourable to the 
profession and their most influential clients.415  It is here that the patent agent profession 
has gained “considerable influence of global patent policy.”416  Patent agents have, 
through lobbying and other acts of persuasion, influenced patent offices to accept certain 
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norms, rules and behavior417, which no doubt favour both the profession and the large 
corporate clients the profession predominantly serves.418  
Around the globe, many patent office officials are less than ‘enchanted’ with the 
patent profession, viewing them as a “tightly controlled monopoly squeezing rents out of 
business, often in exchange for comparatively little service”.419  Despite this fact, patent 
offices around the world are clear that maintaining good relations with the patent agent 
profession is a priority for them.420  Furthermore, “legislators and ministers in many 
countries generally do not understand the extent of regulatory capture of patent offices” 
and tend to be reliant on patent offices and agents “for advice, advice that tends to be of a 
predictable kind.”421 
Patent agents in many countries operate under a form of self-regulation, 
regardless of whether actually granted self-regulatory authority by statute, given that the 
“cosy networked relationship between the professional body that represents patent agents 
and the patent office” has afforded the patent profession a tremendous amount of 
professional freedom.422  With non-existent political oversight, it is unlikely that any 
form or progressive patent law or practice reforms will be led by the profession itself.423  
This system, largely influenced and evolved by the profession, has also afforded them a 
very lucrative practice niche, and it is for this reason that “patent [agents] live in fear of 
deregulation.”424 
Over many years, this influence of patent agents and offices has coalesced into a 
dominant discourse.  What happens when this discourse excludes the interests of large 
segments of the population, such as independent inventors, small-to-medium enterprises 
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and consumers of invention information?  As these atomized interests are widely 
dispersed compared to the tight-knit patent agent and patent office interest groups, it is 
difficult for these groups to influence institutional decision makers.  How then does one 
go about disrupting this dominant discourse? 
Drahos bluntly advocates that as one of the first mechanisms of accountability, 
patent offices need to be less connected to the patent agent profession.425  Specifically, 
what is required are mechanisms that push the patent agent profession “out of its comfort 
zone of self-regulation.”426  Forming separation between the patent office and the patent 
agent profession will create space for new outsider groups, groups with technical 
expertise in patent practice but independent from the profession and patent offices, to 
enter into and begin to influence the patent system.427  Creating separation between the 
profession and the patent office will generate new and different information flows to 
institutional decision makers, including patent offices, legislators and courts, and help 
challenge the current dominant patent discourse.428 
4.2(ii) Canadian Patent Agent Governance – What Challenges Lie Ahead? 
The Canadian patent agent regulatory framework exhibits many of the same 
indicia that contributed to the decline of self-regulation generally in both U.K. and 
Australia. For example, the Canadian patent agent profession is one of the few Canadian 
federally self-regulated professions.  The Canadian profession has historically exhibited 
an over-proximity between the regulated and regulator, namely, patent agents and CIPO 
respectively.  Furthermore, this over-proximity has included a hyper-influence of the 
patent agents’ professional association, IPIC, in matters of regulation, with the overlap 
between IPIC and CIPO being practically inseparable. 
Furthermore, the current Canadian patent agent regulatory regime bears 
tremendous similarity to other Canadian professions with respect to over-emphasis on 
competency as the central ‘public interest’ concern to the exclusion of various other 
                                                           
425 Ibid at 294. 
426 Ibid at 214 at 311. 
427 Ibid at 311. 
428 Ibid at 296. 
 111 
 
public interest considerations.  Similar to other Canadian self-regulated professions, 
regulation of Canadian patent agents began as a matter of professional ethics.  
Competence was not a prevailing concern, and in fact, in many jurisdictions, there is little 
documented historical evidence of practitioner incompetence justifying regulation of the 
profession.  Following regulation, ethics took a back seat to competency to the point that 
ethics, in Canadian patent agent regulation, is almost a non-existent concern.  
Competency, however, has become the only focus, to the point that the entire regulatory 
framework has become structured around an ambiguous concept of competency that has 
been poorly validated and lacks substantial empirical connection to defined public 
interests. 
With respect to the current Canadian patent agent regulatory framework, to briefly 
summarize some of the specific facts set out under Chapter 3.3: 
• an annual payment of public funds to the IPIC organization, as opposed to the 
individual IPIC appointed members of the Patent Agent Examination Board, for 
‘exam administration and development’, funds which are used non-transparently 
and with no accountability to the public; 
• the IPIC organization has been solely responsible for all aspects of standard 
setting and examination development, with practically no accountability or 
transparency regarding this work; 
• the IPIC organization hires its own psychometric expert, who ‘coaches’ only IPIC 
Patent Agent Examination Board members and IPIC committees on standards and 
exam setting; no one from CIPO, including the Chairperson of the Patent Agent 
Examination Board, have ever participated in, or have any knowledge of the 
details of these ‘coaching’ sessions; 
• the IPIC organization has been an active lobbyist for the interests of the Canadian 
patent agent profession, and for several decades has actively lobbied for raising 
the standards for entry to the Canadian patent agent profession; 
• the IPIC organization offers what is practically the only examination training and 
preparation program available in Canada, which program is referenced by CIPO 
as being the key resource for examination preparation; 
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• frequent unannounced changes in exam format and marking create a perception of 
arbitrariness, which enhances the perception of bias as an attempt to adjust 
marking distribution;  
• communications between members of the Patent Agent Examination Board and 
the IPIC organization, including the Chairperson of the Examination Board, with 
regard to detailed analysis and recommendations pertaining to exam development 
and administration;  
• patent agent examinee candidates, other professional organizations and other 
government reports have all commented on the perception of bias created by the 
over-proximity between IPIC and CIPO in the governance of the patent agent 
profession; and 
• the current Canadian patent agent examination appears to have by far the lowest 
pass rate of any comparable jurisdiction in the world. 
Competency-based entry-to-practice standards appear to be having a detrimental 
effect on public access to service.  Client capture dominates the Canadian patent agent 
profession, with the overwhelming percentage of patent agent work consumed by large 
corporations and foreign clients.  In many respects, client capture was the motivating 
factor for establishing and maintaining a regulatory framework for Canadian patent 
agents.  Recent studies show that many Canadian market segments made up of individual 
inventors and small-to-medium enterprises lack access to meaningful intellectual 
property services, and studies from comparable jurisdictions have pointed to patent agent 
regulation as a key contributing factor to this problem.  U.S. and Australian studies have 
demonstrated patent agents generally command higher rates than regular attorneys, and 
although there is no similar Canadian study, it is reasonable to expect comparable 
statistics in Canada given that the Canadian profession is far more stringently regulated 
than these jurisdictions.429  
                                                           
429 Supra note 310 at 39-40.  Supra note 20 at 408. “Patent-attorney billing rates are generally higher than those of 
agents and many non-Patent-Bar-member lawyers. Some inventors and potential infringers may not be able to afford 
these more expensive services and therefore may not pursue certain matters in the USPTO.”  Although Canadian patent 
agent regulation does not distinguish between agents and attorneys, given that the profession is far more stringently 
regulated than in the U.S., this study at least raises the possibility that the same situation may hold true in Canada. 
 113 
 
The current licensing examination process demonstrates serious validation issues.  
There has been little historical effort to validate standards, examination content or 
constructs.  Each year, the examination is developed and administered by a small group 
of individuals with practically no objective validation.  The profession’s influence over 
the examination process has created a perception of bias in the regulatory framework.  
CIPO has had practically no involvement in the development, either historically or an 
annual basis, of the exam format, competencies and marking guidelines.  IPIC is not 
accountable to CIPO regarding use of publicly-funded fees earmarked for licensing 
administration, and CIPO has no information regarding how those funds are used. Similar 
perceptions of bias in patent agent regulatory frameworks has been documented in 
comparable jurisdictions. 
While much of the foregoing discussion surrounding competency and self-regulation 
draws considerable similarities between the Canadian patent agent profession and other 
Canadian professions, there are several key factors that are unique to patent agent 
practice.  Internationally, the patent agent profession, since its inception at the time of the 
early 19th century, has always been a small, esoteric profession uniquely suited to secure 
its own political interests.  Specifically, patent agents, being a tight-knit, specialized and 
highly-focused interest group compared to the atomized interests of independent 
inventors and the general public has allowed patent agents to self-define their own 
professional domain through political influence and a unique proximity to patent offices. 
The proximity between patent agents and patent offices, a relationship which in many 
ways is historically unique, has allowed the two groups to co-evolve and co-develop 
many aspects of the patent system itself, defining a narrative which serves the interests of 
patent agents and their corporate clients.  Advanced industrialized economies that are net 
exporters of patent services, a group to which Canada belongs, are particularly sensitive 
to this phenomenon. Patent agent governance may be the epitome of epistemic capture.  
Accordingly, patent agent regulation in many respects is less about public interest as 
it is about maintaining a dominant narrative.  Competency, as the lynchpin of this 
narrative, is as flexible as the patent system itself.  Since the beginning of Western patent 
systems, patent agents as a unique profession have taken an active role in defining the 
 114 
 
social patent narrative, and with it, their own social role.  Thus, competency in many 
ways is synonymous with administrative efficiency- competency maintains a set structure 
for the patent system between the patent office, patent agents and the major corporate 
filers, each as an interest group in and of themselves.  Efficiency in and of itself is not 
objectionable, and in many ways, is a desirable objective.  But what happens when this 
dominant narrative, sealed closed at the point of ‘competency’, fails to accommodate for 
the needs and interests of large groups of individuals, such as individual inventors and 
small-to-medium enterprises?  What happens if this narrative fails to consider broader 
public interests in access to and dissemination of knowledge?  How will patent agency 
respond to future technological developments, such AI-driven solutions and other 
technological developments, which threaten to disrupt the nature of patent agency?  With 
competency being the cornerstone of this narrative, challenging the narrative may require 
the uneasy task of challenging the concept of patent agent competency. 
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PART 2: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CAPTURE AND PATENT AGENT 
REGULATION 
CHAPTER 5 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW AND PROCEDURAL 
FAIRNESS 
Part 1 of this thesis has set the stage for the significance of patent agent 
competency and regulation, not only in the narrow sense of effect on access to patent 
services, but also its impact in supporting and maintaining a social patent narrative.  As 
Part 1 concluded, if one wishes to challenge this dominant narrative, one of the leading 
options is to challenge the regulatory framework surrounding patent agency and 
specifically, patent agent competency. 
Part 2 of this thesis will explore the available legal mechanisms under Canadian 
law for challenging self-regulatory, entry-to-practice competency standards. This analysis 
will explore the available administrative law mechanisms for challenging self-regulatory, 
entry-to-practice standards, with the following Chapter focusing on administrative law 
challenges to the reasonableness of such standards. 
5.1 SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW AND THE REASONABLENESS OF COMPETENCY 
BASED ENTRY-TO-PRACTICE STANDARDS 
5.1(i) Introduction – Reasonableness Dissected 
To date, there has been a paucity of cases challenging the substantive legality of 
professional competency-based entry standards, and even fewer pertaining directly to 
licensing examinations.  Many of the cases cited herein do not relate directly to 
competency-based entry standards, rather, they deal with self-regulatory bodies and rule-
making pertaining to practice standards for individuals who are already members of the 
profession. Both sets of cases pertain to self-governing bodies’ authority to define who 
may and may not practice the licensed profession and how they may practice.  Thus, 
much like competency-based entry standards, cases relate to self-regulatory bodies’ 
ability to create a boundary between an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ of the profession.  While 
there are certainly legal distinctions between entry qualifications for those who are 
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‘outside trying to get in’ the profession and governance situations involving those who 
already within the profession, for reasons discussed below, many of these cases are 
persuasive for this current analysis. 
Coincidentally, one of few cases relating to licensing examinations comes from 
within the area of patent agent licensing- the 2011 Engfield v. Canada (Attorney General) 
decision.430  This decision is significant in that it highlights issues prevalent in numerous 
cases involving substantive review of competency-based entry standards.  What is the 
level of deference self-regulatory boards are entitled to when setting competency-based 
standards?  How does one properly characterize a substantive versus a procedural issue?  
How are the issues defined and how does one prove their case?  What evidence is 
required, how is it acquired and how should it be presented? 
The self-represented applicant in Engfield had failed three of the four papers of 
the Canadian patent agent examination.  He requested a grade appeal, which led to no 
change in his marks.  He appealed to the federal court (rather than an application for 
judicial review) loosely alleging that that setting of the exam and the marking of his 
examination were unreasonable.431  The applicant requested that the court effectively 
substitute the marks he believed he was entitled to for the marks he had received, which 
ultimately would have allowed him to pass the examination. 
The court acknowledged the daunting pass rate statistics and challenging nature of 
the examination.432  However, the court stated that “[t]he functions of setting and 
marking the annual fall squarely within the Board's specialized expertise and it is fully 
entitled, as it has done, to set exacting standards for entry to this profession.”433  In this 
regard, the court stated that the Patent Agent Examination Board is entitled to a high 
degree of deference in setting and marking the patent agent examination.434   
                                                           
430 2011 FC 1386, 2011 CF 1386, 2011 CarswellNat 5066 [Engfield]. 
431 Ibid at para 8. The court specifically highlights that the applicant misunderstood the difference between appellate 
review before the Board and judicial review before the court.  
432 Ibid at para 7. 
433 Ibid at para 8, para 11: “The Board has appropriately adopted very exacting standards for gaining admission to a 
very exclusive and learned profession.” 
434 Ibid at para 11. 
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The court also highlighted the challenges in clearly discerning the applicant’s 
grounds for review.  The applicant appeared to be arguing either that the exam was too 
challenging or that he believed he was entitled to greater marks on his exam than he was 
awarded, and accordingly, the examination was unreasonable.  The court characterized 
this as a “substantive, albeit misguided, attack on the test results before the Court.”435 The 
applicant presented no clear evidence of unreasonableness, with the court stating that the 
“fact that he is able to advance a more favourable interpretation of his answers than that 
adopted by the examiners is no basis for concluding that the appeal results were 
unreasonable.”436  
The court stated that whatever legal obligations might be owed to the applicant, 
they were at best minimal and were largely procedural in nature.  The Board was required 
to act in good faith and only in instances where the record demonstrated that the Board 
manifestly failed to assess a candidate’s answers would a court intervene on review.437  
Regarding procedure, the court stated that “the Board has no duty to provide reasons 
beyond the provision of the marking guides, the examination questions, the answers and 
the record of the conclusions reached by the reviewers.”438  As the record showed that the 
applicant received all of the foregoing, and that the reviewers did in fact mark his exam 
in accordance with the marking guides, the court dismissed his review.439 
The way that courts have approached these issues and how courts have viewed 
their role on judicial review has changed considerably in the pre and post Dunsmuir eras. 
In the pre-Dunsmuir years (pre-2008), as well as the years following shortly after 
Dunsmuir, courts conflated substantive and procedural issues, inadequately articulated 
the issues on review and most importantly, were quick to set aside decisions of the self-
regulatory bodies on substantive grounds.  However, in recent years, this trend has 
                                                           
435 Ibid at para 14. 
436 Ibid at para 11. 
437 Ibid at para 11. 
438 Ibid at para 14. 
439 The applicant in Engfield appeared to misunderstand the scope of judicial review and put together a confused case, 
citing little precedent and struggling to frame the issues at play in his case.  This may have contributed to the brevity of 
the applicant’s dismissal. 
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slowed and particularly, the level of deference afforded to self-regulatory bodies has 
increased significantly.   
A good example of the way courts approached review in the pre-Dunsmuir era is 
the 1993 Brett v. Board of Directors of Physiotherapy (Ontario) decision.440  In Brett, a 
licensed physiotherapist was charged by the profession’s regulatory board with three 
cases of misconduct under regulations passed pursuant to the Drugless Practitioners Act, 
1925.441  The regulations in question permitted the board to set standards governing 
professional ‘misconduct’, which misconduct included “failure to maintain the standards 
of practice of the profession” and “permitting, counselling or assisting any person to 
engage in the practice of physiotherapy whom the physiotherapist knows or ought to 
know is not registered as a physiotherapist”.442  Pursuant to such authority, the board set 
“Standards of Practice” guidelines which prohibited registered physiotherapists from 1) 
treating more than 5.5 patients per hour, 2) having more than one auxiliary staff member 
employed per physiotherapist and 3) permitting auxiliary staff and students from 
administering treatment, in its entirety, without a physiotherapist having had contact with 
the patient.  
The applicant was charged and found guilty of violating all three of the above-
referenced standards and on request for judicial review, challenged verdict as being 
unreasonable.  Although not pertaining directly to entry-level competency-based 
qualifications, the standards did concern acceptable “modalities of physiotherapy 
treatment” separating and distinguishing acceptable involvement of individuals deemed 
competent (i.e. registered practitioners) and incompetent (i.e. staff and students) in the 
delivery of professional services.443  As such, Brett related to the respective roles and 
authority of self-governing bodies and courts in assessing the boundary between 
competent and incompetent practice. 
                                                           
440 (1993), 13 Admin. L.R. (2d) 217, 64 O.A.C. 152, (sub nom. Brett v. Ontario (Board of Directors of Physiotherapy)) 
104 D.L.R. (4th) 421 (C.A.). 
441S.O. 1925, c. 49 [DPA].  Note that this legislation was subsequently replaced with the Regulated Health Professions 
Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 18 which applies to over twenty different health professions in Ontario. 
442 O. Reg. 636/86, s. 1. 
443 Brett, supra note 449 at para 3. 
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The issue in Brett was framed as a review of the Board decision that the applicant 
was guilty of professional misconduct.  The issue was not framed as review of the 
reasonableness of the Board’s interpretation of its “standards of practice” regulatory 
authority nor as the reasonableness of the impugned “Standards of Practice” guidelines 
passed pursuant to that authority.444  Furthermore, Brett involved several other issues, 
including bias surrounding the role of counsel to the Board in carrying out investigation 
of the applicant and errors committed during the investigation.  At times, the court’s 
reasoning seems to blend these issues into a single analysis. 
Regarding the applicant’s alleged misconduct due to breach of the impugned 
guidelines, the court stated that “all [of the impugned guidelines] rest on the assumption 
that all patient treatment or virtually all patient treatment should be given only by a 
physiotherapist. If that assumption is not well founded, then findings of misconduct based 
thereon must fail.”445  Accordingly, the court conducted a thorough review of the process 
used to establish the guidelines.  The court was highly critical of the fact that the 
guidelines were established based almost entirely on a single survey distributed to 
registered practitioners across the province, a survey which the board itself recognized as 
having shortcomings.446  The Board itself acknowledged that it was an ‘assumption’ that 
patient loads over the 5.5/hour might place the public at risk447 and that in the absence of 
an evaluative component linking caseloads to outcome measures and ensuring validity 
and reliability “the establishment of caseload guidelines will remain a somewhat arbitrary 
                                                           
444 Ibid at para 34. However, the court seemed to question whether the Board had authority to pass the impugned 
guidelines: “Under s .6 of the Drugless Practitioners Act, the board, with the approval of the Lieutenant-Governor in 
Council, can by regulation make it professional misconduct for a physiotherapist to direct auxiliaries to apply 
physiotherapy treatments to patients, or to treat more than 5.5 patients per hour on the average, or to hire more than one 
auxiliary for every two physiotherapists. But that in the long run is a political decision and approval for such 
regulations is not likely to be given by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council unless such regulations are required in the 
public interest.”  The court’s interpretation may not have been entirely accurate, given that the Regulation allowing the 
Board to govern ‘standards of practice’ had already been approved by the Lieutenant-Governor in Council. Regardless, 
this may be at best described as obiter as it does not appear that the court resolved this question or that its resolution (or 
lack thereof) was determinative of the outcome. 
445 Ibid at para 16.  Also, at para 18: “Indeed, if those guidelines and ratios are not related to the efficacy of treatment, 
they would appear to have little relevance to the proper practice of physiotherapy.” 
446 Ibid at para 21. 
447 Ibid at para 22. 
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procedure.”448  Guidelines pertaining to use of auxiliary staff were developed in a similar 
manner.449 
The court did not dispute that increased patient loads could affect competent 
delivery of services and that there were certain kinds of treatment that should only be 
delivered by a registered physiotherapist.450  However, the court received evidence from 
several doctors- doctors also being legally entitled to provide physiotherapy services- 
stating that the impugned guidelines relating to use of auxiliaries was contrary to the way 
physiotherapy was customarily being practiced in Ontario.451 The court stated that a 
professional cannot be charged with professional misconduct where “there exists a 
responsible and competent body of professional opinion that supports that conduct or 
judgment.”452  The court concluded that: 
In the light of that evidence, and even assuming that the great majority 
of physiotherapists are of the opinion that only physiotherapists should 
give treatment to patients, I am of the view that the board was not 
entitled to find that because Brett's clinic employs more than one 
auxiliary for every two physiotherapists and treats more than 5.5 
patients per hour per physiotherapist, that Brett is for those reasons 
guilty of failing to maintain the standards of practice of her 
profession.453 
In a relatively brief judgement, the Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court 
ruling, stating that: 
…the standards of practice purportedly contravened by the respondent 
were promulgated as a result of the survey referred to in the reasons of 
the Divisional Court. We agree with its comments with respect to those 
standards. Although the standards applied purportedly had as their 
objective the protection of members of the public having resort to 
treatment by physiotherapists, the method by which the standards were 
                                                           
448 Ibid at para 21. 
449 Ibid at para 23. 
450 Ibid at paras 26-7. 
451 Ibid at paras 28-31. “It appears from the evidence, therefore, that it is common practice throughout Ontario that 
auxiliaries are allowed to apply most if not all modalities of treatment to patients. It is also clear that medical doctors 
specializing in orthopaedics and rehabilitation medicine feel that properly trained and supervised auxiliaries are 
competent to give such treatment.” 
452 Ibid at para 35. 
453 Ibid at para 31. 
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established was so flawed that the resulting standards cannot be said to 
come close to meeting that objective. Consequently, any decision 
respecting standards of practice based only on failure to meet those 
standards, as in this case, we consider to be patently unreasonable.454 
There are many curious aspects to the Brett decision.  Primarily, with the issue 
being exclusively framed as reasonableness of the misconduct verdict, it is interesting 
that the court instead emphasized the reasonableness of the guidelines as the basis for its 
reasoning.  Furthermore, it is not only difficult to understand the relevance of the 
evidence provided by the several doctors pertaining to the unreasonableness of the 
guidelines, but also how such evidence was permitted on the record.  Ultimately, it is 
difficult to ascertain a clear set of legal principles from the court’s reasoning that would 
provide direction for self-regulatory bodies, practitioners and future courts.455   
Things have changed since the time Brett was decided.  As discussed below, the 
scope of how and when courts will set aside competency-based standards based on what 
it considers to be improper validation processes, and the evidence upon which it can base 
such decisions, has diminished considerably.  Furthermore, the scope of discretion 
afforded to self-regulatory bodies in interpreting and implementing their statutory 
mandate has increased considerably. Lastly, although there are still many unanswered 
questions, in the post-Dunsmuir era, and especially in recent years, courts of all levels, 
including the Supreme Court, have provided considerable clarity regarding scope of self-
regulatory discretion with respect to setting competency-based standards.  
5.1(ii) Expertise, Legislative Intent and Professional Self-Regulation 
Courts have stated that self-regulatory discretion is grounded not only legislative 
intent, but also out of recognition of the need for deference to administrative expertise.  
For example, in Patterson v. Dental Assn. & College (Alberta), three foreign trained 
dentists initiated the process of becoming licensed dentists in the province of Alberta, 
                                                           
454 Ibid at para 7. 
455 The reasoning in Brett pertaining to evaluation of competing sets of professional opinions pertaining to acceptable 
standards of practice appears to have only once been followed.  In Provincial Dental Board of Nova Scotia v. Dr. Clive 
Creager, 2005 NSCA 9 (CanLII) at para 36. The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal cites Brett for the proposition that: 
“there is authority that a course of treatment supported by a responsible and competent body of professional opinion 
does not become professional misconduct merely because there is a differing body of professional opinion.  A 
discipline proceeding is not a laboratory for prioritizing competing but responsible methods of treatment.” 
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which process involved writing a set of equivalency examinations administered by the 
Alberta’s licensing Tribunal.  Upon failing the exams on repeated occasions, the three 
doctors brought applications for judicial review.   
Although decided on procedural considerations unique to the facts of the case and 
based on the pre-Dunsmuir patent unreasonableness standard of review, the court’s 
comments regarding its role in substantive review of professional licensing standards, and 
the legal justifications supporting its position, are nonetheless reflective of general 
propositions adopted by numerous courts: 
…[T]he real decisions of the [licensing Tribunal] were decisions on the 
technical qualifications necessary for the practice of dentistry in 
Alberta…. On that issue, the tribunals appealed from have relative 
expertise — the courts do not. Given the nature of the issue before the 
tribunals, the required relative expertise is technical and professional; 
the courts do not have expertise in matters such as endodontics, 
removable prosthodontics, fixed prosthodontics, pedodontics, operative 
dentistry, periodontics, orthodontics. The relative expertise of the 
Council includes the balancing of the public interest in minimal 
professional qualifications with the interests of the applicants. The 
court’s expertise is less in balancing public health interests against other 
claims than in resolving disputes between two parties. Moreover, the 
mandate given to those tribunals by the Legislature of Alberta was to 
protect the health of persons residing in Alberta requiring dental care. 
Professional qualifications are obviously an important component of the 
public interest in this matter… After weighing all those factors, the 
court concludes that it owes great deference to these decisions of the 
[licensing Tribunal]. Indeed, in matters relating essentially to health 
standards, those tribunals have the right to make “near exclusive 
determinations”; they are entitled to make decisions, even decisions that 
are incorrect in law, so long as the decisions are not clearly irrational. 
456 (emphasis added) 
The court in Patterson stated that the purpose of the licensing legislation was to 
“protect the health of Albertans who require dental care by ensuring that dentists licensed 
to practice in this province are at least minimally qualified to do so” and that self-
regulation of the profession “allows, and requires, the profession to establish and monitor 
standards for admission to the practice of dentistry” and “the task of balancing the safety 
of the public and the interests of individuals who wish to practice dentistry in this 
                                                           
456 Patterson v. Dental Assn. & College (Alberta), 2004 ABQB 742, 2004 CarswellAlta 1339 at para 20. 
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province.”457  The court acknowledged both the technical expertise of the Tribunal, with 
respect to dental competency, as well as its “broad representation of public policy 
perspectives”, stating that “while the court must be alert to public policy objectives, it 
does not have the means of obtaining input on public policy objectives.”458  
5.1(iii) The Difficulty in Challenging ‘Difficulty’ 
The difficulty that most applicants face in attempting to challenge licensing 
standards is largely evidentiary in nature.  Even where courts are seemingly sympathetic 
to what appears to be unduly onerous standards, without an evidentiary basis or 
benchmark of what is reasonable or unreasonable, how can applicants legally challenge 
such standards?   
For example, in Safai-Naini v. Quebec (Attorney General)459, a group of foreign 
trained physicians sought judicial review after failing Quebec’s licensing examination 
process, alleging that the process was conducted in bad faith, was unreasonable, arbitrary 
or discriminatory.   The evidence demonstrated that between 1995 to 2001, the pass rate 
for foreign trained doctors had dropped from 25 percent to 19.3 percent, compared to an 
average pass rate of 94 to 95 percent for Quebec medical graduates.460   
While both foreign and domestic trained doctors wrote the same examination, the 
applicants presented several differences in the examination process which they alleged 
led to unequal treatment.  Foreign trained students had to first pass a qualifying 
examination that domestic students did not have to pass.461  Unlike domestic trained 
students, foreign trained doctors were prohibited from taking a supplemental examination 
upon failure, instead having to wait until the following year to retake the examination.462  
                                                           
457 Ibid at para 62. 
458 Ibid at para 61. 
459 2002 CarswellQue 1560, JE 2002-1406, REJB 2002-33103. 
460 Ibid at para 14. 
461 Ibid at para 33. 
462 Ibid at para 33. 
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Furthermore, they were not entitled to access a preparation course offered to domestic 
students as part of the education, and no preparatory assistance was provided.463 
The court accepted that differences in requirements between foreign and domestic 
students was necessary to guarantee the quality of education received in the diversity of 
schools around the world with curricula and systems which cannot be adequately 
monitored in Canada.464 While the court also acknowledged that the applicants’ 
complaints pertaining to the significantly disparate pass rates between domestic and 
foreign students “at face value seem plausible”, the court stated that it had “no real and 
verifiable way of knowing why so many foreign trained graduates do not succeed.”465  
With a lack of evidence providing details as to how and why foreign trained students 
were failing is such greater numbers, the court stated that “it would be wrong for the 
Court to decline to accord the required curial deference to the College with respect to the 
manner it has decided to examine these candidates, especially because the written exam is 
the same as the one written by Quebec medical school graduates.”466  Thus, in the 
absence of verifiable record demonstrating the cause of the disparate failure rates, the 
court dismissed the applicantion.467 
Similarly, Togher v. Law Society (Alberta) centered around Section 37 of 
Alberta’s Legal Profession Act468 which granted broad authorization to the Benchers to 
make rules dealing with evaluation of academic qualifications and bar admission.469  The 
applicant, midway through her foreign legal education, was informed that the Law 
Society of Alberta had changed the foreign accreditation process, switching to the FCA’s 
                                                           
463 Ibid. 
464 Ibid at paras 36-40. 
465 Ibid at para 42. 
466 Ibid at para 43. 
467 Ibid at para 46. 
468 R.S.A. 2000, c.L-8 
469  Ibid at s 37(1). The section grants Benchers authority to make rules regarding: evaluation of the academic 
qualifications of applicants for enrolment as members of the Society or for admission to the Society as students-at-law; 
bar admission courses and bar admission examinations; special examinations to be taken by an applicant for enrolment 
as a member of the Society or for admission to the Society as a student-at-law; the period and conditions of articles to 
be served before an applicant's enrolment as a member; other examinations to be taken or requirements to be fulfilled 
by applicants for enrolment as members of the Society or for admission to the Society as students-at-law. 
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NCA examination.  It was undisputed that the FCA requirements, which included a series 
of nine equivalency examinations, were far more onerous than the previous 
requirements.470 
The applicant raised a number grounds for review, including a “beguiling” 
assertion that the Law Society acted outside of its mandate by retaining the NCA to 
determine foreign legal education equivalency and imposing a higher standard upon 
students with foreign law degrees than for domestic law students.471  While the court 
readily dismissed this argument, Hart J. stated: 
I am sympathetic to the proposition that the number of examinations 
and required subjects is onerous, and in fact appears arguably 
excessive. However, I do not believe that it would be appropriate to 
interfere in the decision of the Law Society to defer to the NCA in 
determining the educational program required to achieve equivalence, 
even on a standard of correctness.472 (emphasis added) 
 
5.1(iv) Legislative Interpretation and the Range of Acceptable Solutions 
In circumstances involving questions of scope of a self-regulatory body’s 
governance authority, courts have afforded self-governing bodies considerable discretion 
in interpreting their enabling statute.  For example, in Basciano v. Assn. of Landscape 
Architects (Ontario), the Association of Landscape Architects [the “Association”] had 
passed a By-law expanding the definition of the certification title “Landscape Architect” 
to include a broad range of activities along with a reduction in certification examination 
standards.473  The applicant challenged the legality of the By-law, arguing that 
broadening the scope of the activities captured by the ‘landscape architect’ title was 
                                                           
470 Togher v. Law Society 2005 ABQB 937 at para 9, CarswellAlta 1892 Hart J [Togher]. 
471 Ibid at paras 31-3. 
472 Ibid at para 33. 
473 Basciano v. Assn. of Landscape Architects 2008 OJ at para 24, 3751CarswellOnt 5660 [Basciano]. “The Association 
adopts an expansive interpretation of the term "landscape architecture": it views the activities reasonably 
comprehended by "landscape architecture" to include activities such as urban design, site planning, regional landscape 
planning, ecological planning and design, heritage conservation, and landscape reclamation and restoration.”   
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either ultra vires the Association’s discretion to act in the ‘public interest’ or that the By-
law was passed for the improper purpose of simply increasing membership.474   
Interestingly, the Ontario Association of Landscape Architects Act, 1984475 does 
not define ‘landscape architecture’, which the court found to be an “elastic term” granting 
the Association “liberty to self-define”.476  In upholding the validity of the By-law, the 
court stated that the Association’s mandate to enact by-laws as well as its ‘public interest’ 
mandate granted it broad discretion to set its own professional standards: 
Here, the Association has the mandate of regulating the practice of the 
profession of landscape architecture. With that mandate goes a dual 
obligation to its constituency of practitioners on one hand and to 
members of the public on the other. In the discharge of that mandate, 
the association is empowered by statute to determine the standards that 
are appropriate and necessary by way of educational and other 
qualifications for membership. No body is in better position to assess 
those needs than the Association and it is clearly better placed to make 
those determinations than the court. The court should therefore defer to 
the Association's greater expertise.477 
Despite the foregoing, courts have, in recent years, invalidated competency-based 
entry standards as unreasonable.  In these instances, the matter typically involves 
particular legislative context and statutory language, and as such, the matter can be 
characterized as the reasonableness of a self-regulatory body’s interpretation of its 
statutory authority.  An excellent example is Laffin v. Assn. of Professional Geoscientists 
(Ontario).478 In issue in Laffin was the Professional Geoscientists Act, 2000479, which 
                                                           
474 Ibid at 16-17. However, the court at para 43 states that “The heart of the applicant's challenge goes to the wisdom of 
lowering the bar for qualification for full membership.” 
475 S.O. 1984, c. Pr12. 
476 Basciano, supra note 482 at paras 31-32. “It is a profession that applies artistic and scientific principles to the 
research, planning, design and management of both natural and built environments. Practitioners use creative and 
technical skills together with scientific, cultural and legislative knowledge in the planned arrangement of natural and 
constructed elements on the land. The principles of stewardship, conservation and preservation of natural features are 
paramount in the practice of landscape architecture. Landscape architects are qualified to render advice on matters 
related to the planning, design and management of landscapes for human use and enjoyment. Further, landscape 
architects are trained to have the multidisciplinary education and experience to recognize, analyze, and synthesize the 
complex issues surrounding land use changes which often result in the design of landscapes that accommodate human 
activity, while protecting and enhancing the natural processes upon which we depend.” 
477 Ibid at paras 44-5. 
478 Laffin v. Assn. of Professional Geoscientists 2011 ONSC 6927, CarswellOnt 15450 [Laffin]. 
479 S.O. 2000, c. 13. 
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governs the practice of professional geoscience but not define ‘geoscience’.480  
Individuals seeking licensing as a professional geoscientist must meet certain ‘prescribed 
requirements’, and the Council of the Association of Professional Geoscientists is 
authorized, subject to the approval of the Minister of Northern Development, Mines and 
Forestry, to make Regulations “respecting eligibility for membership, standards relating 
to the practice of the profession, including educational requirements for members, and the 
discipline of members and certificate holders, including what constitutes professional 
misconduct”.481 
The applicant in Laffin sought licensing as a geoscientist.  At the time of her 
application, s. 8(1)1(i) of the relevant eligibility Regulation stated that applicants must 
hold: 
 
a four-year bachelor of science degree or its equivalent, awarded by a 
Canadian university, in an area of geoscience and have at the time of 
applying at least four years of qualifying work experience, as 
determined by the Registration Committee, in an area of geoscience 
that was obtained within the previous 10 years.482 
The applicant had completed a four year Bachelor of Science degree with a 
double major in Geology and Geography and completed the requisite work experience.483  
Upon application for licensing, the applicant was informed that upon review of her 
educational transcript, it was determined that she needed to complete further educational 
requirements in order to qualify.484  A special appeal committee upheld the decision, 
referencing an Association education guideline, developed pursuant to s. 8(1)1(i) of the 
eligibility Regulation, which set out detailed sample curriculum course content for 
                                                           
480 Ibid. Sec. 2(1) defines the practice of professional geoscience as “An individual practises professional geoscience 
when he or she performs an activity that requires the knowledge, understanding and application of the principles of 
geoscience and that concerns the safeguarding of the welfare of the public or the safeguarding of life, health or property 
including the natural environment.” 
481 Laffin, supra note 487 at paras 5-6. 
482 Sec. 8(1), O. Reg. 59/01 
483 Laffin, supra note 487 at para 8. 
484 Ibid at para 9. “She was informed that the Registration Committee had decided to defer consideration of her 
application until she met further educational requirements: two foundation mathematics and science courses, including 
physics, and two geoscience electives. She was to meet those requirements by June 30, 2012.” 
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licensing consideration.485  As the applicant’s course of study was deficient in several 
respects compared to the guideline, the committee found that additional educational 
courses would be required for licensing. 
On application for judicial review486, the superior court, characterizing the issue 
as reasonableness of the Association’s interpretation of s. 8(1)1(i), found the 
Association’s interpretation unreasonable.  Applying Dunsmuir, the court found that 
although not explicitly stated, the Association had accepted that s. 8(1)1(i) had granted it 
authority to review the course content of Canadian university programs to determine 
whether such curriculum was satisfactory to the Association.487  Upon analysis of s. 
8(1)1(i) within the context of the entire statutory scheme, the court found it “telling that 
other parts of the regulation clearly give the authority to the Registration Committee to 
assess the quality of work experience or to assess the equivalency of a degree… It does 
not use that language with respect to the evaluation of the requisite Canadian degree.”488  
The court stated that: 
The absence of a reference to a discretion to evaluate the content of a 
Canadian degree is significant. There is no question that the 
Registration Committee has the authority to determine whether the 
degree is in an area of geoscience. But once there has been an 
assessment of the applicant’s major field of study, the Committee does 
not appear to have the authority to specify the particular components of 
the degree. That appears to have been left to the Canadian universities.  
For the Registration Committee to go further and evaluate the content 
of the degree gives the Association a role similar to the power of 
accreditation…489 (emphasis added) 
The court distinguished the Basciano decision, stating that in Basciano, the 
legislation in question explicitly granted the Association of Landscape Architects 
authority to prescribe a curriculum and courses of study for students.490  Furthermore, the 
                                                           
485 Ibid at paras 10-4. 
486 Ibid at paras 15-17. Note that the court characterizes the decision as an appeal rather than judicial review, despite 
applying a judicial review analysis. 
487 Ibid at para 20. 
488 Ibid at para 29. 
489 Ibid at paras 31-32. 
490 Ibid at para 33. 
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court highlighted the significance of the Regulation-making process, stating that 
education Regulation required Ministerial approval and was originally passed after 
rounds of revisions and a public consultation process.491  If the Association wished to 
change its educational requirements, it would again have to go through regulatory 
approval process, “a process that includes an opportunity for notice, as well as public 
scrutiny and comment from interested stakeholders, including members and prospective 
members” and approval by the Minister.492 
The court’s conclusion, ultimately upheld by the Court of Appeal493, was that: 
 
The Registration Committee and Special Committee never addressed 
the scope of the Association’s power under the registration regulation. 
In my view, the decision of the Special Committee, which is the 
decision under appeal, meets neither part of the reasonableness test in 
Dunsmuir: the decision lacks justification, and it does not fall within the 
range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible, given the 
legislative framework. When the wording of s. 8(1)1(i) of the regulation 
is examined in the context of the regulation as a whole, the Act and 
other similar legislation, the decision to impose additional educational 
requirements on the appellant was unreasonable. Ms. Laffin has a four 
year Bachelor of Science degree in an area of geoscience — geography 
and geology — from a Canadian university. From the material, it 
appears there is no question that she has met the experience criterion.494 
(emphasis added) 
5.1(v) Public Interest and Rule-Making Authority 
Decisions such as Laffin, involving specific statutory context limiting broad 
discretion to govern competency-based entry standards, are few and far between.  
Furthermore, recent Supreme Court and appellate court jurisprudence has set a wide 
scope of discretion for self-regulatory, competency-based rule making authority.  The 
recent Green v. Law Society of Manitoba decision may epitomize this line of 
jurisprudence.  Although not decided in the context of entry-based competency standards, 
                                                           
491 Ibid at para 36. 
492 Ibid at para 37. 
493 2012 ONCA 846, 225 A.C.W.S. (3d) 245, 2012 CarswellOnt 15169.  
494 Ibid at para 38. 
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Green directly involved competency-based rulemaking in the form of continuing 
professional development (CPD) requirements for lawyers, and as such, is undoubtedly 
persuasive. 
In Green, the Law Society of Manitoba had passed rules regarding mandatory 
CPD requirements for licensed lawyers.  Under the rules, lawyers failing to comply with 
mandatory CPD requirements would receive several warnings notifying them to comply 
within a certain timeline.  After a certain number of warnings were received, the lawyer 
in default of their CPD obligations would automatically have their license suspended. 
The Court begins its analysis by summarizing the issues: 
Mr. Green has challenged the impugned rules because he has no interest 
in complying with them. Since these rules came into force in 2012, Mr. 
Green has not reported completing any CPD hours. He argues that the 
impugned rules are unfair because they impose a suspension without a 
right to a hearing or a right of appeal. Yet Mr. Green has not applied for 
judicial review of the Law Society’s decision to suspend him. He has 
not complained that the Law Society treated him unfairly. Mr. Green is 
challenging these rules on these procedural grounds, not for fear of 
injustice. He is simply not interested in attending a mandated number of 
CPD activities.  Despite these motivations for Mr. Green’s challenge to 
the impugned rules, this Court must now determine whether those rules 
fall outside the Law Society’s statutory mandate.495 
With respect to rule-setting authority, the Court stated that the standard applicable 
to the review of law society rules is reasonableness.  Citing its decision in Catalyst 
Paper, a case involving the reasonableness of a taxation by-law passed by a municipal 
council, wherein the Court stated: 
It is thus clear that courts reviewing bylaws for reasonableness must 
approach the task against the backdrop of the wide variety of factors 
that elected municipal councillors may legitimately consider in enacting 
bylaws. The applicable test is this: only if the bylaw is one no 
reasonable body informed by these factors could have taken will the 
bylaw be set aside. The fact that wide deference is owed to municipal 
councils does not mean that they have carte blanche….Reasonableness 
limits municipal councils in the sense that the substance of their bylaws 
must conform to the rationale of the statutory regime set up by the 
legislature. The range of reasonable outcomes is thus circumscribed by 
                                                           
495 Green v. Law Society of Manitoba 2017 SCC 20, [2017] 1 SCR 360 at paras 18-19 [Green]. 
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the purview of the legislative scheme that empowers a municipality to 
pass a bylaw.496 [emphasis added] 
According to the Court, “a law society rule will be set aside only if the rule ‘is one 
no reasonable body informed by [the relevant] factors could have [enacted]’… this means 
‘that the substance of [law society rules] must conform to the rationale of the statutory 
regime set up by the legislature’”.497  The Court stated that: 
Similar considerations (as Catalyst Paper) are relevant in the context of 
rules made by a law society.  The legislature specifically gave the Law 
Society a broad discretion to regulate the legal profession on the basis 
of a number of policy considerations related to the public interest. The 
Act empowers the benchers of the Law Society to make rules of general 
application to the profession, and in doing so, the benchers act in a 
legislative capacity.  Further, reasonableness is the appropriate standard 
because many of the benchers of the Law Society are elected by and 
accountable to members of the legal profession. While it is true that the 
public does not directly vote for the benchers, the rules the benchers 
make apply only to members of the profession. Thus, McLachlin C.J.’s 
comments in Catalyst Paper in the context of municipal bylaws are apt 
here as well: “. . . reasonableness means courts must respect the 
responsibility of elected representatives to serve the people who elected 
them and to whom they are ultimately accountable”498 (emphasis 
added) 
With respect to the rationale of the statutory regime, the Court cited Edmonton 
City as supporting the proposition that “the Law Society has expertise in regulating the 
legal profession ‘at an institutional level’”499 and highlighted its previous history of 
recognizing that self-governing professional bodies have “particular expertise when it 
comes to deciding on the policies and procedures that govern the practice of their 
professions”.500  In upholding the reasonableness of the mandatory CPD rule, the Court 
concluded that “the Law Society must therefore be afforded considerable latitude in 
                                                           
496 Catalyst Paper Corp. v. North Cowichan (District), 2012 SCC 2, [2012] 1 SCR 5 at paras 24-5 [Catalyst Paper]. 
497 Green, supra note 504 at para 20. 
498 Ibid at paras 22-23. Although the Court did not explicitly cite any cases to support its line of analogy between the 
self-regulating legal profession in Green and a municipally elected council in Catalyst Paper, this is in line with both 
the Court’s own jurisprudence as well as lower court jurisprudence.  See Pearlman v. Law Society 1991 2 SCR 869, 
SCJ No 66, CarswellMan 201 [Pearlman] at paras 40-3. See also Basciano, supra note 482 at para 44. “The power 
vested in the Association's council to enact by-laws pursuant to s. 7 of the Act is analogous to the power vested in a 
municipal council to enact by-laws under the provincial municipal acts.”   
499 Green, supra note 504 at 25. 
500 Ibid. 
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making rules based on its interpretation of the “public interest” in the context of its 
enabling statute”.501   
The companion cases of Sobeys West Inc. v. College of Pharmacists of British 
Columbia502 and Alberta College of Pharmacists v Sobeys West Inc.503 provide a recent 
look at the reasonableness of bylaws passed by self-regulatory bodies, and specifically, in 
the context of balancing ‘public interest’ considerations with economic considerations 
such as cost of services, access to services and competition.  Both Sobeys West and 
Alberta College, similar to Green, followed and applied Catalyst Paper’s test pertaining 
to reasonableness of self-regulatory by-laws, and Alberta College, decided shortly after 
Green, provides an early glimpse into Green’s impact.   
In Sobeys West, the College of Pharmacists of British Columbia passed By-laws 
prohibiting pharmacists from adopting ‘customer incentive programs’ to induce the 
purchase of pharmacy services, drugs or devices from particular pharmacies or 
pharmacists.504  The College is governed by a Council authorized to pass By-laws for the 
achievement of several professional objectives, pursuant to its duty to serve and protect 
the public, such as establishing competency-standards for entry to practice as well as 
professional ethics standards.505  Such By-laws must be filed by the Minister of Health 
“who may disallow the bylaw or a portion thereof, or declare that the bylaw or a portion 
thereof will come into force on a specified date.”506 
The impugned By-law, passed unanimously by a 12-person Council consisting of 
four public members appointed by the Minister of Health and eight members elected by 
the College, prohibited members from providing ‘incentives’ to patients for the purpose 
                                                           
501 Ibid at para 24. The Court states: “I agree with the courts below that the Law Society has the authority to do so. The 
Law Society is required by statute to protect members of the public who seek to obtain legal services by establishing 
and enforcing educational standards for practicing lawyers. CPD programs serve this public interest and enhance 
confidence in the legal profession by requiring lawyers to participate, on an ongoing basis, in activities that enhance 
their skills, integrity and professionalism. CPD programs have in fact become an essential aspect of professional 
education in Canada. Most law societies across the country have implemented compulsory CPD programs.” 
502 2016 BCCA 41, leave to appeal dismissed, [2016] SCCA No. 116 [Sobeys West]. 
503 2017 ABCA 306 [Alberta College]. 
504 Sobeys West, supra note 511 at para 1. 
505 Ibid at 6-7. 
506 Ibid at para 7. 
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of inducing them to deliver prescriptions or obtain pharmacy services from the particular 
member.507 The By-law defined incentives as “money, gifts, discounts, rebates, refunds, 
customer loyalty schemes, coupons, goods or rewards.”508  The College asserted that 
incentive programs could affect fiduciary obligations in the pharmacist-patient 
relationship as well as leading to a number of ‘potential harms’ including causing patients 
to defer filing prescriptions until incentive ‘bonus days’,  causing patients to repeatedly 
transfer prescriptions thereby interrupting continuity of care and incentivizing customers 
to procure more drugs than necessary.509 
The Superior Court invalidated the By-law as an unreasonable exercise of 
discretion.  The court rejected the petitioner’s claim that the impugned Bylaws were 
motivated by a desire to protect smaller pharmacies from competition, finding no 
evidence to support any such assertion.510  While acknowledging that evidence of ‘actual 
harm’ was not required, in the case at hand, the Council had passed the impugned By-law 
based only on conjecture of a possibility of harm.511  The court stated that what was in the 
‘public interest’ had to be justified by facts established before the Board.512   
                                                           
507 Ibid at para 11. 
508 Ibid at para 11. 
509 Ibid at para 21. 
510 Sobeys West Inc. v. College of Pharmacists of British Columbia, 2014 BCSC 1414 (CanLII) at para 21. 
511 Ibid at paras 27-9, 33. 
512 Ibid at para 29.  On this point, it is interesting to note some of the evidence highlighted by the court in support of its 
conclusion: While the Deputy Registrar of the College had alleged that the Board had received reports regarding 
substandard practice relating to cash incentive programs, but the evidence demonstrated that there had only been two 
complaints filed (both of which were after the passing of the Bylaw) (paras 15-6);  the Board had commissioned a 
comprehensive report which concluded that “at that time, there was no evidence that loyalty programs had harmed 
patients”, and that “if cases of specific harms to customers from such programs became evident, those cases could be 
dealt with through the respondent’s inquiry and discipline process” (para 17); the Board held a broad public 
consultation, pursuant to which it “received some 14,000 emails from members of the public. The considerable 
majority of these emails opposed a prohibition of the incentive programs” (para 19); a letter from the Competition 
Bureau to the Alberta College of Pharmacists (at the time considering similar Bylaws) stated that “it is not clear from 
your document that the [Alberta College of Pharmacist’s] views on the impact of inducements on consumer decisions 
to purchase prescription drugs is based on any empirical evidence. We would respectfully suggest that, without such 
evidence, it is difficult to conclude that any of the negative consequences associated with this consumer behaviour can 
be determined.” (para 38); and the letter indicated that such incentive programs may improve access to necessary health 
services for low income Canadians (para 38).  See also para 39 for discussion of the affidavit Ms. Wihak, of Counsel 
for the petitioners.  Upon reviewing the documents produced by the College, she concluded that “The only Documents 
contained in the nine volumes that relate to actual or potential harm caused by incentives relate to documentation of 
incidents with regard to the Methadone Treatment Program, and certain pharmacies located in the Vancouver 
Downtown Eastside, which were engaging in a range of fraudulent and harmful practices in relation to methadone 
treatments… There are no Documents that relate to any specific harm caused by loyalty points or loyalty programs and 
pharmaceutical services and prescriptions.” 
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Four of the twelve Council Members who had voted in favour of the impugned 
Bylaw proffered affidavits highlighting the risks associated with incentive practice, 
including ethical concerns involving pharmacist conflict of interest and over-dispensing 
of drugs.513  The court stated that the affiants’ evidence “defied common sense”, in that 
“customer purchasing of drugs and devices whose prices will far exceed the value of the 
incentives offered”, and especially for those in vulnerable, low-income populations, it 
would seem highly unlikely that such individuals would repeatedly fill orders to receive 
such a comparatively small reward.514  The court highlighted the overbreadth of the 
impugned Bylaw in light of its objectives, pointing out several more precise actions the 
College could have taken to mitigate against the allegedly undesirable conduct, stating 
that “the broader approach adopted by the respondent is thus unnecessary to meet this 
concern, and contrary to the public interest in obtaining drugs and devices at the lowest 
cost.”515  The court concluded that the College’s “decision to pass the Impugned Bylaws 
falls outside the range of possible acceptable outcomes, given the competing public 
interests, and the respondent’s ability to pass bylaws that are narrower in scope to address 
their reasonable concerns.”516   
On appeal, the British Columbia Court of Appeal overturned the Superior Court’s 
finding that the impugned Bylaws were unreasonable.  As a preliminary matter, the Court 
of Appeal addressed the issue of the petitioners’ evidence, and the proper scope of an 
evidentiary record in judicial review of regulatory by-law making authority.  To the 
extent that evidence that was not directly before the Council during the decision-making 
process was admitted, which evidence included material such as studies regarding 
incentive programs from other jurisdictions, the Competition Bureau opinion letter and 
opinions of pharmacists regarding their perceptions of incentive programs, the Superior 
Court had erred in law.517  The Court of Appeal acknowledged that under certain limited 
                                                           
513 Ibid at paras 41-4. The court, at paras 45-6, was critical of the fact that only 4 of the 12 board members proffered 
affidavits and the lack of corroboration between the opinions of the affiants and the evidence regarding lack of actual 
complaints. 
514 Ibid at para 47. 
515 Ibid at para 54. 
516 Ibid at para 59. 
517 Sobeys West, supra note 511 at para 53. 
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circumstances, a more flexible view of the evidentiary record may be justified, such as 
where an administrative body is attempting to ‘immunize its decisions from any 
scrutiny’, situations involving fraud or allegations of bad faith.518  However, in the case at 
hand where no such circumstances existed, the Court of Appeal rejected the admissibility 
of such evidence.519 
Regarding substantive reasonableness, the Court of Appeal stated that the 
unifying theme of the Act, much like other professional regulatory statutes allowing self-
governance in the ‘public’s interest’, is that “[t]here can be no doubt that ‘public interest’ 
in this context extends to the maintenance of high ethical standards and professionalism 
on the part of the profession.”520 While nothing in the Act granted the Council authority 
to regulate professional fees, similarly, nothing required the Council to ensure that 
services were provided to the public at the lowest price.521 
Incentive programs were a matter of concern to the public, and given the 
evidence, “anecdotal though it may have been in whole or in part”, the Council acted 
                                                           
518 Ibid at para 53. 
519 Ibid at para 52: “There is ample authority for the proposition that evidence that could or should have been before the 
tribunal, but which was not in fact before it, is generally not admitted in judicial review proceedings. The court is 
reviewing, and must show some deference for, the decision already taken, rather than decide the matter anew on 
different evidence”.  At para 49-50, the Court discussed and cited “Evidentiary Rules in a Post-Dunsmuir World: 
Modernizing the Scope of Admissible Evidence on Judicial Review” by Lauren Wihak and Benjamin Oliphant in 
(2015) 28 Can. J. Admin. L. & P. 323, wherein the authors advocated a broader approach to the evidentiary record on 
applications for judicial review of policy-based decisions.  Regarding this issue, the Court stated that “any changes to 
the rules of admissibility going forward will have to permit what the authors refer to as “meaningful review” without 
effectively transforming judicial reviews into trials – i.e., without ‘judicializing’ the administration of government to a 
much greater degree than has already occurred. Any change would have to recognize the separate roles of courts and 
tribunals emphasized in Dunsmuir.”  Furthermore, at para 69, the Court of Appeal further opined that a lack of formal 
proceedings, evidence and findings of fact and law, as one would typically find in a formal adjudicative matter, would 
not violate Dunsmuir’s “justifiable, transparent or intelligible” standard.  Interestingly, the Court stated that these 
qualities relate more to reasonableness in procedural, rather than substantive terms, and that the substantive standard of 
reasonableness may be met by non-adjudicative even where no reasons in the formal sense are provided 
520 Ibid at para 56. The Court supported this position by citing Rocket v. Royal College of Dental Surgeons [1990] 2 
S.C.R. 232: “It is difficult to overstate the importance in our society of the proper regulation of our learned professions. 
Indeed, it is not disputed that the provinces have a legitimate interest in regulating professional advertising. The 
maintenance of professionalism and the protection of the public are at the heart of such regulations.  As Dubin A.C.J.O. 
put it at p. 371: [unregulated professional advertising] would only encourage the least competent and most 
unscrupulous dentists to respond in kind to the confusion and detriment of the public and to the diminution of the 
professionalism of the dental profession. In that respect, I repeat what was stated by Chief Justice Hughes in Semler v. 
Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners, supra, when he stated: . . . the community is concerned in providing 
safeguards not only against deception, but against practices which would tend to demoralize the profession by forcing 
its members into an unseemly rivalry which would enlarge the opportunities of the least scrupulous. What is generally 
called the “ethics” of the profession is but the consensus of expert opinion as to the necessity of such standards.” 
521 Ibid at para 57. 
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bona fide to address those concerns and “preserve the professional standards of 
pharmacists across the province”.522  According to the Court of Appeal:  
 
Although the evidence supporting the need for the bylaws was thin, the 
Council was not, in the absence of a Charter challenge, required to 
select the least intrusive path, nor to wait until there was empirical 
evidence demonstrating the harm of customer incentive programs. The 
question was whether, given the expertise of Council members and 
their concerns, the bylaws represented a reasonable response. This was 
a question of policy that would benefit from the particular expertise of 
pharmacists as opposed to a court of law.523 
The Court of Appeal echoed the Superior Court’s acknowledgement that the 
Council is not a publicly elected body524, but still analogized the case to Catalyst Paper, 
stating that: 
Although the Council is of course not elected directly by the public as 
municipal councilors are, it is elected by the members of the College 
and includes experienced pharmacists from disparate locations and 
types of practices, as well as four government appointees. Its meetings 
are open to the public and various procedural safeguards are in place. 
As mentioned earlier, bylaws passed by the Council do not become 
effective until they have been considered by the Minister of Health and 
are thus subject to a degree of oversight by a government official.525 
Furthermore, following Catalyst Paper, the Court of Appeal stated that self-
governing bodies, much like municipal councils, are not obligated to meet a test of 
“demonstrable rationality in terms of process and outcome.”526  Applying the foregoing 
to the facts of the case, the Council was not obliged to adduce evidence of actual harm, 
and “must be free to take preventative measures before actual harm occurs.”527  On that 
point, the Court of Appeal was not persuaded that the Council “was required as a matter 
                                                           
522 Ibid at para 70. 
523 Ibid at para 68. 
524 Ibid at para 11. 
525 Ibid at para 61. 
526 Ibid at para 60. 
527 Ibid at para 63. 
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of law to prove that its concerns were ‘justified by the facts established’ before it.”528 
Thus, in the Court of Appeal’s view, it was inappropriate to view the reasonableness 
standard as requiring empirical evidence of harm in circumstances involving weighing of 
competing public interests and striking the Bylaws down as falling outside of the range of 
reasonable outcomes because they could have been narrower.529 
The companion case of Alberta College played out in very similar fashion as 
Sobeys West, taking a somewhat different route with respect to legal analysis only to end 
up at the same conclusion.  The issue was framed predominantly as one of jurisdiction- 
the applicants argued that in passing the impugned incentive prohibition Bylaws, the 
Alberta College was acting outside of its legal authority to govern in the ‘public interest’ 
pursuant to section 3(1)(a) of the Alberta Health Professions Act.530 
Specifically, the issue was framed as whether “the College has gone beyond its 
power, and acted ultra vires to regulate the conduct of pharmacies and pharmacists so as 
to protect the public interest in receiving safe and competent care, and that it has stepped 
into the area of regulating pricing of pharmaceutical products and services.”531  With 
respect to this issue, it is important to highlight Section 3(2) of the Health Professions Act 
which provided a limit on the application of Section 3(1) ‘public interest’ authority: 
A college may not set professional fees, provide guidelines for 
professional fees or negotiate professional fees on behalf of some or all 
of its regulated members unless the Minister grants the college an 
approval under section 27. 
Applying the Dunsmuir analysis for standard of review, the court stated that the 
College did not have greater institutional competence than the court in delineating the 
scope of its public interest mandate in the given circumstances.532  The court reasoned 
                                                           
528 Ibid at para 65. 
529 Ibid at paras 66-67. 
530 RSA 2000 c. H-7.  The section in question reads “3(1) A college: (a) must carry out its activities and govern its 
regulated members in a manner that protects and serves the public interest” 
531 2016 ABQB 138 at para 37.  Furthermore, at paras 51-53, the court pointed out that the same or similar ‘public 
interest’ language was contained in several other professional regulatory legislation, including the Agrology Profession 
Act, c. A-13.5, the Regulated Forestry Professions Act, c. R-13, Architects Act, RSA 2000, c. A-44, s the Engineering 
and Geoscience Professions Act, c. E-11 and the Chartered Professional Accountants Act, c C-10.2. 
532 Ibid at para 45. 
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that the interpretation of the ‘public interest’ mandate was of central importance to the 
legal system generally, given that the Health Professions Act governed 27 other 
professions outside of pharmacists and therefore consistency in interpretation across 
professions was important.533  As such, the court found that the presumption of 
reasonableness standard was rebutted in favour of the correctness standard. 
In the court’s opinion, the limitation that regulatory conduct “must be done ‘in a 
manner that protects and serves the public interest’ was a clear indication of legislature’s 
intention that the subject professions did not have unfettered regulatory discretion.534  
Turning to Hansard to review legislative history of the Health Professions Act, the court 
recognized that competency of the professions was of significant importance to the 
legislature535, as was public accountability, transparency and “providing for greater 
flexibility when it comes to improved choice and access for consumers”.536 
Significantly, the court stated that with respect to the public interest, “the 
legislature clearly saw and drew a distinction between the Colleges’ regulatory functions, 
in terms of professional self-regulation of practice by its members, and their economic 
functions.”537  It was legislature’s intention that the licensing and operating of 
pharmacies, including scheduling of drugs, was to be governed under the companion 
Pharmacy and Drug Act while conduct and competency of pharmacists would be 
governed under the Health Professions Act, hence the inclusion of Section 3(2) of the 
Health Professions Act.538 
The court concluded that the impugned inducement provisions had “a clear and 
direct economic function”539, which amounted to “controlling the way commercial 
entities (pharmacies) operate and compete amongst themselves in terms of prices offered 
                                                           
533 Ibid at para 47. 
534 Ibid at para 14. 
535 Ibid at para 21. 
536 Ibid at para 20. 
537 Ibid at para 22. 
538 Ibid at paras 24, 26. Also, at para 27, “A review of Alberta Hansard as noted above clearly indicates that the 
objective and purpose of the HPA was to ensure that all health professionals be competent and accountable to the 
public.” 
539 Ibid at para 29. 
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to consumers and costs incurred by the affected patient consumers.”540  The legislative 
intent was clear that with respect to the public interest, the practice of professions (in this 
case, pharmacists) would be distinctly and separately governed apart from the economic 
aspects of the profession, namely, pharmacies.  The court concluded that the impugned 
inducement provisions “do nothing to protect from incompetent or unethical 
pharmacists”541, the selective approach in which inducements were prohibited lacked 
transparency542 and the provisions had nothing to do with competency.543  Accordingly, 
the concluded that the impugned provisions were ultra vires the Board’s statutory 
authority. 
In a relatively brief judgement, the Alberta Court of Appeal reversed the lower 
court decision.  With respect to standard of review, the Court of Appeal stated that the 
trial judge did not have the benefit of the Supreme Court’s Green decision which had 
clearly set a reasonableness standard for review of such rules and bylaws.544  
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal, agreeing with the British Columbia Court of Appeal in 
Sobeys West Inc, rejected admissibility of affidavit material containing evidence that was 
not before the Board when making its decision.545 
Reviewing the matter anew, regarding the issue of vires, the Court of Appeal 
stated: 
We see no difference in principle between the Policy enacted by the 
College in this case, and the rule implemented by the Law Society of 
Manitoba in Green, and the policy under consideration in Sobeys West 
Inc v College of Pharmacists of British Columbia. In both of the latter 
                                                           
540 Ibid at para 28. 
541 Ibid at para 33. 
542 Ibid at para 34. 
543 Ibid at para 37. 
544 Alberta College, supra note 512 at para 60.  Furthermore, at paras 62-3, the Court of Appeal also cited Sobeys West, 
stating that “In light of both the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Green and the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
decision in Sobeys West Inc v College of Pharmacists of British Columbia, we hold that the correct standard of review 
to have been employed by the reviewing judge was reasonableness.” 
545 Ibid at para 70. 
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decisions, the rule and policy were consistent with the statutory 
purposes of their enabling legislation.546 
The Court of Appeal took a critical view of the application judge’s use of 
Hansard, stating that “[f]rankly, we are of the view that in this case little, if any, weight 
ought to have been given to the excerpts from Hansard.”547  Finally, the Court, citing 
Katz, stated that impugned regulations must be “irrelevant”, “extraneous” or “completely 
unrelated” to the statutory purpose to be found to be ultra vires on the basis of 
inconsistency with statutory purpose, and “it would take an egregious case to warrant 
such action”.548  Given that the impugned regulations conformed to the rationale of the 
statutory regime, the Court concluded that “it cannot be said to be “irrelevant”, 
“extraneous” or “completely unrelated” to the statutory purpose.”549 
The Court of Appeal’s judgement was at its briefest with respect to 
reasonableness of the impugned provisions.  The Court relied on Green, stating the test as 
only bylaws that no reasonable body informed of the relevant factors could have taken 
would be considered unreasonable.550  The Court found that the application judge had 
erred by not assessing the impugned regulations in light of the test set out in Green.  
Finally, the Court of Appeal cited Sobeys West Inc., and its comments regarding the 
reasonableness of the by-laws in question not being dependent on actual demonstrated 
harm or being the least intrusive option, as being determinative of the matter.551 
5.2 ANALYSIS OF SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW AND REASONABLENESS 
5.2(i) Public Choice, Regulatory Capture and Deference 
An analysis of substantive judicial review of competency-based entry-to-practice 
standards, and the corresponding concerns regarding competency-based ‘capture’, should 
                                                           
546 Ibid at para 76. 
547 Ibid at para 74- “Although we are deciding this matter afresh, it is appropriate to remember “the frailties of Hansard 
are many” and that the courts “must remain mindful of the limited reliability and weight of Hansard evidence”: Rizzo & 
Rizzo Shoes Ltd, 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 SCR 27 at para 35.” 
548 Ibid at para 75. 
549 Ibid at para 78. 
550 Ibid at para 82. 
551 Ibid at para 84. 
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begin by revisiting the concerns surrounding regulatory capture and public choice theory 
discussed under Chapter 2.3.  Specifically, what is the concern, or rather the connection, 
between substantive review, capture and competency-based entry-to-practice standards?  
The concern regarding capture has been framed as tension between the legal standard of 
‘reasonableness’ and giving deference to the expertise of specialized boards.   
Although the deference/expertise dichotomy is theoretically sensible, from a 
practical perspective, what happens if the expertise of regulatory decision-makers has 
somehow been affected by the influence of special interests?  If the tenets of capture hold 
true, and special interests can easily influence regulators, at least compared to the public 
interest, how does this effect our view of the proper role of courts with respect to 
deference for regulatory expertise?  In light of this phenomenon, several commentators 
have expressed the need for a restructuring of legal doctrine to account for possible 
regulatory capture.552 
But this brings us full circle to the discussion set out under Chapter 2.3, and the 
significance of carefully elaborating what precisely is meant by ‘regulatory capture’ and 
concerns regarding competency-based capture.  As discussed under Chapter 2.3, the 
professional self-regulatory framework is challenging for many of the precisely defined 
concepts of ‘regulatory capture’.  The perpetuation of the traditional Canadian self-
regulatory model, and concerns regarding the ability of self-regulatory bodies to balance 
professional and public interests within their broad, legislated authority are best 
categorized as a by-product of the operation of public choice theory rather than 
regulatory capture. 
Accepting the foregoing, public choice theory is best characterized as a political 
rather than legal explanation.  If the concern is framed as one of biased decision-making 
and its effect on expertise, most self-regulatory legislation explicitly provides for such 
                                                           
552 For example, see supra note 106 at 396.  According to Niles, if the reasonableness standard of review “is founded 
on the assumption that agency action is entitled to some measure of "deference" because it is informed by the kind of 
specific expertise that agencies are presumed to not only enjoy, but to incorporate in their factual determinations, legal 
interpretations, or policy pronouncements. If one accepts the notion that some, if not many, agencies are the victims of 
the hyper-influence of the very private entities that they are obliged to regulate, then the assumption that any expertise 
the agencies might have is actually being relied upon in their decision- making process is dubious, at best, and the 
relationship between the courts and the agencies would require a dramatic restructuring.” 
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biased decision-making.  Typical self-regulatory legislation creates regulatory boards that 
are dominated, if not completely than at least in majority, by members of the profession 
itself.  Furthermore, self-regulatory legislation typically grants such boards the authority 
to set entry-to-practice standards pursuant to legislated public interest and competency 
governance mandates.  In this scenario, if professional special interests have ‘captured’ 
the governance framework, this capture has taken place at the political level, by 
influencing legislators to pass legislation favourable to the special interests of the 
profession.  This would be an example of public choice, rather than regulatory capture, as 
defined under Chapter 2.3.  The question becomes what role can courts play in 
combatting public choice versus regulatory capture concerns?  Where does the line 
between the two begin and end? 
Canadian courts of all levels have elaborated that the role of a court in exercising 
its substantive judicial review function involves carefully navigating the boundary line 
between law and politics.  Deference not only respects expertise, but also legislative 
intent.  A long line of Canadian jurisprudence has identified a well-established legislative 
intent granting self-regulatory bodies broad discretion in setting practice standards within 
their professional field pursuant to their public interest mandate.  Thus, the role of a court 
reviewing substantive matters is severely limited by legislative text and intent, and 
recourse pertaining to concerns that self-regulatory bodies cannot effectively accomplish 
their objective of balancing professional and public interests most often lies at the polls 
rather than the courts.  The political movements in the U.K. and Australia to reform self-
regulatory governance models resulted in legislative amendments creating broad self-
regulatory bodies incorporating non-professional majority membership and external 
standard-setting organizations.553  As long as the Canadian self-regulatory framework, as 
is customary in most self-regulatory legislation, remains an accepted form of professional 
governance, the role that courts can play in challenging over-influence of professional 
influence may be limited. 
Judicial review and its deference for legislative intent is always a function of 
statutory context.  Every case will inevitably be decided based on specific legislative 
                                                           
553 Aoun, supra note 16 at fn 172. 
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context, and each situation presents unique statutory provisions.  This makes drawing 
generalizations across professions and cases challenging, as every statutory context 
presents unique factors either broadening or constraining the range of acceptable 
decision-making authority.  However, it appears that several conclusions can be derived 
from the case law analysis set out above. 
5.2(ii) Public Interest, Competency and Self-Regulatory Authority 
Based on the broad statutory grant of authority typical of most self-governing 
legislation, arguments that standards set by self-regulatory bodies are unreasonable solely 
because of the alleged adverse economic impacts they create will not likely carry much 
weight.  For example, with respect to Sobeys West, some have remarked that elements of 
regulatory capture may have influenced the self-regulatory decision makers to favour 
adopting prohibitions on incentive programs despite the abundance of evidence 
suggesting that the economic costs far outweigh the benefits.554 While some may be 
critical of a tightly-knit group of professionals placing emphasis on notions of 
‘professionalism’ ahead of consumer concerns for pricing and competition, and may 
disagree with prohibitions such as those at issue in Sobeys West, any recourse would 
likely need to be political rather than legal.  The British Columbia Court of Appeal 
examined the record, which demonstrated consideration on the part of the Board of all 
relevant factors, prior to coming to its decision.  Within the context of the self-regulatory 
legislation in question, and the broad discretion granted to the Board, it is hard to argue 
that the Board abused its discretion.  As demonstrated in many of the cases discussed 
herein, courts have not been shy in expressing that certain self-regulatory conduct may 
appear excessive, while still respecting that on substantive review, it is inappropriate for 
courts to substitute their own opinion of what may be better alternatives in the face of 
clear legislative intent that such decisions should be made by a self-governing body.  
                                                           
554  See Paul Daly, “Capturing Regulatory Capture by Expanding the Record: Sobeys West Inc. v. College of 
Pharmacists of British Columbia, 2016 BCCA 41” Administrative Law Matters (blog) (29 February 2016), online: 
<http://www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2016/02/29/capturing-regulatory-capture-by-expanding-the-record-
sobeys-west-inc-v-college-of-pharmacists-of-british-columbia-2016-bcca-41/>.  Despite the provocative title, 
“Capturing Regulatory Capture”, Daly himself acknowledges the challenge in defining ‘regulatory capture’: 
“Moreover, there are considerations of good administration that might justify expanding the record in a case like this 
one. Where it is plausible to suggest that a regulatory body has been ‘captured’ by an influential interest group (though 
I appreciate that this may not always be easy to demonstrate)….”. 
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The mandates to govern ‘professional competence’ in the ‘public interest’, which 
is common to most self-governance statutes, provides self-regulating professions very 
broad authority to set professional standards.  Nowhere is the breadth of this discretion as 
evident as it is in setting of competency-based entry-to-practice standards.  As the 
jurisprudence demonstrates, under most circumstances courts will be loath to set aside 
competency-based entry-to-practice qualifications on substantive grounds.  Arguments 
loosely structured around allegations that entry qualifications are ‘too stringent’ will 
receive little, if any consideration.   
Evidence of deleterious effects of entry-to-practice regulation, including effects 
on public access to, and cost of professional services, will not in and of itself lead to a 
conclusion that such standards are unreasonable.  Regardless, evidence of deleterious 
economic effects of regulation will no doubt be challenging to enter on the record.  Given 
that courts restrict the scope of affidavit evidence to material that was before the 
decision-making body when enacting such standards, any additional material a 
challenging party wishes to enter as evidence will in most circumstances be inadmissible. 
In setting standards, if the self-regulatory body has considered the consequences of 
regulation and some evidence exists to support their choice of competency-based 
regulatory intervention, courts will likely uphold such decisions as being reasonable. 
Furthermore, a lack of rational connection between competency standards and 
public harm caused by practitioner incompetence- in psychometric terms often referred to 
as content validation- or failure to select regulatory options that minimally impair 
individuals’ liberty to practice a profession will not likely support a conclusion that the 
competency-based standards are unreasonable.  Courts have even gone so far as to state 
that assessing the reasonableness of a self-regulatory body’s subordinate legislation “does 
not extend to a weighing of its practical efficacy”.555 
Following Green, Sobeys West and Alberta College, self-regulatory bodies 
defining the boundary between who may, and who may not practice a regulated 
profession, and how they may or may not practice, need not do so based on evidence of 
                                                           
555 Basciano, supra note 482 at para 34. 
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actual public harm between regulated and non-regulated behaviour.  As Canadian 
jurisprudence has not yet recognized a Constitutional right to practice a profession, self-
governing bodies are not required to meet the typical Charter obligations of rational 
connection and minimal impairment when setting entry-to-practice standards.556   
The broad discretion to set entry-to-practice boundaries pursuant to a public 
interest mandate would permit most self-regulatory bodies to do so based upon some 
evidence of potential harm.  Although Green, Sobeys West and Alberta College pertain to 
governance of the conduct of professionals already within a profession, there is a strong 
argument to be made that the same reasoning in these cases would apply to entry-to-
practice standards effecting those outside of the profession seeking entry.  If evidence of 
potential harm to the public exists, thereby justifying the competency-based entry-to-
practice standards, and some evidence of reasoned decision-making is provided by the 
self-regulatory body in setting entry standards, such standards will most likely be upheld 
on judicial review.557 
Of course, Sobeys West and Alberta College, decided in British Columbia and 
Alberta respectively, would be persuasive but not binding within other provinces, so 
Green’s effect within the rest of Canada remains to be seen.  Furthermore, an argument 
could be made that Green and its progeny are not analogous self-regulatory bylaws 
governing entry-to-practice.  The Court in Green drew a strong parallel to Catalyst 
Paper, specifically analogizing the self-regulatory bylaws in question to municipal 
bylaws.  In both instances, those who are governed vote for those who directly govern 
them, and those who govern are directly accountable to those who are governed.  This 
analogy does not ring entirely the same for entry-to-practice standards; those who are 
                                                           
556 The court in Togher refused to accept that protection of liberty under Section 7 of the Charter extended to the ‘right 
to practice a profession.  At paras 37-9, the court, citing Godbout c. Longueuil (Ville), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844 at para 66, 
stated that the burden imposed upon the applicant by the licensing framework in question did not constitute matters that 
are “fundamentally or inherently personal such that, by their very nature, they implicate basic choices going to the core 
of what it means to enjoy individual dignity and independence” thereby justifying application of Section 7 of the 
Charter. 
557 Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has moved towards a considerably active approach to the supplementing of a 
decision-making record as a by-product of the presumption of deference.  See for example Newfoundland and 
Labrador Nurses’ Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62 at para 12.  See also 
Edmonton (City) v. Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd., 2016 SCC 47 and Williams Lake Indian Band v. 
Canada (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development), 2018 SCC 4 wherein the Court permits supplementing of the 
record with respect to agency exercise of statutory interpretation. 
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subject to such regulations, namely prospective practitioners, do not vote directly for 
those who govern and those who govern are not directly accountable to them.  However, 
other elements of statutory context and legislative intent likely justify broad discretion to 
govern entry-standards.  Most self-regulatory legislation provides self-regulatory bodies 
authority to police against non-licensed practitioners (i.e. those who have not met 
requisite competency-standards), which combined with public interest and competence 
mandates would justify broad discretion in setting entry standards.558 
5.2(iii) Legislative Intent as a Limit on the Range of Acceptable Solutions 
The foregoing being said, it is important to re-iterate the significance of statutory 
intent.  Sweeping generalizations regarding self-regulatory discretion are difficult in light 
of differing legislative contexts.  Judicial review is a search for legislative intent and the 
limit of discretion is always a factor of statutory context.  Laffin demonstrates that courts, 
in the post-Dunsmuir era of the presumption of reasonableness, will invalidate 
competency-based entry-to-practice standards as an unreasonable exercise of discretion 
where justified by statutory context.  Laffin is an excellent illustration of a court 
respecting deference, while still exercising its judicial review function by carefully 
analyzing statutory context to understand the limits of self-regulatory authority.  In this 
sense, the court in Laffin did not exercise ‘disguised correctness’ review, coming to its 
own ‘correct’ conclusion and then judging whether the decision in issue aligned with that 
of the court.559  Rather, the court engaged in a sophisticated statutory analysis, 
considering the effect of s. 8(1)1(i) of the Professional Geoscientists Act, 2000 in limiting 
the Council’s authority in setting education requirements.  Thus, the court concluded that 
the educational guidelines in issue were unreasonable given that that the Council failed to 
consider s. 8(1)1(i) in its reasoning and that s. 8(1)1(i) limited the range of acceptable 
solutions.560 
                                                           
558 See for example Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.8, sec. 26.1, 26.2, 26.3. 
559 See generally Paul Daly, “The Analytical Structure of Reasonableness Review” in Paul Daly, A Theory of Deference 
in Administrative Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
560 The Federal Court of Appeal has also accepted this approach to reasonableness review, wherein the range of 
acceptable outcomes may be constrained by statutory context; see for example B010 v. Canada (Citizenship and 
Immigration), 2013 FCA 87 at para 7 and Canada (Attorney General) v. Almon Equipment Limited, 2010 FCA 193 at 
para 38. 
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As legislative intent, political will and statutory context all play a pivotal role in 
judicial review, one point of significance drawn from the jurisprudence is the level of 
political oversight required within any given self-governing regime. The court in Laffin 
distinguished the Basciano decision based on political oversight- the Association in 
Basciano did not require Ministerial approval for setting educational standards whereas 
the Association in Laffin did.  The court in Laffin was critical of the fact that the 
Association had apparently foregone the required political approval process when setting 
its educational guidelines.  Furthermore, the Court of Appeal in Sobeys West placed 
considerable emphasis on the fact that the impugned bylaws passed through the required 
approval process by the Minister of Health, who had authority to either approve, amend 
or disapprove such by-laws.561 
One cannot help but wonder whether the outcome in Alberta College may have 
been different had the issue been framed as the reasonableness of the impugned incentive 
prohibition by-laws in light of the statutory context rather than vires.  As the Court of 
Appeal highlighted, the issue of reasonableness of the incentive provisions was not 
argued or thoroughly considered in the lower court, and as such the Court of Appeal 
briefly dealt with the issue by simply citing Sobeys West and stating that it agreed with its 
outcome.562  It appears that the issue should have been framed and argued as the 
reasonableness of the incentive prohibition by-laws in light the statutory effect of section 
3(2) of the Health Professions Act.  This is not to say that the conclusion would have 
been different, as the Court of Appeal clearly stated that the application judge did not 
explicitly consider and find that breach of section 3(2) had occurred.563  However, as in 
Laffin, the more appropriate approach may have been to consider the meaning of section 
3(2), and then, how section 3(2) may limit the range of acceptable solutions within the 
context.  If in passing the impugned provisions, the council had failed to adequately 
                                                           
561 Sobeys West, supra note 511 at para 61: “As mentioned earlier, bylaws passed by the Council do not become 
effective until they have been considered by the Minister of Health and are thus subject to a degree of oversight by a 
government official.” 
562 Alberta College, supra note 512 at paras 80-5.  At para 84, the Court of Appeal states that “the reviewing judge in 
this case did not ask if the Policy was one no reasonable body informed by these factors could have taken.”  The Court 
of Appeal then cites a paragraph from Sobeys West, following with a simple conclusion at para 85 that “for the same 
reasons, we hold that the Policy is reasonable.” 
563 Ibid at para 82. 
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consider the effect of section 3(2) or acted outside of the range of discretion 
circumscribed by it, the by-laws may have been found unreasonable. 
5.2(iv) Unanswered Questions 
Within the discussion of legislative intent, statutory context and substantive 
review, several outstanding questions remains.  Green, citing Edmonton East, places 
emphasis on the concept of ‘institutional expertise’ as a justifying broad deference to 
self-regulatory bodies’ by-law authority.  What exactly does ‘institutional expertise’ 
mean?564 Here again, context is very important- is the standard of ‘institutional expertise’ 
the same in situations where a self-regulatory body is governing members of the 
profession versus members of the public wishing to enter the profession?   
As set out above, in cases involving university decision-making, courts have 
regularly stated that university educational decisions are entitled to a high-level of 
deference where such decisions fall within a university’s expertise.  Subject matter 
expertise weighs heavily in favour of deference to subject matter experts as opposed to 
courts, and this would apply equally to self-regulated professions as it would university 
faculty.   But is psychometrics and licensing framework design within the ‘institutional 
expertise’ of self-regulatory bodies (or universities for that matter)?   
The foregoing also ties into the Dunsmuir question of transparency and 
intelligibility within the decision-making process.  What does transparent and intelligible 
decision-making require in the context of professional licensing?  Are validation studies 
required, and if so, what extent of validation is necessary to support reasonable entry-to-
practice standards?  In a situation like Brett, it is hard to argue that the validation efforts 
used to support the competency-based practice restriction guidelines were anything but 
flimsy at best.  But this leaves open the question of what level of validation is actually 
necessary.565  Brett presented a unique situation where validation studies were actually 
presented and used as reasoning and rationale to support the impugned provisions.  If 
                                                           
564 For a critique of ‘institutional expertise’, see the dissenting opinion of Côté and Brown JJ. (McLachlin C.J. and 
Moldaver J. concurring in dissent) in Edmonton (City) v. Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres Ltd.,  2016 SCC 
47, [2016] 2 SCR 293 at paras 82-5. 
565 For an excellent discussion of the challenges associated with align psychometric standards of validity with legal 
analysis, see generally supra note 24. 
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reasoning so faulty as to borderline on irrationality is provided as support of self-
regulatory decision making, courts can find the resulting decision unreasonable.566  But 
how much reasoning must be presented?  Can self-regulatory bodies insulate themselves 
by presenting little validation evidence, in the hope that the presumption of deference will 
allow them to avoid scrutiny? 
While Canadian courts have correctly hesitated to engage in detailed 
reasonableness review of substantive educational content, given that relative subject-
matter expertise clearly favours deference, in the U.S. context, courts engaging in 
substantive judicial review have demonstrated a willingness to dig deeper into content 
validity than have Canadian courts.  For example, U.S. courts have been willing to review 
actual licensing examination questions to ensure that exam setting is reasonable.  It is 
important to note that U.S. courts have recognized that this exercise is not intended to 
substitute the courts judgement on the merit of formulation and grading of such 
examinations for that of the statutory licensing body, nor is it an exercise to ensure 
perfection from ambiguities.567 However, courts have found that content that is 
sufficiently ambiguous, such as examination questions containing insufficient 
information to be answered correctly, constitute an unreasonable exercise of discretion.568   
                                                           
566  Delta Air Lines Inc. v. Lukács, 2018 SCC 2.  In Delta, the Court drew an important distinction between 
supplementing the reasoning of an administrative body and supplanting faulty reasoning on judicial review, the latter 
being unacceptable: “while a reviewing court may supplement the reasons given in support of an administrative 
decision, it cannot ignore or replace the reasons actually provided. Additional reasons must supplement and not 
supplant the analysis of the administrative body.”  
567 Kenny v. Snow, 28 C.I.T. 852 at 856–58 (2004), aff'd, 401 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  See also Depersia v. United 
States, 33 C.I.T. 1103, 1105–06 (2009): “In reviewing the Secretary's decision to deny Plaintiff's application for a 
license, the Court ‘must necessarily conduct some inquiry into plaintiff's arguments and defendant's responses’ 
concerning the question at issue. DiIorio v. United States, 14 CIT 746, 747 (1990). Although the Court reviews the 
exam question being challenged, the ‘[p]arties should not conclude from the court's detailed examination of the test 
answers that the court is some kind of final reviewer of the [exam].’ Id. at 752.”  Furthermore, at 1111-12: “While 
Customs could perhaps have used more precise language in its drafting of question 9, susceptibility of different 
meanings does not in and of itself render a term ambiguous.  The overall meaning is unmistakable: the question seeks 
to identify the course of action most appropriate for the hypothetical importer with regard to the current transactions 
described therein.” 
568 See for example O'Quinn v. United States, 24 CIT 324, 100 F.Supp.2d 1136 (2000) [O’Quinn].  O’Quinn involved a 
customs broker licensing examination wherein one question utilized the ambiguous term ‘FOB’.  The court found that 
the term was sufficiently ambiguous and capable of at least two very different meanings such that the question could 
not reasonably be expected to be answered correctly: “Therefore, the Court agrees with Plaintiff's argument that the 
question does not contain sufficient information to choose an answer…. Therefore, “[b]ecause of faulty drafting, 
[P]laintiff's answer must be considered correct or the question must be voided.” Carrier v. United States, 20 CIT 227, 
232 (1996).”  
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5.3 PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND COMPETENCY-BASED ENTRY-TO-PRACTICE 
STANDARDS 
5.3(i) Educational Institutions – Deference and Procedural Fairness 
When discussing the interplay between substantive review, procedural fairness 
and competency-based entry to practice standards, a logical starting point is cases 
involving academic institutions such as universities.  At least at first glance, this seems to 
make sense- after all, substantive education is one of the foundational pillars of 
universities.  Furthermore, there is no shortage of case law involving disputes between 
universities and students with respect to administration of education. From a judicial 
review perspective, it has been stated that: 
It is a consistent and well-recognized principle in Canadian 
[a]dministrative law that judicial review boards do not interfere in the 
academic activities and internal functioning of educational institutions, 
relating to examinations and the application of evaluation standards, 
unless in exceptional circumstances, for example, where the educational 
institution has acted in bad faith or acted unreasonably, arbitrarily or 
discriminated against.569 
Some courts have even gone so far as to state that substantive academic decisions 
made by universities are entitled to such level of deference that applying a Dunsmuir 
analysis regarding discretion is an “unnecessary and wasteful distraction”.570  
However, courts have been sensitive to the important distinction between universities 
carrying out activities that are entirely within their sphere of domestic competence and 
their broader ‘public interest’ mandate.  This distinction carries important consequences 
with respect to judicial review.  This defining principle is summarized in the often-cited 
Houston v. University of Saskatchewan: 
… standards for a University degree and the assessment of a student's 
work are so clearly vested in the university that the courts have no 
power to intervene merely because it is thought that the standards are 
too high, or that the student's work was inaccurately assessed. However, 
the prerogative writs of certiorari and mandamus are available to a 
student who has been denied natural justice in respect of his 
                                                           
569 Barreau du Québec v. Boyer, [1994] R.J.Q. 29 (C.A.) at para 19.   
570 Hamze v. McGill University, 2016 QCCS 630, 264 A.C.W.S. (3d) 659, 2016 CarswellQue 1172, at para 147. 
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examinations. The university has been entrusted with the higher 
education of a large number of the citizens of the province. This is a 
public responsibility that should be subject to some measure of judicial 
control.571 (emphasis added) 
Furthermore, unlike substantive review, matters of procedural fairness are not 
entitled to Dunsmuir’s presumption of deference.  Rather, as stated in Chambers v. 
Dalhousie University: 
When breach of natural justice is alleged the applicable standard of 
review is one of correctness. It is a question of law. When applying the 
correctness standard in respect to jurisdictional and some other 
questions of law, a reviewing court will not show deference to the 
decision maker’s reasoning process; it will rather undertake its own 
analysis of the question and decide whether it agrees with the 
determination of the decision maker; if not, the court will substitute its 
own view and provide the correct answer.572 (emphasis added) 
As discussed below, courts frequently cite university jurisprudence, and 
propositions such as those referenced above, in professional licensing cases.  As such, it 
is clear that while substantive review of matters of an academic nature will be extremely 
limited in scope, courts have an important role to play in safeguarding procedural 
fairness. 
 
5.3(ii) Procedural Fairness and Examination Administration 
Beginning with examination standards, as with the discussion set out under 
Chapter 5.1 regarding substantive review, procedural fairness has historically provided 
little recourse for individuals taking issue with general examination standard setting 
processes and value judgements regarding the stringency of such examinations.  
There exists a paucity of Canadian case law surrounding procedural fairness and 
competency-based entry-to-practice standards.  Looking at examination administration 
generally, case law from the public sector employment testing context provides some 
guidance as to fairness obligations in general exam setting and marking. Regarding 
                                                           
571 (1994), 117 Sask. R. 291 (Sask. Q.B.) at pp. 297-298. 
572 Chambers v. Dalhousie University, 2013 NSSC 430, 2013 CarswellNS 1026 [Chambers] at para 16. 
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general examination administration, courts have stated that in public sector employment 
advancement examinations, the duty of administrators is to ensure that candidates are 
assessed against the same standards. Complainants alleging arbitrary treatment in an 
examination process are entitled to assurances that their assessment has been considered 
in light of the assessment of other candidates in order to guarantee consistency in 
application of assessment standards.573   
For example, in Ahmad v. Canada Revenue Agency, the applicants alleged that the 
examination process and format used for CRA employment advancement decisions were 
‘flawed’, alleging impropriety in the tools used to assess competencies as well as 
allegations that the examination trainers were not adequately qualified to apply training 
standards consistently.574  The federal court accepted that having two markers marking 
against set criteria, calibrating their scores and then permitting a review of these marks 
was sufficient to ensure consistency.575  That is not to say that courts have been entirely 
deferential to choice of examination setting and marking processes and unwilling to 
undertake a critical look at the methods of exam setters.  The federal court has taken a 
critical view of incomplete or unclear exam instructions and the prejudice this caused to 
candidates, along with a willingness to invalidate such examinations based on 
unfairness.576 
                                                           
573 P.I.P.S.C. v. Canada (Customs & Revenue Agency), 2004 FC 507, 2004 CF 507, 2004 CarswellNat 1010 at paras 
161-3.  Also, at paras 77-8, the court refused to take up judicial review on an application directed towards design of a 
program for Canada Customs and Revenue Agency staffing decisions.  In P.I.P.S.C., the court framed the application 
as a non-adjudicative, “somewhat abstract debate without the benefit of a live dispute on a particular set of facts”.  The 
court indicated that declaratory relief in such circumstances, wherein a specific decision that is part of the testing and 
promotion procedure is not being challenged, would be inappropriate given the hypothetical and speculative nature of 
the allegations. 
574 Ahmad v. Canada Revenue Agency, 2011 FC 954, 2011 CF 954, 2011 CarswellNat 2963 at para 46. 
575 Ahmad v. Canada Revenue Agency, 2011 FC 954, 2011 CF 954, 2011 CarswellNat 2963 at para 47. 
576 See for example Ligondé v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FC 1342, 2015 CarswellNat 7137 [Ligondé].  In 
Ligondé, applicants for promotion to policy analyst positions were required to write an examination as part of a 
competitive process.  Exam instructions informed candidates that they were not communicate with one another but 
were silent regarding use of internet resources or copy/pasting solutions therefrom.  Several candidates copied and 
pasted solutions from the internet, indicating that a number of candidates understood that there was no prohibition on 
using internet resources.  Several candidates were eliminated from competition on the basis that this conduct was 
fraudulent. At paras 50-53, the Federal Court was critical of the candidates’ elimination on the basis of what was 
genuine confusion regarding instructions, considering the fact that one the senior exam setters acknowledged the 
imprecision of the instructions as well the fact that exam instructions were subsequently rewritten afterwards to resolve 
this ambiguity. 
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While cases involving public sector employment advancement testing are 
persuasive and may provide insight into fairness in examination administration, 
contextually, employment testing and professional licensing are very different.  Public 
sector employment testing is typically used for career advancement, and employment 
tests implemented for government transparency and accountability by ensuring 
advancement is based on a competitive process. However, professional licensing serves a 
public interest mandate in ensuring that individuals entitled to practice meet a minimum-
standard of competence.  It is not a matter of career advancement, rather, it is a matter of 
individual liberty.  
In competency-based professional licensing contexts outside of the university 
education setting, it appears that courts have, over time, placed increasing emphasis on 
the importance of procedural fairness in licensing administration given the significant 
individual liberty implications at stake.  This is evidenced by the willingness of courts to 
dig deep into the details of licensing examination processes, to ensure that licensing 
candidates are treated fairly throughout the process. 
In the interesting pre-Baker Boyer c. Barreau du Québec577 decision, the licensee 
had completed four out of five of the necessary licensing examinations required by the 
Quebec Bar, all with relatively high marks, but failed the largely essay-based legal 
‘techniques’ examination by falling just short of the 60% passing threshold.  The licensee 
challenged the legality of the examination on the basis that his examination was returned 
to him without marking or corrections, rather, he was only given a ‘bubble sheet’ with 
score markings next to sample responses.  “Correction by bubbles”, as the licensee 
argued, provided him with insufficient indication as to his shortcomings in order to 
understand and modify his understanding for the future.578  Furthermore, the licensee 
argued that “it is impossible to identify any objective standard allowing a more or less 
uniform correction of the ‘techniques’ section, so that the assessment and application of 
each of the elements of the correction grid are left to the discretion of the correctors and 
the two different correctors could not arrive at the same results, let alone for the same 
                                                           
577 [1993] R.J.Q. 2830, 1993 CarswellQue 1787. 
578 Ibid at para 11. 
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reasons.”579  This, applicant asserted, created standards and marking guidelines that were 
arbitrary. 
The Quebec Superior Court found that the marking guidelines for the ‘techniques’ 
examination “open[ed] wide the door to the arbitrariness of the correctors.”580  According 
to the court: 
No precise standards of correction, nothing to moderate the first 
marking committee and the second marking committee and above all, 
no way for the student to know his failings other than by consulting the 
correction bubbles. This inaccuracy in standards, the absence of marks 
of correction and the possibility of being corrected, revised and 
recorrected by the first rather than the second committee, make these 
standards and their application a perfect example of arbitrariness to 
which a student only to bend if he wants to enter the compulsory stage. 
It cannot even in such circumstances, make any grounds for revision 
and recorrection. It must merely allege general reasons to the effect that 
it believes it has responded accurately and concisely while using 
appropriate legal language.581  
 
With respect to balancing of interests and the significance of the licensing process 
both to the licensee and to the public, the court stated: 
The arbitrary character of the norms and their application cause the 
student serious injustice. On the eve of entering a profession he has 
chosen, a young man with a strong legal background is forced to 
resume an examination before starting his internship. He loses his 
job and his income but, above all, he loses confidence in an 
institution which, for the public, represents the first step towards 
access to justice.  This virtue allowing to attribute to each his fair 
share of goods and services, honor and noble end that must translate 
into the adoption and especially the application of fair standards for 
all candidates for the internship required by the Law Society. 
Regardless of the angle under which the matter is being considered, 
the Bar's duty of fairness must be reflected in the accuracy of its 
                                                           
579 Ibid at para 8. 
580 Ibid at para 16. 
581 Ibid at para 16. 
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standards, the objectivity of its examiners and the clear indication of 
the student's shortcomings. That is not the case here.582 
Lastly, the court opined on the danger of over-encroaching onto the historically 
broad discretion afforded to educational institutions, stating that: 
 [T]he court does not underestimate the risk inherent in any judicial 
intervention in the fields of educational institutions. It must then act 
with caution and measure each time the impact of its decision on 
academic freedom. However, this reservation should not prevent it from 
examining each case on its merits and, in the present case, convinced of 
the serious injustice committed against Mr. Boyer, the court has no 
hesitation in fulfilling its duty and justice by attributing to it its fair 
share of property and honor.583 (emphasis added) 
On appeal, the Quebec Court of Appeal set aside the judgement of the superior 
court.584  The Court of Appeal reviewed the entire examination process, which 
examination process included several weeks of teaching by trained instructors in 
accordance with detailed guides outlining readings, objectives and sample solution 
texts.585  Students were trained by their instructors using template solutions and their 
practice exercises were corrected in class according to solution grids similar to those used 
on the actual examination.586  
The Quebec Court of Appeal also highlighted the effort the Barreau put into exam 
validation.  Exam questions were developed by instructors, which were reviewed by both 
a sample population of practicing lawyers as well as an evaluation subcommittee prior to 
being submitted for approval by the Barreau’s Professional Bar Council.587  Furthermore, 
following completion of the examination, a team of reviewers sampled fifty answer 
papers in order to analyze, compare and where necessary, adjust the model correction 
grid to accommodate for variations.588  While the court appreciated the candidate’s 
                                                           
582 Ibid at para 17. 
583 Ibid at para 23. 
584 Barreau (Québec) c. Boyer, 1993 CarswellQue 388, [1993] Q.J. No. 2222. 
585 Ibid at para 9. 
586 Ibid at para 10. 
587 Ibid at para 11. 
588 Ibid at para 12. 
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frustration in not having received the standard answer key, the fact that he had received 
his exam and correction grid, along with the fact that the validation procedures were 
effective at ensuring that all candidates’ papers were corrected in the same fashion 
according to the same rules, led the court to rule that the exam was not arbitrary and 
unfair.589  
Although the Quebec Court of Appeal overturned the lower court decision, many 
aspects of both courts’ decisions merit recognition.  Primarily, the effort that both courts 
put into reviewing the entire examination process in detail demonstrates the importance 
placed on ensuring that licensees are treated fairly. Although decided pre-Baker, both 
courts acknowledged the significance of the context, and the importance of the decision 
to the individual.  This line of reasoning, and recognition of the importance of setting the 
standard high in professional licensing contexts, has continued, and arguably expanded, 
post-Baker. 
In the post-Baker Khan c. Barreau (Québec)590 decision, a candidate of Quebec’s 
lawyer licensing program had received less than the required overall 60% mark on a 
series of three licensing examinations, administered by École du Barreau (the “School”) 
on behalf of the Barreau, on account of a particularly poor mark on one of her 
examinations.  Upon request for revision (an administrative review), the mark on the 
lowest exam was increased slightly, but the candidate still did not achieve the requisite 
60% total.  The candidate was informed that although she was entitled to review her 
examination paper and correction grid, the mark was final and without appeal.591  At the 
review meeting, the candidate was not allowed to take a copy of her exam booklet and 
correction grid, and was not allowed to take notes regarding the marking of her exam.592 
                                                           
589 Ibid at para 16-7- “The proofreaders must apply the criteria adopted by the Bar School and known by the students. 
The correction is additionally framed by a standard corrector, a detailed grid and precise correction instructions. The 
form of the review and the use of several scrutiny teams inevitably involve a degree of subjectivity in the evaluation, 
but the standards of correction do not become arbitrary by the mere fact that there may be occasional interpretations 
according to the persons who are called upon to apply them. The means provided by the Law School and the process of 
revision and recorrection reduce to a large extent the part of subjectivity that may be involved in the correction of the 
examination of writing.” 
590 2011 QCCA 792, 2011 CarswellQue 15551. 
591 Ibid at para 16. 
592 Ibid at para 19. 
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The Quebec Court of Appeal found that: 
[t]he evidence indicates that the student evaluation process and 
examination correction method satisfy rigorous standards and respect 
the recognized evaluation rules, with respect to both developing the 
examination as well as passing and correcting same. In this context, 
there can be no question as to the validity or legality of the École du 
Barreau’s evaluation and examination correction process.593 
Despite this fact, the Court of Appeal characterized the issue not as 
reasonableness of the Barreau’s standards, rather, as whether the mechanism chosen to 
implement its licensing process satisfied the requirements of procedural fairness-“even a 
well-thought-out and correctly implemented system may give rise to errors and require 
occasional adjustments”.594  The Court of Appeal highlighted the significance of 
transparency, given that the School and the Barreau carry out a public interest function, a 
transparency which extends to licensing candidates and the examination process.595  
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal stated that “the [Barreau] would have been transparent 
and would have completely satisfied its duty of procedural fairness if it had allowed the 
respondent to take handwritten notes during the consultation”596, thereby ruling that the 
Barreau had breached its procedural fairness obligations.597  
The Court of Appeal considered the Barreau’s administrative efficiency rationale.  
Exam material was withheld from candidates on review to permit the re-use of exam 
questions in subsequent years, which, according to the Barreau, would lead to a 
significant reduction of expenses associated with exam content development.  However, 
the Court of Appeal stated that the “economy sought would benefit the Barreau, not the 
students.”598 
                                                           
593 Ibid at para 37. 
594 Ibid at para 58. 
595 Ibid at para 39. 
596 Ibid at para 43. 
597 Ibid at para 61- “It is neither fair nor equitable to require students who question the correction of an exam spread out 
over two days to memorize problematic questions and answers. Students must be able to verify and formulate, where 
necessary, precise arguments, otherwise they are asked to simply rely on the institution’s established procedure. For 
some, the difference between success and failure comes down to only a couple of points. Students must at least be able 
to take notes when consulting the examination documents, as proposed by my colleague.” 
598 Ibid at para 63. 
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Applying the Baker factors, the Court of Appeal highlighted both the importance 
and consequences of the process to candidates as well as candidates’ expectations in 
being treated fairly, impartially and with transparency.599  While recognizing that the 
School and Barreau’s “choice of procedure must be considered and respected, when 
related to its expertise”600 (emphasis added), the court stated: 
There are heavy consequences for the student who fails the 
examinations giving access to the practice of law. Aside from the 
economic cost of reapplying for admission to the [Barreau], the 
candidate, if readmitted, must register for preparatory courses prior to 
recommencing the professional training… Practically speaking, the 
candidate who fails the four month professional training in December 
of one year, which began the previous September, may not reregister 
until the following September. The candidate must take preparatory 
courses for four months as a condition for admission to the professional 
training session starting in January and ending in April. Ultimately, this 
means an additional delay of almost one and a half years before 
entering the profession, in some cases having to find another 
professional training articling period, without taking into account the 
psychological distress and impact of a major failure at the beginning of 
one’s career.601 
A similar set of facts were presented in the Goldwater c. École du barreau du 
Québec602 decision.  In Goldwater, much like Khan c. Barreau (Québec), the applicant 
requested review of a failing grade on a midterm, rather than final, licensing examination.  
At the meeting, the candidate was prohibited from taking any notes regarding his 
examination and scoring grid.  Distinguishing Boyer, the court found the case at hand 
akin to the fact pattern in Khan c. Barreau (Québec), stating that the ruling in Khan c. 
Barreau (Québec) should apply equally to the midterm evaluation.603  As such, the court 
ruled that the applicant had been denied procedural fairness.604 
                                                           
599 Ibid at para 57. 
600 Ibid. 
601 Ibid at paras 55-6. 
602 2011 CarswellQue 6727, 2011 QCCS 3176. 
603 Ibid at para 19. 
604 Although the court in Khan c. Barreau (Québec) relied heavily on Baker in its reasons, it is not entirely clear that 
that court distinguished its previous Boyer ruling on account of Baker.  At para 59, the candidate in Boyer “had a copy 
of the exam and the correction grid, which enabled him to ‘know precisely where he had committed errors’”, and “only 
the model answers were not provided, which prevented him from ‘comparing the ideal answers required by the Barreau 
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5.3(iii) The Right to Pursue a Chosen Profession 
Standards of procedural fairness should be heightened in circumstances where an 
individual’s right to continue towards their chosen profession or employment may be at 
stake.605  In the often-cited Ontario Court of Appeal Khan v. University of Ottawa606 
decision, a law student having failed one of her law school exams alleged that she had 
been marked on only three of the four of her exam booklets. The law student appealed 
her grade to a faculty examinations committee followed by a University Senate 
Committee. Without being provided the opportunity to appear to provide testimony 
before either committee, her application for review was dismissed on the basis that she 
had failed to prove any error in the grading of her examination.  
Acknowledging that the student should have been granted the right to provide 
testimony in the circumstances, the Ontario Court of Appeal stated: 
In my view, a university student threatened with the loss of an 
academic year by a failing grade is also entitled to a high standard of 
justice. The effect of a failed year may be very serious for a university 
student. It will certainly delay if not end the career for which the 
student was studying. It may render valueless any previous academic 
success. In some cases it may foreclose further university education 
entirely.607 
While Khan seems to set a very high procedural fairness standard, the cases that 
have followed Khan have taken differing views of its applicability.  Some courts have 
limited the stringency of its application to circumstances where the right to a hearing is in 
issue.  In Green v. The University of Winnipeg608, a student enrolled in the university’s 
education program appealed a poor grade he had received on a final course assignment to 
a departmental committee followed by a senate committee.  The senate committee 
                                                                                                                                                                              
with his own.’”  In the circumstances of Boyer, this was found to satisfy the requirements of procedural fairness.  
However, in Khan c. Barreau (Québec), the candidate was not permitted to take copies of any of these items, and was 
not entitled to take notes during the meeting.  Accordingly, it appears that Boyer and Khan c. Barreau (Québec) were 
distinguishable on a factual basis, regardless of the effect of the Baker. 
605 Al-Bakkal v. de Vries, 2003 MBQB 198, 2003 CarswellMan 346 at para 47. 
606 (1997), 34 OR (3d) 535 (Ont. C.A.). 
607 Ibid at 541. 
608 2017 MBQB 67, 278 A.C.W.S. (3d) 76, 2017 CarswellMan 167. 
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acknowledged that the departmental review may have been incomplete, and in order to 
undertake an appropriate review, requested a copy of the student’s assignment.  The 
student refused to provide a copy of his assignment unless he also be given the 
opportunity to address the senate committee in person. When the student refused to 
provide a copy, his appeal was dismissed without a hearing.  The student’s allegation of 
breach of procedural fairness was dismissed, with the court distinguishing the application 
of Khan on the basis that the student’s credibility was not a critical issue as it had been in 
Khan.609 
In Daneshvar v. Canada (National Dental Examining Board)610, the applicant, an 
English qualified dentist, sought to complete a series of three qualification examinations 
to acquire a Canadian license to practice.  The applicant failed one of the examinations, 
and as all exams had to be successfully completed to pass, the applicant was given a 
failure.  The applicant requested an appeal in accordance with the Board’s appeal 
process, which process involves a review of a candidate’s written submissions to 
determine whether there was a mistake of fact of such significance that it could have 
altered the decision or that the examiners failed to conduct the examination in accordance 
with the procedures established.611  Although oral submissions were possible in the event 
that the Appeal Committee found a prima facie case of error, in Daneshvar, the Appeals 
Committee dismissed the applicant’s appeal, providing a brief letter simply stating that 
“The Committee determined that there was no mistake of fact of such significance that it 
could have altered any decision made and that examiners conducted the examination in 
accordance with the procedures established by the Board.”612 
The applicant sought judicial review on the basis that “she had made a series of 
very specific complaints” and the letter she received from the Board did not sufficiently 
disclose the basis of the denial, thereby denying her procedural fairness.613 The court in 
Daneshvar was clear that it “could not review the dental quality and competency 
                                                           
609 2017 MBQB 67, 278 A.C.W.S. (3d) 76, 2017 CarswellMan 167 at para 29. 
610 2002 CarswellOnt 2067, [2002] O.J. No. 2487. 
611 Ibid at para 3. 
612 Ibid at para 4. 
613 Ibid at para 6. 
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decisions” and was limited to reviewing the appeal process, and specifically, whether the 
applicant was denied procedural fairness due to a lack of sufficient reasons following her 
appeal.614  However, in applying Baker’s ‘importance of the decision to the individual’ 
factor, acknowledged the significance of written decisions in promoting meaningful 
decision making.615   While the respondent Board attempted to distinguish Baker’s 
requirement for written reasons to ‘serious’ cases involving personal detention and 
physical liberty, the court emphasized the importance of the decision at hand to the 
applicant’s ability to practice her chosen profession: 
The applicant is qualified to practice dentistry in England and her 
entitlement to pursue her profession in this country, to which she has 
immigrated, is at stake in these examinations. She has already passed 
the first three stages at considerable investment of time and effort. The 
respondent down-played the significance of the applicant’s failure at 
this level because she could try the clinical examination one more time. 
In our view that is not the point. If she was unfairly failed, it is a serious 
wrong to require her to risk all on one final attempt. The added stress of 
knowing it was her last chance would no doubt add to the difficulty of 
the test. The ability to pursue the profession for which we have been 
trained goes to the heart of who we are as persons, as well as having 
huge economic consequences. In our view the consequences to the 
applicant are of the magnitude contemplated in the Baker decision. We 
conclude that, in simple justice, the Appeal Committee owed the 
applicant some explanation for its decision.616 
The court concluded that what the Board had provided the applicant was not 
reasons, rather, simply “conclusions that follow from whatever the reasons may be.”617  
Furthermore, the court took a critical view of administrative expediency as a justification 
for its relatively brief reasons on appeal, stating that “[t]he governance of the entry of 
persons with foreign qualifications into a profession is important work for the profession, 
the applicants and the public and cannot be conducted unfairly for reasons of economy or 
expediency.”618 (emphasis added)  While recognizing that reasons as extensive as those 
given by courts would not have been necessary, given the importance of the decision to 
                                                           
614 Ibid. 
615 Ibid at para. 11. 
616 Ibid at para. 16. 
617 Ibid at para 5. 
618 Ibid at para 18. 
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the applicant, at least a brief answer to the complaints raised by the applicant would have 
been necessary in the circumstances.619 
However, contrast Daneshvar with the facts, reasoning and outcome in Akhtar v. 
Canadian Board for Certification of Prosthetists and Orthotists.620  Similar to 
Daneshvar, the applicant in Akhtar was licensed and experienced orthotist in Pakistan, 
and sought to acquire certification in Canada.   Certification of orthotists in Canada is 
governed by a private, non-profit corporation which administers the ‘certified orthotist’ 
credential.621  After completing the required residency program, the applicant failed one 
of the three required examinations on three separate occasions, thereby being deemed to 
be permanently ineligible to sit the examination again.622  The failed ‘practical 
examination’ involved two examiners independently assessing the practical performance 
of the candidate against objective marking criteria.623  The applicant appealed his third 
failure to an examination appeal committee, which, upon review, notified the applicant 
with a brief letter that his appeal had been denied.624  The applicant then exercised his 
right to a further appeal to the president of the respondent, and similarly, the applicant 
was again denied his appeal.625 
The applicant applied for judicial review, alleging that he was denied procedural 
fairness in that “he did not have a meaningful opportunity to fully and fairly present his 
case to the respondent”.626  However, unlike in Daneshvar where the applicant 
challenged the adequacy of the written reasons provided on appeal, the applicant in 
Akhtar stated that he should have been entitled to an in-person hearing to present his 
evidence as it was his assertion that a central issue in the marking of his practical 
                                                           
619 Ibid. 
620 2015 CarswellMan 212, 2015 MBQB 46 [Akhtar]. 
621 Ibid at para. 5-6.   
622 Ibid at paras 18-19. 
623 Ibid at para 11. 
624 Ibid at para 25. 
625 Ibid at para 27. 
626 Ibid at para 28. 
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examination “was the credibility of his recollection of events versus that of the 
examiners.”627 
In its analysis, the court, applying Baker and citing Daneshvar, recognized that 
the very significant economic impact failure of the examination would have on the 
applicant warranted an increase in the requisite degree of procedural safeguards.628  Yet 
the court was also sensitive to the balance between ensuring procedural fairness and 
possibly encroaching on the expertise of the board, stating that: 
the decisions were discretionary administrative decisions of the 
examination appeal committee and the respondent board made within 
their core competence and expertise, which, in my view, attracts 
considerable deference. The decisions should only be set aside if the 
appeal process was unreasonable and if the duty of procedural fairness 
was breached.629 
In reviewing the procedure chosen by the board, the court highlighted the fact that 
the examination was conducted by two independent examiners who confer to compare 
results, followed by independent review by a chief examiner who provides a breakdown 
of marks and examiner comments.630  The examination appeal committee was composed 
of certified orthotists from across Canada and appointed based on regional representation, 
and the appeal committee provided a written response within 30 days of an appeal.631 
Furthermore, candidates were still entitled to a second appeal, which appeal reviewed all 
information with respect to the examination prior to making its decision.632    
Accordingly, while the court acknowledged that procedural fairness required that 
the respondent be provided with details of his performance and reasons for his failure, the 
duty of fairness did not require that the applicant be afforded an oral hearing.633  
Regarding the appropriateness of the provided written decisions, the court stated that 
                                                           
627 Ibid. 
628 Ibid at para 50-1. 
629 Ibid at para 75-76.    
630 Ibid at para 48. 
631 Ibid. 
632 Ibid. 
633 Ibid at para 55-6. 
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“comprehensive reasons for the decision would have been the preferred course for the 
examination appeal committee and the respondent board to foster better decision-making 
and to satisfy the applicant that the arguments he made were considered and properly 
taken into account in the decision-making process”634.   However, the court ruled that 
“although it may have been preferable to provide more comprehensive reasons for its 
decision, the respondent board was not required to give written reasons for its decision 
more than what was provided in the circumstances.”635 
5.4 ANALYSIS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS  
5.4(i) The Elevated Standard of Procedural Fairness and Pursuit of a Chosen 
Profession 
The survey of Canadian jurisprudence set out under Chapter 5.1 demonstrates that 
over time, substantive review of competency-based standards set by self-regulating 
professions has moved from courts readily intervening in substantive decisions towards 
showing substantial deference to the discretion of self-regulatory bodies.  Similarly, the 
opposite effect has taken place in the realm of procedural fairness- courts have moved 
from being tentative with respect to intervening in matters of procedural fairness to 
expressing the significance of fairness in the context of professional licensing and 
engaging in comprehensive review of procedural matters.    
Both cases of unsuccessful judicial review, such as Boyer c. Barreau du Quebec, 
and successful judicial review, such as Khan c. Barreau (Quebec) and Goldwater, 
demonstrate that when it comes to matters of procedural fairness and construct validity, 
courts have not hesitated to comprehensively scrutinize all aspects of licensing 
                                                           
634 Ibid at para 75-76. 
635 2015 CarswellMan 212, 2015 MBQB 46 at para 82.  The court’s reasoning did at times seem to be a confusing 
amalgamation of Baker and Dunsmuir.  For example, the court assessed whether “the respondent’s appeal process was 
not reasonable and that the respondent breached its duty of fairness by failing to consider the applicant’s written 
submissions” (para 57) based on a standard of reasonableness (para 80).  Furthermore, it is difficult to reconcile the 
court’s distinguishing of Danshevar.  In discussing the appropriateness of the provided written reasons, the court 
distinguished Daneshvar to find that “the appeal process was reasonable and the duty of procedural fairness was not 
breached” (para 77) on the basis of the decisions in Surette v. Eastern Regional Integrated Health Authority 2011 
NLTD(G) 31, [2010] N.J. No. 433 (N.L. T.D.) and Baxter v. Memorial University of Newfoundland (1998), 166 Nfld. 
& P.E.I.R. 183 (Nfld. T.D.).  Surette involved rejection of a candidate’s application into a nursing program.  Baxter, 
involving a student’s application for review of failure on a medical school examination where the evidence clearly 
demonstrated that the school went to considerable lengths to accommodate and assist the student, was cited with very 
little discussion or analysis. 
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examination administration.  Examination construct validity, as opposed to substantive 
content validity, can and should be reviewable as a matter of procedural fairness to 
candidates.  Courts have shown a willingness to review all matters of construct validation 
including exam setting, instructions to candidates and marking procedures.  It is 
important to re-iterate here that a court would not be reviewing the substance of such 
educational standards, such as educational requirements, curriculum and the number and 
nature of examinations that must be completed.  Rather, once substantive standards are 
set, procedural fairness obligations set in.  For example, while the setting of a curriculum 
for a licensing examination is a substantive matter, once a curriculum is set, courts should 
ensure that notice of such curriculum is adequately conveyed to examinees, that 
examinees are provided access to preparatory material covering such curriculum and 
adequate time to prepare for the examination following notice of curriculum, and that the 
licensing examination does not test matters that are extraneous to the curriculum. 
With respect to licensing examination, Danshevar sets a high threshold with 
respect to the duty to provide reasons.  While an oral hearing is not always required, there 
must be clear evidence that an examinee’s feedback has been received, individually 
considered and responded to in order to meet the requisite fairness obligations.  As with 
other matters of procedural fairness, while concerns for efficiency are an important and 
pertinent consideration for administrators, efficiency alone cannot justify abdication of 
the duty to provide reasons.  
While the foregoing willingness to review examination construct issues is 
certainly commendable, clear standards have yet to emerge.  Matters involving 
ambiguous examination instructions, for example, present a straightforward fact pattern 
on which courts can receive evidence and formulate a clear decision.  However, with 
respect to examination setting, how much objective validation is required?  What process 
must be followed for setting examination questions, solutions and marking grids?  How 
are examination test-writers selected, and how many test writers are required?  Are exam 
timing and pass score matters of content (i.e. substantive) or construct (i.e. procedural) 
validity?  Even in the U.S., where a larger set of professional licensing case law exists, 
questions surrounding validation standards have long remained unsettled.  While U.S. 
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courts have invalidated examinations set ‘by a small number of people in a dark, smoke-
filled room’,636 a clear standard of psychometric acceptability has yet to emerge.637   
 
If courts are willing to accept any evidence of validation as being sufficient for 
procedural fairness purposes, this may give way to the triumph of form over substance.  
In the U.S. context, courts and commentators have long-struggled to find that right touch 
when it comes to review of licensing examination validation.638  
5.4(ii) Professional Licensing and Educational Institutions – An Appropriate 
Analogy? 
A consistent theme within the jurisprudence is that courts in professional 
licensing cases often draw analogies to the university context pertaining to the balance 
between substantive and procedural review.  At first glance, this comparison seems 
appropriate- both contexts involve subject matter specific expertise, educational testing 
and entry-to-practice qualifications.  Thus, the often-expressed apprehension to intervene 
in matters of substantive education while setting a high standard for procedural fairness 
seem equally applicable to both university and professional licensing circumstances. 
Upon deeper analysis, important contextual differences between internal 
university education, involving matters of developing and delivering university courses, 
and matters of professional licensing examination emerge.  Although university 
educational programs are often a part of a professional licensing program, university 
education and professional licensing examination play separate, but equally important 
roles in both professional self-regulation and society generally.639  Universities and 
university professors are afforded certain safeguards to ensure adequate separation from 
the politicization involved in professional licensing, including but not limited to tenure 
                                                           
636 See Groves et al. v. Alabama State Board of Ed. et al., 776 F. Supp. 1518 (M.D. Ala. 1991) for an example of a 
court striking down a teacher licensing on account of poor validation practices. 
637 See e.g. William A. Mehrens, W. James Popham, “How to Evaluate the Legal Defensibility of High-Stakes Tests” 
(1992) 5(3) Applied Measurement in Education 265. 
638 See supra note 24.  See also Paul T. O’Neil, “High Stakes Testing Law and Litigation” (2003) BYU Educ & LJ 623. 
639 Supra note 22 at 460. 
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for university professors.  University grading policies are afforded certain flexibilities, 
such as grading curves, which promote passing as opposed to failing students.  
Universities actively pursue recruitment of students for tuition purposes, and failing 
students from any program is often seen as a last resort- there are strong moral and 
financial incentives to assist students in succeeding.  From a ‘political’ perspective, 
student representatives are involved in various university governing and oversight bodies, 
which is seldom the case for professional self-governing bodies.  To put it simply, 
universities have every incentive to recruit and keep students in a program, while in the 
context of professional licensing examination, there is a strong implicit bias to keep 
people out.   
Contextually, courts reviewing matters involving procedural fairness issues in 
professional licensing circumstances should exercise a level of apprehension in drawing 
analogies to internal, university education scenarios.  Accordingly, if courts reviewing 
university decisions involving student education and pursuit of professional careers have 
set a high procedural fairness standard, from a contextual perspective, the standard in 
matters involving professional licensing examinations should be set even higher.  Post-
Baker cases such as Danshevar and Khan c. Barreau (Quebec) have correctly 
contextualized the nature of professional licensing regulation in terms of interests and 
significance to licensing candidates, the profession and the public.  These cases have set a 
substantially high procedural fairness standard, and although decided in the context of the 
duty to provide reasons, the reasoning and standard should apply with equal effect to all 
aspects of the professional licensing processes.   
5.4(iii) Procedural Fairness – A Tool For Political Reform? 
While the foregoing procedural fairness approaches offer candidates for entry to a 
profession, including the patent agent profession, mechanisms to challenge the 
implementation of rules pertaining to competency-based entry-standards, they do not 
provide much in the way of recourse to challenge the setting of standards for entry to 
practice. These challenges might be viewed as an individual matter, a case of one or more 
individuals challenging certain aspects of a licensing process that has left them unfairly 
treated.  In many circumstances, issues such as poor examination instructions or faulty 
 168 
 
marking processes would likely be viewed as an unfortunate administrative oversight 
rather than a challenge to the foundational notions of competency and public interest 
within the respective self-regulatory framework. 
That is not to say that the value of such challenges should be dismissed outright.  
Judicial threats of any form can lead to political change.640  As public choice theory 
dictates, some political actors may recognize that certain regulatory mechanisms may run 
counter to the public interest, but may face strong political lobbying from well-organized 
professional interest groups.  In these circumstances, even the slightest legal threat may 
provide the necessary impetus for political reform.641   
Legal threats of any kind further promote the values of judicial review, namely, 
accountability and adherence to legislative intent.  Forcing accountability through any 
means of judicial review would force administrative bodies to remain true to statutory 
intent and would create incentives to reduce conflicts within the governance 
framework.642  By challenging self-regulatory bodies through any judicial review 
mechanism, this furthers the purpose of political accountability by ensuring that any 
governance conduct must either adhere to the provisions of the enabling statute or go 
through appropriate political mechanisms in order to achieve the sought after objectives.  
Even challenges to seemingly routine procedural matters, such as exam setting and 
marking procedures, may force self-regulatory bodies to implement objective validation 
mechanisms, and any level of objective third party validation minimizes potential biases.  
Furthermore, procedural challenges leading to objective validation creates an objective 
record, and as such, minimizes the possibility of self-regulatory bodies seeking to 
immunize scrutiny by avoiding the creation of decision-making record.  Over time, legal 
challenges, both successful and unsuccessful, can create a transparent judicial record of 
                                                           
640 Supra note 2 at 849.  At 874: “Given the public choice dynamics, the credible threat of legal action is essential to 
reforming occupational licensing laws. Without it, elected officials have little concrete incentive to reduce or reform 
irrational licensing laws given the concentrated benefits and diffuse costs. Indeed, in some jurisdictions, legal 
challenges blazed the trail for political reform that liberalized licensing regulations….In this respect, the mere threat of 
litigation can be sufficient to spark reform.” 
641 Ibid at 875. 
642 Ibid at 895. 
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self-governance activity and may shift political norms.643  From this perspective, the 
value of any legal challenge as a tool for political reform should not be discounted.644 
  
                                                           
643 Ibid at 899. 
644 Ibid at 898. Blevins cites several examples of legal challenges to occupational licensing restrictions which led to 
legislative response thereafter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – INSTITUTIONAL BIAS 
6.1 INSTITUTIONAL BIAS AND REGULATORY CAPTURE 
6.1(i) Public Choice, Regulatory Capture and the Limits of Judicial Review – 
Grounding Institutional Bias  
As with the analysis of substantive review under Chapter 5.2, it is important to 
begin the discussion of institutional bias by first returning to the discussion surrounding 
competency-based entry-to-practice standards and capture.  As discussed under Chapter 
5.2, if we distinguish public choice concerns from regulatory capture concerns, with 
regulatory capture in the context of self-regulated professions manifesting itself within 
the administration of the self-regulatory framework, then what legal mechanisms are 
available to safeguard against the detrimental effects of such phenomenon?  What, 
precisely, is the concern surrounding regulatory capture?  From an operational 
perspective, the concern is best characterized as concern regarding biased decision 
making.  Self-regulatory bodies, either consciously or unconsciously, may make 
decisions favouring professional interests over the public interest.  
Substantive review, grounded in the principles of legislative intent, deference and 
expertise, will in many circumstances struggle to provide an effective filter against biased 
decision making within the self-regulatory context, and specifically, as set out in the 
previous Chapters, in circumstances surrounding competency-based, entry-to-practice 
standards.  As Laverne Jacobs states, the “Dunsmuirian approach without more is not 
enough to produce meaningful judicial review of the procedural fairness issues relating to 
independence and accountability”, issues best characterized as matters of bias.645 Recent 
jurisprudence has demonstrated increasing willingness to exercise heightened scrutiny of 
procedural fairness issues surrounding examination administration, issues which to date 
have been largely framed as concerns surrounding adequate notice and provision of 
reasons.  However, as set out in detail under Chapters 5.3 and 5.4, even judges 
                                                           
645 Laverne Jacobs, “Transparency and Institutional Bias in Canadian Administrative Law: Why the Dunsmuirian 
approach is not enough”, Double Aspect (blog) (1 March 2018), online: 
<https://doubleaspect.blog/2018/03/01/transparency-and-institutional-bias-in-canadian-administrative-law/>. 
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sympathetic to the plight of prospective professional licensees up against what appear to 
be excessively onerous licensing standards have upheld the fairness of examination 
procedures against such challenges. Most importantly, central to this thesis is the question 
of what role can administrative law play in challenging competency-based regulatory 
capture, and as set out under Chapter 5.4(iii), while challenging licensing examinations 
based on questions of adequacy of notice and provisions of reasons might possibly lead to 
heightened political scrutiny of licensing standards, such political scrutiny would be a by-
product of administrative challenge rather than a direct administrative challenge aimed at 
disrupting capture. 
Returning to matters of substance, as discussed under Chapter 5.2, many of the 
cases cited therein can be distinguished on the basis of the fact that they deal with internal 
matters, such as governance of professionals already within a profession, as opposed to 
external matters, such as licensing of individuals wishing to enter a profession.  
According to Jacobs, the Dunsmuirian reasonableness approach, and its respect for 
deference, is grounded in internal expertise.646  Correctness, on the other hand, focuses 
largely on external relationships.647  As such, in situations involving self-regulatory 
conduct and action vis-à-vis external parties, such as entry-to-practice standards and 
licensing, procedural fairness is the key to filtering out many of the deleterious biases 
inherent to the self-regulatory governance model resulting from regulatory capture. 
According to Jacobs, the question of reasonable apprehension of bias in the 
administrative context often revolves around the question of “whether an administrative 
actor’s structure or relationships appear sufficiently free from inappropriate 
interference.”648  While this is a seemingly straightforward question, as we shall see 
under Chapter 6.2, jurisprudence has, to date, provided little guidance regarding a 
structured methodology for undertaking such an analysis.  This is particularly challenging 
                                                           
646 Ibid: “Dunsmuir’s reasonableness is best suited for litigious matters involving parties before the administrative 
actor. The concept of being respectful of agency procedural choices aligns most logically with choices 
made internally by the agency alone, based on its expertise and within the context of a specialized process designed to 
widely improve efficiency across the range of its cases.  In such cases, there may be an expertise in process developed 
by the tribunal that should be taken into account on judicial review.” 
647 Ibid.  
648 Laverne Jacobs, "From Rawls to Habermas: Towards A Theory of Grounded Impartiality in Canadian 
Administrative Law" (2014) 51 Osgoode Hall L Rev 543 at 575. 
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in an administrative setting, as opposed to judicial decision-making, wherein courts have 
recognized that review of administrative decision-making demands a flexible approach to 
bias in appreciation for the particularities of any specific administrative context. 
The challenge with self-regulatory bodies is that unlike many other administrative 
bodies, matters which would normally be considered ‘biased’ often appear to be by self-
regulatory legislation, thereby blurring the line between acceptable and unacceptable 
bias.  In the self-regulatory context, careful attention must be paid to the dichotomy 
between biases authorized by statute and biases which manifest themselves within the 
exercise of regulatory discretion.  According to Jacobs: 
…consider the administrative law doctrine that a reasonable 
apprehension of bias is deemed not to arise as long as the conflicting 
functions of an administrative body are prescribed by constitutionally 
valid enabling legislation. Under the rule of law, democratically created 
legislation may authorize a single administrative body to perform 
functions such as prosecution and adjudication even though the 
performance of both functions by the same entity would otherwise 
contradict the principles of natural justice. The difficulty with the 
doctrine is that it has been interpreted in some instances to permit 
conflicting functions to survive without scrutiny even in cases where 
the legislation has not expressly sanctioned the specific type of conflict 
at issue. In other words, it fails to deal with the discretionary pockets 
that may exist within the legislation where the conflicting actions are 
not entirely covered by the legislation’s sanction.649 (emphasis added) 
To address inherent biases developing within a specific administrative system, 
Jacobs suggests grounding procedural fairness analysis within the appropriate context and 
‘on the ground’ understandings between regulator and regulated.  The idealized, objective 
hypothetical “reasonable and right-minded” person from whose perspective allegations of 
bias have been traditionally assessed may lead to superficial analyses of bias focused 
entirely on objective criteria such a statutory language.  One of the key insights of a 
grounded impartiality approach is that a reading of statutory text, alone, is often 
insufficient to ground a legitimate determination of what can be considered ‘reasonable’ 
independence within any specific administrative context.650  A grounded impartiality 
                                                           
649 Ibid at 587. 
650 Ibid at 581. 
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analysis requires of courts the willingness to dig deeply into the operational workings of a 
regulatory framework. From a contextual perspective, a deep dive into the workings of a 
regulatory framework may uncover that jointly held beliefs between regulator and 
regulated, while genuinely held, may also present evidence of unconsidered agency 
capture.651   
As discussed under Chapter 2.3, environments of tightly-knit, like-minded 
individuals can quickly develop into epistemic capture and regulatory drift.  Thus, as 
Jacobs states, an understanding of institutional culture, while “not, in and of itself, 
excus[ing] situations that would otherwise clearly lead to a reasonable apprehension of 
bias… may offer avenues for additional exploration of the administrative body’s 
understanding of procedural fairness.”652  Such an approach “ground[s] the analysis of 
reasonable apprehension of bias by focusing the inquiry on concrete areas where barriers 
to independence may exist.”653 As such, if one accepts that the hyper-proximity between 
the Patent Office and the profession has created a barrier against meaningful dialogue and 
change within the institution, a grounded impartiality approach may be the key to re-
establishing regulatory independence. 
Jacobs proposes five contextual factors for grounding an analysis for 
disqualifying bias: the provenance of the administrative actor; the shared understandings 
and institutional culture (including institutional practices) within which the administrative 
body is embedded; local understandings jointly held by the administrative actor and 
regulated community; any connections between the administrative body and those 
appearing before it that have been jurisprudentially flagged as potential impartiality 
concerns; and the administrative discourse, and the extent to which this discourse either 
promotes or hinders meaningful dialogue between all relevant parties.654  
                                                           
651 Ibid at 567. 
652 Ibid at 566. 
653 Ibid at 580. 
654 Ibid at 566-8. 
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The provenance of the administrative actor examines the history, policy origins 
and legislative framework of the specific administrative agency.655  The shared 
understandings and institutional culture requires consideration of “institutional norms, 
which are often implicit rather than express, develop[ed] through the repeated 
discretionary actions of an administrative agency or other administrative body and form 
part of its ethos.”656  This consideration of institutional norms serves two significant 
objectives.  Analyzing institutional norms requires assessment of the operative 
functioning of an administrative body, which in turn enables a deeper consideration of 
biases that may or may not be legitimated by express legislative wording.657  
Furthermore, an understanding of institutional norms may lead to a more thorough 
examination of barriers to fairness inherent within the administrative workings of an 
agency.658 
Local understandings build upon institutional norms, by considering the norms 
and understandings between the institutional actor and the regulated community it is 
tasked with overseeing.659  An analysis of local understandings may discover that certain 
practices that a hypothetical, ‘objective’ observer may consider illegitimate may in fact 
be ‘reasonable’ within the specific administrative context.  However, Jacobs is careful to 
point out that a grounded impartiality analysis cuts both ways, and that “in considering 
local understandings, a reviewing court should pay equal attention to the potentially 
problematic issue of agency capture disguised as local understandings.”660 
While the third factor considers connections between administrative body and 
those appearing before it relates to traditional jurisprudential understandings impartiality, 
this analysis should carefully consider the nature of the relationships based for a 
grounded consideration of legitimacy.  Lastly, discourse considers the reality of exchange 
between the parties, and whether this exchange allows for meaningful dialogue between 
                                                           
655 Ibid at 566. 
656 Ibid. 
657 Ibid. 
658 Ibid. 
659 Ibid at 567. 
660 Ibid. 
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the parties.  Here, the central question is whether the institutional norms and narratives 
within the specific context act as a conduit or barrier to meaningful dialogue between 
regulator and regulated.661  The dominant discourse within a given administrative context 
may lead to attitudinal biases, which, when implemented, may lead to incapability for 
open exchange and testing of facts within the specific regulatory framework.662 
As mentioned above, these contextual factors cut both ways with respect to the 
traditional notion of an objective, acontextual perception of what is a ‘reasonable’ 
apprehension of bias within a specific context.  In some instances, a grounded 
impartiality analysis will find that what a hypothetically objective, acontextual observer 
might view as being biased decision-making may be legitimate within the specific 
administrative context, while in some instances, what those whose rationality has been 
tightly circumscribed by the boundaries of a specific contextual discourse may view as 
legitimate may actually signal unintentional forms of bias.  Essentially, a grounded 
impartiality analysis seeks to define what a ‘reasonable’ apprehension of bias means 
within a given administrative context by offering guideposts for analytic consideration as 
opposed to an idealized, acontextual objective standard disengaged from the everyday 
realities of a specific administrative environment.663 
6.1(ii) Patent Agent Regulation, Institutional Bias and Capture 
Returning specifically to Canadian patent agent regulation, Part 1 argues that 
epistemic and cultural capture have become deeply rooted into the Canadian patent 
practice landscape through years of custom and tradition. The reality is that the 
institutional actors and practitioners have all become accustomed to the current system 
and the current narrative has become engrained within the current patent practice 
landscape.  The situation is not necessarily a matter of institutional actors placing their 
individual material interests in conflict with the public interest. It may not even be a 
matter of incumbent patent agents attempting to protect their market position.  Rather, the 
individuals involved have become so accustomed to the current framework that they are 
                                                           
661 Ibid at 568. 
662 Ibid. 
663 Ibid at 581. 
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oblivious to the inherent biases within it. To put it simply, the institutional actors within 
this system may hold a genuine belief in its legitimacy. 
In challenging the current Canadian patent agent regulatory framework, what is at 
stake is far more profound than incumbent patent agents potentially losing market share 
to new practitioners.  Rather, challenging the predominant patent practice narrative poses 
an existential threat to the current patent practice narrative. If the goal is to challenge the 
current narrative in the hopes of reforming the system, it is essential to challenge the 
institutional biases inherent within the current regulatory framework. Patent agent 
‘competency’ acts as a lynchpin to the current dominant practice narrative.  As this 
dominant narrative may be deeply connected to limiting access-to-services for the most 
vulnerable market segments, homogenizing professional identity and ethics, creating a 
tightly-knit interest group predominantly serving foreign clientele (and interests) and 
inhibiting the growth of new and innovative service modalities, challenging this narrative 
may require challenging ‘competency’, which in turn requires challenging the biases 
inherent within the current system. 
Challenging the current Canadian patent agent regulatory framework based on 
institutional bias presents the most promising option for disrupting the current Canadian 
patent practice narrative.  Disrupting the current patent practice narrative requires outside 
groups interjecting themselves between the long-standing patent office/patent agent 
connection.  To create the space for such a group to disrupt the current narrative, a crack 
must form within the hyper-connectivity between the patent office and the patent agent 
profession to allow new information, ideas and interests to manifest themselves. If the 
objective is to use a judicial, rather than political, mechanism to achieve this objective, 
then institutional bias may be the best possible tool for disentangling the patent office and 
patent agent profession from one another. 
6.2 INSTITUTIONAL BIAS JURISPRUDENCE 
6.2(i) The Fundamentals of Institutional Bias 
The following sets out the history of Canadian jurisprudence regarding 
institutional bias.  The roots of institutional bias were planted in the oft-cited Committee 
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for Justice & Liberty v. Canada (National Energy Board) decision.664  Although not 
pertaining directly to institutional bias, Committee for Justice & Liberty set out the test 
for reasonable apprehension of bias generally: 
...[T]he apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one held by 
reasonable and right minded persons, applying themselves to the 
question and obtaining thereon the required information... that test is 
what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and 
practically — and having thought the matter through — conclude. 
Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the decision 
maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide 
fairly?665 [Emphasis added] 
The Supreme Court long ago recognized that the obligation of impartiality is not 
restricted to individual decision-makers, but also applies at an institutional level.  In 
Lippe c. Charest, the Court emphasized that the appearance of impartiality is important 
for public confidence in the justice system, and it is important for the public to have 
confidence not only in the impartiality of individual decision makers but in the system 
itself.666  According to the Court, “whether or not any particular judge harboured pre-
conceived ideas or biases” is not in and of itself determinative, and “if the system is 
structured in such a way as to create a reasonable apprehension of bias on an institutional 
level, the requirement of impartiality is not met.”667   
Thus, the Court in Lippe stated that the test set out in Committee for Justice 
applied equally on an institutional as well as an individual level.668  However, the Court 
in Lippe set out a two-step test for cases involving allegations of bias at an institutional 
level, has been subsequently followed and applied in Canadian Pacific Ltd. v. Matsqui 
Indian Band: 
Step One: Having regard for a number of factors including, but not 
limited to, the potential for conflict between the interests of tribunal 
members and those of the parties who appear before them, will there be 
                                                           
664 (1976), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369 (S.C.C.) 
665 Ibid. at 394 
666 [1991] 2 S.C.R. 114 at p 438. 
667 Ibid. 
668 Ibid. 
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a reasonable apprehension of bias in the mind of a fully informed 
person in a substantial number of cases? 
Step Two: If the answer to that question is no, allegations of an 
apprehension of bias cannot be brought on an institutional level, but 
must be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.669 
In C.U.P.E. v. Ontario (Minister of Labour)670, a majority of the Court stated that 
the test for institutional impartiality “is whether a well-informed person, viewing the 
matter realistically and practically and having thought the matter through, could form a 
reasonable apprehension of bias in a substantial number of cases.”671  Although the 
majority cited both Lippe and Matsqui for this proposition, it did not cite the two-step 
test.  However, the test set out in C.U.P.E. closely resembles the first step of the Lippe 
test as well as the test set out in Committee for Justice & Liberty.  In Bell Canada v. 
Canadian Telephone Employees Association, the Court reiterated the test as “would a 
well-informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, have a reasonable 
apprehension of bias in a substantial number of cases?”, and if this question is answered 
in the negative, bias may only be alleged on an individual, case-by-case 
basis.672 Accordingly, C.U.P.E., Lippe and Bell appear to provide a consistent doctrinal 
test with respect to institutional bias. 
Regarding the standard for proving institutional bias, in Committee for Justice & 
Liberty, the Court endorsed a flexible application of the "reasonable apprehension of 
bias" test to account various administrative contexts. The Court stated that: 
The question of bias in a member of a court of justice cannot be 
examined in the same light as that in a member of an administrative 
tribunal entrusted by statute with an administrative discretion exercised 
in the light of its experience and of that of its technical advisers. The 
basic principle is of course the same, namely that natural justice be 
rendered… In the case at bar, the test must take into consideration the 
broad functions entrusted by law to the Board.673 
                                                           
669 [1995] 1 S.C.R. 3 at para. 67. 
670 [2003] 1 S.C.R. 539 (S.C.C.). 
671 Ibid at para 195. 
672 2003 SCC 36 (CanLII) at para 25.  See also Sutherland v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles), 
2018 BCCA 65 (CanLII) at para 51, where in the British Columbia Court of Appeal follows this proposition. 
673 Supra note 659 at 395. 
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In Bell Canada, the Court stated that “[t]he requirements of procedural fairness — 
which include requirements of independence and impartiality — vary for different 
tribunals” and that “the procedural requirements that apply to a particular tribunal will 
“depend upon the nature and the function of the particular tribunal.”674  In Ocean Port 
Hotel Ltd. v. British Columbia (General Manager, Liquor Control and Licensing 
Branch), the Court stated that the degree of independence and impartiality required of an 
administrative agency in any given circumstance is a matter of discerning Parliamentary 
intent.675 Furthermore, according to Bell: 
All aspects of the tribunal’s structure, as laid out in its enabling statute, 
must be examined, and an attempt must be made to determine precisely 
what combination of functions the legislature intended that tribunal to 
serve, and what procedural protections are appropriate for a body that 
has these particular functions.676 
 
Accordingly, Supreme Court jurisprudence appears to set a line of clear doctrine 
regarding the appropriate approach to institutional bias analysis.  However, as discussed 
below, despite this apparent clarity, a paucity of case law and inconsistent application of 
this jurisprudence have created a sphere of uncertainty regarding the precise scope of the 
doctrine’s applicability. 
6.2(ii) Institutional Bias and Professional Licensing 
When considering administrative challenges to the legality of entry-to-practice 
standards, institutional bias is possibly the most intriguing.  This is due to the small but 
increasing number of cases involving this issue, as well as courts’ comments and 
perceptions regarding the nature and applicability of bias arguments.  Courts have 
increasingly drawn connections between bias, transparency and institutional design, 
discarding conceptions of institutional bias as being only some form of nefarious 
behaviour on the part of administrators in favour of a more pragmatic approach to the 
issue. 
                                                           
674 Supra note 667 at para 21. 
675 2001 SCC 52 (CanLII) at para 24. 
676 Ibid at para 22. 
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For example, in the above-referenced Goldwater decision, the midterm evaluation 
process established by the Barreau was not mandated by the licensing ‘Rules and 
Procedures’, rather, it was operated as an informal process.677  Contrary to the assertions 
of the Barreau, the court found that rather than calling for a lower standard of procedural 
fairness, the informal nature of the process demanded a heightened level of scrutiny- 
“The danger of the informal review system called "rectification" is that it has no legal 
existence and thus gives the appearance of a random and obscure system.”678  On this 
point, the court concluded that: 
Procedural fairness requires that an organization such as the Law 
Society act with the utmost transparency in order to avoid the possible 
fear of institutional bias based on the absence of clear and precise rules. 
To say that the rectification of an assignment is possible is, of course, to 
deny its finiteness. Everything that is hidden gives rise to 
apprehensions.679 (emphasis added) 
In Togher, the applicant alleged that the NCA process created a reasonable 
apprehension of institutional bias, given that “a significant portion of the NCA's 
operating funds came from examination fees and a significant amount of the Executive 
Director's compensation was derived from those fees.”680  The applicant argued that the 
Executive Director had an economic interest in having students writing more exams, 
thereby creating an apprehension of bias in the process for determining Canadian 
equivalency for foreign trained students. 
The court stated that “of all the matters raised by Ms. Togher before the Benchers 
and on this judicial review, the most troubling, in my view, is the issue of reasonable 
apprehension of bias.”681  The court was critical of the Benchers’ characterization of the 
applicant’s argument as being ‘extreme’ and ‘way out of line’, clarifying that an 
                                                           
677 Supra note 611 at para 21. 
678 Ibid at para 40. 
679 Ibid at para 42. 
680 Supra note 479 at para 48. 
681 Ibid at para 53. 
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allegation of institutional bias does not suggest ‘highly improper conduct’ or even require 
evidence of actual improper conduct.682  Rather, the court stated: 
On its face, I agree with Ms. Togher that the financial structure of the 
NCA raises questions. It is somewhat surprising that the Federation of 
Law Societies could not devise a structure for the NCA that more 
adequately separates the results of its decisions from its source of 
financing.683 
While somewhat sympathetic to the applicant, the court ultimately rejected the 
institutional bias arguments.  Although the NCA’s finances were drawn from 
examination fees, the Executive Director’s compensation was directly linked to the 
number of assessments performed rather than then number of examinations ordered.684 
Furthermore, as the NCA was structured to operate on a break-even basis, no direct 
benefit accrued to the NCA or the Executive Director as a result of the number of exams 
that needed to be written.685  Thus, the court ruled that the examination process “does not 
create an apprehension in a reasonably well-informed person that the NCA would not 
decide fairly.”686 
6.2(iii) The Possibility of a ‘Piercing’ Review – Does Current Canadian 
Jurisprudence Allow for Grounding an Impartiality Analysis? 
Cases such as Bell and Ocean Port Hotel call for the type of piercing review that a 
grounded impartiality analysis demands, which requires a reviewing court to consider all 
relevant contextual and statutory factors in determining legislative intent, statutory 
authorization and standard of fairness.  However, few cases have actually applied such 
level of review and accordingly, there remains uncertainty as to how such an institutional 
bias analysis should be applied. 
One case which seems to apply such a piercing level of review is the Federal 
Court of Appeal decision in Kozak v. Canada.  In Kozak, a group of Roma refugee status 
                                                           
682 Ibid at paras 49, 51. 
683 Ibid at para 54. 
684 Ibid. 
685 Ibid. 
686 Ibid. 
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claimants had their claims denied by the Convention Refugee Determination Division (as 
it then was) of the Immigration and Refugee Board.  The Board had found that the 
appellants had failed to prove that they had a well-founded fear of persecution in 
Hungary and that state authorities would not, or could not, provide them adequate 
protection.687 
The claimants applied to the Federal Court for judicial review to set aside the 
decisions, alleging a lack of procedural fairness in the decision-making process.  The 
claimants alleged a reasonable apprehension of bias and of a lack of independence in the 
Board’s use of “lead cases”- the Board had developed its lead case by identifying a Roma 
refugee claim with which to create a full evidentiary record for other panels could use for 
making informed findings of fact.688  The lead case would provide guidance to future 
panels and would “promote consistent, informed, efficient, and expeditious decision-
making.”689 
The claimants based their allegations of bias not on a single instance of bias, 
rather a factual matrix raising the specter of institutional bias.  This factual matrix 
included a series of emails between senior management at the Board and Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada (“CIC”) discussing the increasing number of successful Roma 
applications.690  Furthermore, included in the email exchanges and involved in the 
planning process for lead case development was Board Member Vladimir Bubrin, , who 
was also a member of the two-person panel which heard the claimants’ refugee claims.691 
Just prior to publication of the two lead cases, both of which denied the refugee 
claimants, several leading Hungarian publications carried stories regarding the new 
Board decisions, describing them as ‘precedent-setting’ and that they meant that 
Hungarian Roma refugee claims would not be accepted in Canada.692 
                                                           
687 Kozak v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FCA 124 at para 3.  
688 Ibid at para 7.   
689 Ibid at para 8. 
690 Ibid at paras 15-7. 
691 Ibid at para 14. 
692 Ibid at paras 34-7. 
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Applying the test in Committee for Justice and Liberty v. Canada (National 
Energy Board), the federal court concluded that the adoption of the ‘lead case’ by the 
Board to promote consistent decision-making did not raise a reasonable apprehension of 
bias, given that the independence of future panels was not compromised.693  On appeal, 
the Federal Court of Appeal overturned the federal court’s ruling regarding bias.  Given 
that Charter rights were at stake, the Court of Appeal stated that the reasonable 
apprehension of bias standard should be “particularly demanding”.694 The Court of 
Appeal set out a broad definition of bias, relating both to impartiality and independence.  
Based respectively on impartiality and independence, the legal notion of bias relates both 
to “circumstances that give rise to a belief by a reasonable and informed observer that the 
decision-maker has been influenced by some extraneous or improper consideration”, as 
well as “the improper surrender of freedom as to how disputes should be decided.”695 
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, the Court of Appeal stated that: 
Contrary to the Judge’s conclusion, the appellants may establish a 
reasonable apprehension of bias without proving the motivation of the 
Board in orchestrating the lead cases. In my respectful view, it is 
sufficient that a reasonable person could conclude from a review of the 
evidence as a whole that the Board’s motive was such as to make it 
more likely than not that the hearing panel was not impartial.696 
(emphasis added) 
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal stated that the standard of impartiality in any 
given circumstance depends on context and is to be measured by reference to the 
Baker factors, thereby implicitly acknowledging the flexible standard approach set out in 
Committee for Justice.697  In the circumstances at play in Kozak, including the fact that it 
was an adjudicative procedure affecting the Charter rights of claimants, the standard fell 
on the high end of the procedural fairness spectrum.698  While the ‘reasonable person’ of 
                                                           
693 Ibid at para 51. 
694 Ibid at para 46.  Also, at para 54, the Court stated that the duty of fairness owed by the Board to claimants “falls at 
the high end of the continuum of procedural fairness”. 
695 Ibid at para 57. 
696 Ibid at para 47. 
697 Ibid at para 53. 
698 Ibid. 
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the bias analysis should not be “unduly suspicious”, this hypothetical person’s 
apprehension should be reflective of the standard of fairness owed in any given 
context.699 
The Court of Appeal was sympathetic to the Board’s administrative challenges- 
continuously increasing workload, public and political attention, decreasing resources, 
maintaining consistent decision-making and the need for innovative methods to tackle 
these issues.700  However, the Court stated that “procedures designed to increase quality 
and consistency cannot be adopted at the expense of the duty of each panel to afford to 
the claimant before it a high degree of impartiality and independence”.701 
Applying the law to the facts, the Court stated that it could not “point to a single 
fact which, on its own, is sufficient to establish bias.”702 However, “despite the absence 
of a ‘smoking gun’”, the Court concluded “on the basis of the entire factual matrix of this 
case that a reasonable person who had considered every aspect of the matter and had 
thought it through carefully, would think that the hearing panel was biased and was not 
acting independently when it rejected the appellants’ claims for refugee status.”703   
Regarding the factual matrix, the Court stated that a “cloud of suspicion” was 
created by a series of connected circumstances.704 These circumstances included the fact 
that Burbin participated in the hearing in addition to taking a lead role in planning an 
organizing the lead cases and that the no external groups, such as the immigration Bar, 
were involved in the planning process or even received any public explanation until after 
the judicial review was initiated. 705 Furthermore, the series of email exchanges between 
                                                           
699 Ibid at para 54. 
700 Ibid at paras 55-6. 
701 Ibid at para 56. 
702 Ibid at para 58: “There is, for example, no evidence of a statement by a senior Board official or member that the 
purpose of the lead cases was to reduce the number of positive decisions in Hungarian Roma cases and to deter 
potential claimants, although there are references early in the planning stage to the high rate of positive decisions 
previously rendered, to CIC’s concerns about this, and to public opinion.” 
703 Ibid at para 60. 
704 Ibid at para 59. 
705 Ibid.  At para 63: “When considered in the context described above, the Board’s selection of both the lawyer and the 
cases to serve as the “lead cases”, without any wider consultation with the immigration and refugee Bar, would also 
trouble the reasonable observer. The Board’s selection of the lawyer and of the lead cases may be seen as part of Board 
 185 
 
senior management detailing the increasing number of Roma applicants, the high number 
of positive Roma application and little evidence of inconsistency between cases, 
combined with “the Board’s selection of both the lawyer and the specific cases to serve 
as the ‘lead cases’, would also trouble the reasonable observer.”706 
Reviewing the totality of the evidence, the Court concluded that: 
…a person could reasonably conclude that the lead case strategy was 
not only designed to bring consistency to future decisions and to 
increase their accuracy, but also to reduce the number of positive 
decisions that otherwise might be rendered in favour of the 15,000 
Hungarian Roma claimants expected to arrive in 1998, and to reduce 
the number of potential claimants.707 (emphasis added) 
The Kozak decision provides a number important take-away points.  Primarily, 
the Federal Court of Appeal states that for a finding of bias, it is sufficient that a 
reasonable person could conclude, based on the evidence as a whole that it was more 
likely than not that bias was present.  Significantly, the court rejects the necessity of 
proving any motivation for biased decision-making, a proposition which, as we shall in 
our discussion of capture below, coincides with recent non-materialist theories of capture.  
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal accepted and considered a broad evidentiary record, 
rejecting that a ‘smoking gun’ is necessary for a finding of bias and that a ‘cloud of 
suspicion’ raised by the record as a whole can support a finding of bias.   
6.2(iv) Applying a Grounded Impartiality Analysis to the Canadian Patent Agent 
Regulatory Framework 
 Based on the details set out herein, and specifically, the summary set out under 
Chapter 4.2(ii) which summarizes the history and potential biases within current patent 
                                                                                                                                                                              
management’s response to the concerns of CIC about the Board’s previous positive decisions and its future handling of 
a large number of Hungarian Roma claims.” 
706 Ibid at paras 62-3. 
707 Ibid at para 61.  Also, at para 65: “To summarize, given the high standard of impartiality to which the Board is held 
in its adjudicative capacity, a reasonable person might well have concluded on the basis of the above that the panel 
hearing the appellants’ claims was not impartial. This is because one of its two panel members may have been 
predisposed towards denying the appellants’ claims since he had played a leading role in an exercise that may seem to 
have been partly motivated by a desire by CIC and the Board to produce an authoritative, if non-binding legal and 
factual “precedent”, particularly on the adequacy of state protection, which would be used to reduce the percentage of 
positive decisions in claims for refugee status by Hungarian Roma. The panel may reasonably be seen to have been 
insufficiently independent from Board management and thus tainted by the Board’s motivation for the leading case 
strategy.” (emphasis added) 
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agent regulation, the following is an application of Jacobs’ grounded impartiality 
contextual factors to the current Canadian patent agent regulatory framework. 
Provenance of the Administrative Actor 
The history of Canadian patent agent regulation as set out in detail under Chapter 
3.3 demonstrates that Canadian patent agent regulation, much like historical, international 
patent agent regulation, developed largely from concerns of ethical practice rather than a 
specific, documented history of practitioner incompetence.  However, much like patent 
agent regulation in comparable jurisdictions, and similar to the general trend in Canadian 
self-regulating professions, the Canadian regulatory framework has drifted towards 
emphasis on competency as the predominant, if not the only, regulatory objective.   
As with most administrative law matters, analyses relating to bias begin with the 
context set by the legislative framework. Canadian patent agent regulation provides an 
excellent example of the tension between statutory language, operational context and 
potential bias.  Referring to and re-iterating the statutory guidelines, Rule 13(1), which 
establishes an Examining Board for preparing, administering and marking the qualifying 
examination for patent agents, states that: 
The members of the Examining Board shall be appointed by the 
Commissioner, and the chairperson and at least three other members 
shall be employees of the Patent Office and at least five members shall 
be patent agents nominated by the Intellectual Property Institute of 
Canada. (emphasis added) 
 The statute not only authorizes the participation of IPIC members, it mandates 
that at least five members of the Patent Agent Examination Board are nominated by IPIC.  
A cursory analysis of statutory language alone may lead to a conclusion that the statute 
thereby authorizes the level of interaction and connection between CIPO and the IPIC 
organization as detailed in Chapters 3.3 and 4.2(ii).  However, a grounded analysis would 
ask, what, within the context of this statute and operational workings of this body, does 
this statute actually authorize and legitimatize? 
 Referring to Rule 13(1), what is the role of CIPO, the Commissioner and the 
chairperson vis-à-vis the Examining Board, and in this licensing process generally?  Does 
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the statute authorize outsourcing practically the entirety of the examination setting, 
training and development process to IPIC, along with unaccountable payments of public 
funds? A similar issue was at play in Bell, namely, the scope of legitimacy in the Chair’s 
discretion, pursuant to the enabling statute, to extend the terms Human Rights 
Commission Tribunal Members’ Appointments during an ongoing inquiry.708 As Jacobs 
highlights, the statutory framework in Bell was ambiguous as to the precise standard of 
required impartiality, and as such, reliance on statutory language alone, without a detailed 
consideration of operational context, could not provide a complete picture.709 As such, 
Jacbos suggests that a grounded impartiality analysis would have been far more 
appropriate in the circumstances at play in Bell.710 
Turning to Canadian patent agent regulation, as a matter of legislative context, 
one would expect that the profession’s full discretion and oversight over practically the 
entirety of the licensing process would require explicit statutory language to give effect to 
such authority.  Although the above-referenced Laffin decision was decided in the context 
of a substantive review of the reasonableness of the Council of the Association of 
Professional Geoscientists’ exercise of discretion, the Court of Appeal’s discussion of the 
scope of statutory self-regulatory authority is nonetheless pertinent to the case at hand.  In 
Laffin, the court recognized that self-regulation may include any number of statutory 
grants of exclusive authority to a self-regulating, professional body, such as discretion 
over entry-to-practice, accreditation and policing against unauthorized practice of the 
                                                           
708 Supra note 657 at 584. 
709 Ibid at 583. 
710 Ibid at 584-5, according to Jacobs: “Applying a grounded theoretical approach, the Court in Bell might first have 
reflected on the policy goals behind the creation of the Human Rights Tribunal and asked whether the attainment of 
these goals would legitimate the discretion vested with the Chair to extend appointments.  In its analysis, the Court 
could have considered evidence regarding the history of the Tribunal, including its place, alongside the Human Rights 
Commission, in the statutory network aimed at resolving human rights claims as expeditiously as possible. Continuing 
with this grounded inquiry, the Court might then have assessed whether the extension power posed a perceived or real 
barrier to fair and independent adjudication on fact and law. To do so, the Court could have explored a series of 
questions about the shared understandings that exist within the human rights tribunal. These questions would 
necessarily be tethered to the arguments put forward by the party alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias due to 
insufficient independence, and could vary from case to case. But, as an example, if the concern were that the Chair 
might withhold the extension of a member’s expiring appointment because of disagreement with the decision the 
member planned to render in the pending case, evidence showing statistical patterns regarding renewal might be useful. 
Any available information (for instance, mission statements, annual reports, academic or other studies done on the 
tribunal or its members) might also be helpful in identifying the norms and values underlying the tribunal’s culture and 
whether the Chair’s discretion is auspicious against this backdrop. The internal practices of the Tribunal that stem from 
this institutional culture could also be accessed in this way… Local understandings could have a role to play as well, if 
only to document what legitimate expectations (if any) a litigant might have in this instance.” 
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regulated field.  Thus in Laffin, the court concluded that the Council’s actions amounted 
to an exercise of educational accreditation, a power which, had the Ontario Legislature 
seen fit to grant to the Council, would have done so explicitly within its enabling statute.  
With respect to the Canadian patent agent licensing framework, Rule 13(2) states 
that the Board, appointed by the Commissioner with the chairperson being an employee 
of the Patent Office, shall be responsible for administering the qualifying examination. 
Rule 12(b) indicates that candidates wishing to sit for the Patent Agent qualifying 
examination must notify the Commissioner in writing of their intention to do so and 
furnish evidence to the Commissioner establishing that they meet the necessary 
professional experience requirements.  Furthermore, Rule 14(2) and Rule 14(3) state that 
the Commissioner shall designate the place of the examination and shall publish the 
requisite public notifications. Rule 15 indicates that Commissioner shall, on written 
request, enter onto the register of patent agents the name of any individual who has met 
all requirements for qualifying as a Canadian registered patent agent.  Finally, Section 16 
of the Patent Act grants the Commissioner oversight authority over patent agent 
misconduct. 
 While Rule 13(2) envisions the appointment of several members of the 
profession, as nominated by IPIC, to the Patent Agent Examination Board, general 
licensing best practices would expect that members of the profession would be involved 
in setting a licensing examination to provide subject matter expertise.  However, the 
above-referenced statutory provisions, in combination with Rule 13(2), indicate a 
statutory intent that it is the Commissioner who is responsible for exercising and 
maintaining oversight of the qualification process. Within the context of both the 
statutory scheme and professional licensing best practices generally, this language should 
be taken to mean that the Commissioner, the chairperson and the Patent Office must 
exercise responsibility for oversight of the patent agent qualification process.  
Accordingly, Rule 13(2) should not be understood as permitting the Commissioner and 
the chairperson to abdicate all oversight responsibility to the IPIC organization.   
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 As in Laffin, one would expect to see clear statutory authority allowing for the 
level of professional self-regulation in setting exam templates, use of public funds and 
psychometric validation, all without any input or knowledge from the chairperson, 
Commissioner or anyone else at the Patent Office, as set out under Chapters 3.3 and 
4.2(ii).  Such statutory authority would no doubt include additional aspects of full self-
regulatory authority aimed at ensuring appropriate transparency, accountability and 
democratic processes.711  Furthermore, as discussed under Chapter 5.2(iii), political 
accountability, as set out within any given statutory framework, is an important 
consideration upon judicial review.  The Patent Act grants the Governor in Council 
authority to make Rules and Regulations, and as in Laffin, one could argue that the 
current level of professional self-regulatory governance over the licensing process is an 
attempt to capture greater professional power without going through the necessary 
political approval process.712 
 Accordingly, from a statutory perspective, the legislative language and context 
creates a strong perception that operatively, it is expected that CIPO and/or the 
Chairperson of the Board should be exercising a far greater role in managing the 
examination process and that the influence of the profession, largely through the IPIC 
organization, may be inappropriate.  Considering the matter from a grounded perspective, 
the question becomes whether norms and practices developed through the historical 
administration and operation of this regulatory framework may indicate operational 
biases that may, or may not be, legitimated within this context. 
 Switching gears from the legislative context to the actual history and operation of 
this regulatory framework, we see that the sparsely documented history demonstrates that 
since as far back as the 1970s, CIPO has relied almost entirely on IPIC for direction on 
licensing standards.  This reliance has consistently increased over time, from 
                                                           
711 Supra note 311. 
712 Section 12(1)(j) of the Patent Act states that “The Governor in Council may make rules or regulations: respecting 
the entry on, the maintenance of and the removal from the register of patent agents of the names of persons and firms, 
including the qualifications that must be met and the conditions that must be fulfilled by a person or firm before the 
name of the person or firm is entered thereon and to maintain the name of the person or firm on the register.”  Rule 
13(2), which sets out the details of the Patent Agent Examining Board, was passed pursuant to the authority set out 
under Section 12(1)(j) of the Act. 
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consultations during the 1970s, to twenty years of outsourcing of the entire examination 
preparation and administration to the IPIC organization.  CIPO and/or the Chairperson of 
the Patent Agent Examination Board have exercised practically no oversight over any 
aspect of patent agent licensing, and in the most recent 2016 High-Level Analysis, the 
Chairperson of the Board (along with others at CIPO) exclusively sought IPIC’s feedback 
and comments regarding agent candidate feedback pertaining to reform. 
 What does this history and customary practice tells us about the norms of this 
professional regulatory framework?  Specifically, does this proximity between the Patent 
Agent Examination Board and the profession evidence a belief on the part of all relevant 
parties that the current practices and norms are legitimate biases inherent within this 
particular context?  While it may be tempting to jump to the conclusion that so many 
years of customary practice is evidence of legitimacy in the current framework’s 
operation, the paucity of documented evidence cannot be disregarded.  Given the lack of 
empirical evidence, including qualitative evidence on the part of key participants within 
this framework, one could just as soon posit that capture, bureaucratic drift and/or a 
combination of both could be equally responsible for shifting the customary practices of 
the regulatory framework from a position of legitimacy to one of illegitimacy.   
 What is important to note is that recent reviews of the current regulatory 
framework have expressed concerns over the proximity between CIPO and IPIC, and the 
influence of such a voluntary professional association within a professional licensing 
process.  The CBA and the Federation of Law Societies have both expressed concerns 
about the propriety of such a voluntary professional association’s influence within a 
regulatory system meant to serve the public, rather than private, interests.  Furthermore, 
the only documented qualitative feedback from patent agent candidates to date, the 2014 
and 2016 High-Level Analyses, show an overwhelming sense of frustration on the part of 
candidates, including a significant perception of bias. 
 Based on the foregoing, what the years of customary practice between the Patent 
Agent Examination Board and the profession may demonstrate are not so much a set of 
legitimate norms and practices within the particularized context of this regulatory 
framework, rather, it may be an unintended drift towards greater proximity between the 
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Patent Agent Examination Board and the profession caused by many years of lack of 
public oversight and accountability.  As discussed in detail herein, intellectual property 
has not, until recently, been a Canadian economic priority, and as such, regulation of 
patent agency has received little public attention.  With little public attention or oversight, 
a regulatory system can easily drift from its original objective and lose sight of its 
purpose.  As CIPO has always relied on the profession for feedback on many relevant 
intellectual property matters, over time, it would only seem natural for CIPO to come to 
rely on the profession for matters of agency regulation as well.  Outsourcing agency 
licensing to the IPIC organization may have been driven entirely by administrative 
efficiency concerns- CIPO may have seen this as a more efficient way of acquiring 
subject matter expertise without consideration for the possible bias it may introduce or 
exacerbate.  Similarly, candidates may have long ago perceived biases in the regulatory 
framework but have only recently been provided the opportunity to provide their 
feedback.  Furthermore, a historical power imbalance between the profession and 
candidates may have dissuaded candidates from openly airing any grievances they may 
have had, for fear of damaging future career prospects. 
 Rather than demonstrating a set of contextually legitimate institutional norms and 
customs, the history and customs of the Canadian patent agent regulatory framework 
appear to demonstrate that what appears to be an explicit statutory intent is indeed a more 
defensible theory of legitimacy and that the current customs evidence a drift, whether 
intention or unintentional, towards illegitimate forms of institutional bias.  While 
additional empirical evidence is required to provide support for one position or the other, 
the available evidence lends itself to a more persuasive interpretation that the current 
customs may be unrecognized forms of capture rather than contextually legitimate norms. 
Shared Understandings and Institutional Culture 
 Decades of hyper-proximity between the Canadian patent agent profession and 
CIPO have created the current institutional culture, where CIPO views the agent 
profession as its customer and relies almost entirely on the agent profession for 
conceptualization of public interest in patent matters.  Patent agent licensing is a glaring 
example of this cultural capture.  Historically, there has been little evidence of any effort 
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to validate competencies or engage in any form of robust exam setting process in line 
with psychometric best practices.  There is little, if any, documented consideration of 
evidence of professional incompetence (or lack thereof) and the necessity for professional 
licensing.  Instead, CIPO has relied entirely on incumbent agents’ feedback on 
appropriate standards of regulation, the basis for such feedback frequently lacking in 
transparency. 
 Can the current patent agent licensing process be legitimated based on the 
statutory framework which enables this regulatory intervention as well as institutional 
culture and norms?  As set out above, it is difficult to argue that the legislative framework 
legitimizes what appear to be inherent biases within the current regulatory framework.  
Furthermore, rather than serving to legitimize, the current institutional culture and norms 
demonstrate that the current framework has lost sight of its purpose and grounding.  To 
paraphrase the above-referenced Khan c. Barreau (Québec) decision, any professional 
licensing framework can easily drift, either intentionally or unintentionally, from its 
original implementation and objectives and require judicial readjustment to give effect to 
the required reorientation.  The current Canadian patent agent regulatory framework may 
be such a circumstance. 
Local Understandings 
 What are the jointly held beliefs, between regulator and regulated, regarding 
fairness and impartiality within the patent agent licensing framework?  Here, it is 
important to heed Jacobs’ warning that agency capture may disguise itself as local 
understandings.  Given the above discussion regarding institutional norms, and that the 
current institutional culture has developed over many decades and has existed with little 
public attention, one might conclude that this is evidence of a localized acceptance of the 
legitimacy and fairness of the current system. 
 It is important to point out that in the circumstances of the current Canadian 
patent agent licensing framework, the regulated are not current Canadian patent agents.  
In fact, the current statutory framework grants CIPO only minimal regulatory oversight 
over registered patent agents, which oversight is limited to de-registration in cases of 
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gross misconduct.713  Rather, the regulated community is the public, and specifically, 
those members of the public aspiring to qualify as registered patent agents. 
 Accepting the institutional culture that has developed between CIPO and the agent 
profession as being indicative of local understandings between the regulator and 
regulated would be to accept capture disguised as local understandings.  The entire 
regulatory framework has evolved through a one-way discussion between CIPO and the 
profession, with practically no outside, objective input, let alone from would-be agents.  
An accurate representation of local understandings would require interaction and 
feedback from aspiring patent agents.  CIPO’s 2014 and 2016 High-Level Analyses are 
the only documented attempts to connect with candidates, and the results of these 
analyses demonstrate a general sense of frustration on the part of aspiring patent 
agents.714  Thus, the only available, documented local understandings demonstrate a 
serious disconnect in perceptions of legitimacy between the regulator and regulated.  The 
challenge, of course, is that this interpretation is based on what little documented 
evidence currently exists.  The unfortunate reality is that within the patent agent licensing 
context, little effort and attention has been given to qualitative feedback from all relevant 
parties (apart from only the profession), and as such, it is difficult to paint a complete and 
accurate picture of the state of the institutional culture. 
Connections Between Administrative Agency and Litigants 
 As the Canadian Patent Agent Examination Board is not a quasi-judicial board, 
this factor is not as relevant within this context as in agencies that carry out an 
adjudicative function.  However, as discussed under the ‘Discourse’ heading, the lack of 
connection between the Board and prospective patent agents is a significant contributor to 
the lack of meaningful interaction between the regulator and regulated. 
Discourse 
                                                           
713 Patent Act, Sec. 16, which states that “for gross misconduct or any other cause that he may deem sufficient, the 
Commissioner may refuse to recognize any person as a patent agent or attorney either generally or in any particular 
case.”  According to Canada, Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, Access to 
Information Request No. A-2017-01275 (Gatineau: Ministry of Innovation, Science and Economic Development 
Canada, 2017), there is no documented evidence that the Commissioner has ever exercised this authority. 
714 See Appendix ‘A’, Appendix ‘B’, Appendix ‘E’, Appendix ‘F’. 
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Of all the contextual factors, consideration of discourse, and the available 
channels for meaningful dialogue between parties, may be the most relevant within the 
context of Canadian patent agent regulation.  As set out above, in the context of Canadian 
patent agent regulation, the regulated are the public, or specifically, those members of the 
public aspiring to become registered Canadian patent agents.  The regulatory 
intervention, in the form of licensing examination, applies to those outside of the 
profession, who wish to enter the profession, rather than the profession itself.   
Yet as set out in considerable detail in Chapters 3.3 and 4.2(ii), the entire history 
of Canadian patent agent regulation is the story of a one-channel conversation between 
the Patent Office and the profession.  In many ways, this story is the narrative of 
historical patent agency generally, but in the case of Canada, socioeconomic factors 
unique to Canada have heightened the nature of this Patent Office/profession closed-
circuit discourse. 
The epitome of this discourse of hyper-proximity between the Patent Office and 
the profession is illustrated by the barriers it creates to meaningful dialogue between 
regulator and regulated.  For example, the examination appeal process involves no 
written feedback to candidates other than a brief statement on whether the appeal has 
been successful or unsuccessful, thereby limiting meaningful interaction between 
candidates and the Patent Agent Examination Board.  The 2014 and 2016 High-Level 
Analysis studies, which requested feedback from candidates, resulted in an overwhelming 
response from candidates regarding perceptions of poor exam preparation material, poor 
exam setting processes, procedural fairness issues and apprehensions of bias. Despite this 
fact, CIPO sought only the guidance of IPIC on how to address these issues and did not 
publish the results of these studies.  The chairperson of the Patent Agent Examination 
Board removed all references to such problematic issues, recommendations for 
Examination improvement based on candidate feedback and plans to publish the results 
of the analyses based solely on the recommendations of IPIC.715 
                                                           
715 See Appendix ‘G’. 
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 The current Canadian patent agent discourse is a case-study in a culture of 
exclusion.  Candidates are provided no meaningful opportunity to participate, in any 
fashion, in the regulatory dialogue.  Even when asked to participate, such as in the High-
Level Analyses or in the examination appeal process, the response they receive is akin to 
a deafening silence.  In the context of the numerous challenging issues surrounding the 
current patent agent regulatory framework, the lack of meaningful dialogue between the 
regulator and regulated is a deeply concerning factor that cannot, and should not, be 
overlooked. 
6.2(v) Application and Uncertainty  
The previous Chapter 6.2(iv) sets out what a grounded impartiality analysis of the 
current Canadian patent agent regulatory framework might look like.  The question 
remains- would such an analysis be possible under current Canadian administrative law 
jurisprudence?  Would current Canadian administrative law doctrine and evidentiary 
rules permit a court to undertake such an analysis?  Even if not explicitly, can current 
Canadian administrative law allow for an implicit application of at least some part of the 
analysis set out under Chapter 6.2(iv)? 
One of the most important factors surrounding an analysis of bias is that it is a 
matter of reasonable perception, and as research regarding epistemic capture, cultural 
capture and bureaucratic drift teaches us, even the most well-intentioned of 
administrators, without any motivation of personal gain or deceptive intentions, can 
easily lose perception of bias when operating entirely within a closed culture endemic to 
a specific regulatory context.  Institutional bias analysis may provide the key to 
combatting regulatory capture within the self-regulatory context, provided that courts are 
willing to engage in the sort of piercing analysis that is necessary to uncover 
operationalized implicit biases.716 
From an evidentiary perspective, institutional bias is advantageous to substantive 
review in that the standard of review is correctness and the scope of evidentiary record is 
not subject to the same limitations as substantive review.  Thus, building an evidentiary 
                                                           
716 Supra note 657 at 587. 
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record for institutional bias can be used to demonstrate a valid ‘capture narrative’.  
However, there are numerous challenges to applying a grounded impartiality analysis.   
It is difficult to understand how analyzing whether a statute expressly authorizes 
conduct that may potentially give rise to an apprehension of bias can be done without 
engaging in some form of statutory analysis.  Bell seems to explicitly require this level of 
statutory analysis.  However, here again the cases seem to point in various directions.  In 
a partially dissenting opinion in C.U.P.E., Bastarche J. rejects that statutory interpretation 
is appropriate in an institutional bias analysis if the issue is framed as a question of 
statutory discretion granted to a specific individual, which would be a matter of 
substantive review.717 The issue in C.U.P.E. revolved around the Minister’s exercise of 
discretion in forming ad hoc tribunals, an authority expressly granted pursuant to statute.  
The Kozak decision, without citing C.U.P.E., distinguishes the issue of statutory 
discretion from bias, and having decided the matter based on bias, the Federal Court of 
Appeal did not address the issue of statutory discretion.718  It would appear that C.U.P.E. 
should be limited to circumstances properly characterized as a reasonableness exercise of 
discretion, and neither Kozak or C.U.P.E. should be read as blanket prohibition against a 
probing statutory analysis in light of the Court’s direction in Bell. 
This issue of discretion and standard of review has also arisen in the context of 
the discretionary choice of procedures set by an administrative body.  Although 
procedural fairness matters are reviewed on a standard of correctness, a line of 
jurisprudence has established a principle that reviewing courts should respect the choice 
of procedures established by an administrative body.719  The court in Engfield did not 
seem to place much effort into reviewing the Patent Agent Examination Board’s choice 
of procedures other than to say that the Board is required to honour them.720  In Maritime 
Broadcasting System Limited v. Canadian Media Guild, the Federal Court of Appeal 
reviewed procedural matters of the Canada Industrial Relations Board on a standard of 
                                                           
717 Supra note 665 at paras 44-5. 
718 Supra note 682 at para 48. 
719 Maritime Broadcasting System Limited v. Canadian Media Guild, 2014 FCA 59 at para 55. 
720 Supra note 439 at para 14. 
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reasonableness.721  However, it is important to note that Maritime Broadcasting System 
Limited was contextually specific, involving a review of the Board’s reconsideration 
hearing decision in which procedural matters were raised, rather than a direct review of a 
procedural matter.722 The Federal Court of Appeal in Maritime Broadcasting System 
Limited v. Canadian Media Guild was clear that the standard in the case at hand was 
context specific723, and to date, there does not appear to be a case involving institutional 
bias wherein a deferential, reasonableness standard has applied.  As such, it would appear 
that a deferential standard of review should not apply to issues of institutional bias, as a 
matter of jurisprudence or principle.724 
With respect to evidence, both C.U.P.E. and Kozak allow for a broad and 
comprehensive evidentiary record.  The Federal Court of Appeal in Kozak took a holistic 
view of the issue, framing it broadly as a question of whether “the circumstances 
surrounding the origin, planning and execution of the lead cases gave rise to a reasonable 
apprehension of bias”.725 (emphasis added)  Furthermore, Bastarche J. states in C.U.P.E. 
that “attacks on the independence or impartiality of a board are most convincingly made 
with evidence of how that board operates in practice”, which should allow for 
introduction of a broad scope of evidence regarding administrative agency practice.726  
The Court of Appeal in Kozak permitted and considered an expansive evidentiary record, 
which included preparatory material, email communications and other documentary 
evidence acquired through access to information requests.   
                                                           
721 Supra note 708 at para 48. 
722 Ibid at para 64: “Maritime Broadcasting does not point to any particular misunderstanding of the Board as to the 
relevant legal concepts. Rather, it invites us to stand in the shoes of the Board and apply the principles in this case. As I 
have said, this is inapt.” 
723 Ibid: “The Board’s task in this case was to apply those standards in a discretionary way to the factually complex 
matrix before it, a task informed by its appreciation of the dynamics of the case before it and its knowledge of how its 
procedures should and must work, all in discharge of its responsibility to administer labour relations matters fairly, 
justly and in an orderly and timely way. It did so under the umbrella of legislation empowering the Board to consider 
its own procedures based on its appreciation of the particular circumstances of cases and to vary or depart from those 
procedures when it considers it appropriate.” 
724 For an excellent discussion, see supra note 654: “Edging towards reasonableness review in situations of institutional 
bias could prove harmful to the development of good public administration. Transparency as a value needs to be 
ascertained within the administrative state, including through judicial review. Collectively, we should work towards 
this goal. Without more, a deferential approach could be detrimental to ensuring administrative justice.” 
725 Supra note 682 at para 51.   
726 Supra note 665 at para 44- this was addressed in dissent, but Bastarche J. states this proposition in agreement with 
the majority. 
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There are, however, several key features distinguishing Kozak from the 
circumstances surrounding Canadian patent agent regulation.  The Court of Appeal 
placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the Charter issues at stake created a very 
demanding standard on the respondent IRB.  Furthermore, Kozak was decided in a quasi-
judicial, IRB hearing context.  Both factors have historically been viewed as demanding 
very high levels of procedural justice.  Lastly, while Kozak briefly considered questions 
of whether the biased conduct was authorized by statute, the issue of operationalized bias 
versus expressed statutory bias was not considered.   
It is also hard to reconcile the test set out in Kozak with both the C.U.PE. and 
Matsqui decisions.  Neither C.U.PE. nor Matsqui were cited in Kozak.  Furthermore, it is 
difficult to reconcile C.U.PE. and Matsqui; does the test set out in C.U.PE. require first 
finding a ‘reasonable apprehension of bias’, according to the test set out in Matsqui?  
Apart from any confusion regarding conflict with previous jurisprudence, the effect of the 
Kozak decision itself remains uncertain.  While Kozak has been cited in numerous 
decisions, few cases have applied the same level of piercing analysis with respect to 
institutional bias analysis.  In Local 1518 v. BC Labour Relations Board & Wal-Mart 
Canada727, J. Brine, citing Kozak, stated that “the facts of the case before me must be 
considered globally rather than parsed individually” with respect to allegations of 
apprehension of bias.728  However, the case pertained to allegation of bias with respect to 
a single quasi-judicial adjudicator and it is not evident that any other aspect of Kozak was 
applied. 
Applying the foregoing to the circumstances surrounding Canadian patent agent 
regulation, what would, or could, an institutional bias argument look like?  Applying a 
Kozak-type analysis, the question is could a reasonable person conclude from the 
evidence as a whole that it was more likely than not that the Patent Agent Examination 
Board has not been impartial in the development, administration and execution of the 
patent agent examination?  
                                                           
727 2007 BCSC 546 (CanLII) aff’d 2008 BCCA 231 
728 Ibid at para 101. 
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One could argue that the high standard of fairness, and corresponding depth of 
review in Kozak was influenced by the Charter implications involved, and as such, an 
equally high standard would not be warranted in the circumstances of patent agent 
regulation.  In response to these distinguishing points, there are reasons to believe that a 
Kozak-level of comprehensive analysis can and should apply. As Canadian patent agent 
regulatory matters fall under federal jurisdiction, the Kozak decision, handed down by the 
Federal Court of Appeal, is highly relevant, binding precedent.  Also, although patent 
agent regulation does not implicate Charter issues in that there is no recognized Charter 
right to practice a profession, as discussed under Chapter 5.3(iii), from a contextual 
perspective, courts have held that the right to practice a profession justifiably warrants a 
high degree of procedural fairness and have been sensitive to matters touching on 
potential bias within the licensing process.  As such, it is reasonable to expect that the 
same level of scrutiny demonstrated in Kozak would also apply in matters involving 
professional licensing. 
The summary of relevant facts set out under Section 4.2(ii) must be viewed 
alongside the relevant statutory language and context.  It is important to again emphasize 
the context, which helps to inform a grounded approach to impartiality.  Here, there is no 
single ‘smoking gun’.  There is no clear indication that any individual has placed 
themselves in a position of personal bias, in the narrow sense, wherein an individual has 
allowed a personal conflict to improperly influence their individual consideration.  There 
is no evidence of ill-will or improper intent. 
Yet many years of customary practice have created a culture between CIPO and 
the profession wherein all relevant parties, despite acting based on what appears to be 
good intentions, have had their perceptions of bias clouded by an inherent institutional 
culture.  Decades of proximity between CIPO and the profession has created a 
comfortable atmosphere whereby information is communicated back-and-forth and 
extreme insularity has bounded their respective rational views of the matter.  The 
profession’s effective self-governance, along with this level of comfort with CIPO and 
lack of oversight, have allowed competency-based standards to drift towards a position 
where objective validation is seriously in question.  There is no evidence of intentional 
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impropriety, and to the contrary, those involved believe that the current system is normal 
and justified. 
Despite the lack of any overt impropriety, the facts cannot be ignored.  Public 
money is transferred to a private, professional association with no oversight or 
accountability regarding use of funds.  Regardless of how one may interpret the statutory 
responsibility of the Chairperson of the Patent Agent Examination Board regarding 
oversight of Examination Board activities, the available evidence demonstrates that the 
Chairperson has abdicated practically all responsibility for oversight to IPIC.  The statute 
states that the Board is appointed by the Commissioner of Patents and the Chairperson 
must be a CIPO employee, implying a statutory intent that CIPO must exert some level of 
oversight and management over professional governance.  As stated in Kozak, bias is not 
only a matter of improper influence, but also the improper surrender of freedom on how 
certain matters should be decided.  In light of the foregoing, it appears that CIPO has 
improperly surrendered its oversight responsibility. 
There is a strong argument that the administration of the patent agent examination 
demonstrates a reasonable apprehension of institutional bias.  While the statute envisions 
participation of IPIC members on the Examination Board, it would be difficult to argue 
that the statute also authorizes the current level of engagement between the IPIC 
organization and CIPO.  The lack of transparency and accountability, specifically in 
relation to particularly sensitive examination issues, combined with poor examination 
validation and dismal examination pass rates creates a strong perception of the possibility 
of bias.  Although Kozak does not require actual proof of apprehension of bias, the 
evidence of actual apprehension of bias on the part of examinees and other organizations 
would undoubtedly be viewed as persuasive.   
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CHAPTER 7 
FINAL CONCLUSIONS – (IL)LEGITIMACY, LEGALITY AND CANADIAN 
PATENT AGENT REGULATION 
The question this thesis set out to answer was whether current Canadian 
administrative law principles provide an adequate mechanism to challenge professional 
capture in the form of competency-based, entry-to-practice licensing standards.  The 
case-study of Canadian patent agent licensing was used to demonstrate if and how 
administrative could possible provide a filter against competency-based, entry-to-practice 
capture.  In the context of Canadian patent agent regulation, the capture and competency 
touch on a much deeper issue- as competency seals a barrier around a dominant patent 
discourse, challenging this discourse in the hopes of reforming patent practice generally 
may require challenging competency. 
From the perspective of substantive review, Canadian administrative law may not 
be an effective mechanism for challenging competency-based, entry-to-practice capture.  
Most statutory grants of authority to regulate ‘competency’ in the ‘public interest’ grant 
self-regulatory bodies tremendous discretion in setting licensing standards.  The relative 
subject matter expertise between courts and professional self-regulatory bodies weighs 
heavily in favour of courts deferring to self-regulatory bodies’ discretion in substantive 
matters of standard setting and examination.  Furthermore, recent decisions such as 
Green, Sobeys West, and Alberta College have both set a standard from tremendous 
deference to self-regulatory bodies in passing by-laws while also limiting the evidentiary 
record in challenges to discretionary by-law decision to matters that were before the 
decision-maker when passing the by-law.  Combined, this severely restricts the 
applicants’ ability to construct an evidentiary capture narrative. 
Although substantive review has been moving towards greater deference for self-
regulatory discretion and limiting the scope of the evidentiary record, procedural fairness 
has moved towards offering far greater protection through exercising heightened levels of 
review.  A body of recent jurisprudence demonstrates judicial recognition that 
individuals’ right to practice their chosen profession is entitled to a very high level of 
procedural fairness.  Thus, with respect to professional examination matters, courts have 
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demonstrated a willingness to review, in tremendous detail, all aspects of exam setting, 
administration and provision of reasons to ensure that the requisite level of fairness is 
being met.  Furthermore, although there does not yet appear to be a decision within the 
professional licensing context wherein a court has invalidated a professional licensing 
decision on account of bias, courts have expressed concerns that transparency and 
impartiality are essential within a professional licensing framework. 
However, while procedural fairness issues surrounding adequacy of notice and 
provision of reasons can be successfully used to challenge invalid professional licensing 
examinations, this brings us back full circle to the question of capture.  The central 
question of this thesis was what role administrative law can play in challenging capture.  
While any legal challenges may raise political awareness of potential capture, thereby 
provoking positive change, this would be an indirect effect on capture rather than a direct 
administrative law challenge to capture.   
As set out under Chapter 6.1, theories of regulatory capture are best translated 
into administrative law through the doctrine of institutional bias.  Challenges based on 
institutional bias cut directly to issues of capture.  Primarily, institutional bias, reviewed 
on a standard of correctness, is less deferential than substantive review and the 
evidentiary record far less constrained.  Thus, in theory, institutional bias can provide a 
judicial mechanism for safeguarding against capture and the evidentiary rules could allow 
for the creation of a capture narrative. 
However, as discussed under Chapter 6.2, the current state of Canadian 
institutional bias jurisprudence is far from settled, with a lack of clear consistency in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.  From a conceptual perspective, one of the challenges 
currently manifest in Canadian jurisprudence is the effect of statutory language in 
assessing what forms of bias or authorized.  This has tremendous relevance to the 
question this thesis … biases manifest themselves at an operational level, and one of 
main unsettled questions in the Canadian doctrine of institutional bias is how far courts 
may go in analyzing operational context, as opposed to strictly statutory language, in 
assessing whether institutional bias exists. 
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This thesis discusses Jacobs’ contextual factors for grounding an analysis of 
institutional bias.  To briefly summarize, Jacobs’ suggests several contextual factors, 
including: the provenance of the administrative actor; the shared understandings and 
institutional culture (including institutional practices) within which the administrative 
body is embedded; local understandings jointly held by the administrative actor and 
regulated community; any connections between the administrative body and those 
appearing before it that have been jurisprudentially flagged as potential impartiality 
concerns; and the administrative discourse.  Grounding an analysis of institutional bias 
using Jacobs’ suggested factors places the question of what is a ‘reasonable’ 
apprehension of bias within the specific context of a regulatory framework, analyzing the 
operation of a regulatory agency as opposed to simply looking to statutory language.  
According to Jacobs, a grounded analysis may determine that certain regulatory customs 
or norms, which viewed acontenxtually and objectively, may seem biased but are 
accepted as legitimate within a given regulatory framework.  Similarly, a grounded 
analysis may uncover operative biases, which, viewed strictly from the perspective of 
statutory language, may remain hidden. 
Applying Jacobs’ factors under Chapter 6.2(iv), this piece argues that a strong 
argument can be made that the current Canadian patent agent regulatory framework 
demonstrates institutional bias.  Although the lack of empirical evidence is certainly 
challenging, the existing evidence lends itself to a strong interpretation that the historical 
over-proximity between CIPO and the patent agent profession, rather than evidencing 
customs and norms that are legitimate within this specific regulatory framework, 
demonstrate signs of impartiality within the regulatory process.  The Patent Agent 
Examination Board has abdicated practically all responsibility for the licensing process to 
the IPIC organization, and private, voluntary association that represents the interests of 
agents.  The few examples of qualitative feedback from both patent agent candidates and 
outside organizations express a sense of deep dissatisfaction with the current licensing 
process, including perceptions of bias within the regulatory framework. 
Despite the foregoing, Chapter 6.2(v) asks whether Jacobs’ factors, whether in 
whole or in part, either explicitly or implicitly, can be applied under the current state of 
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Canadian administrative law.  Here again, the uncertainty manifests itself.  Cases such as 
the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Kozak seem to allow for a probing analysis into 
the operative aspects of a regulatory agency.  Kozak explicitly states that in some 
instances, bias does not involve a search for a ‘smoking gun’, rather, the evidence must 
be considered holistically.  Furthermore, Kozak allowed for an expansive evidentiary 
record, including evidence acquired through access to information requests.  However, 
few courts have followed and applied Kozak’s analysis, and the fact that it was decided in 
an adjudicatory context involving Charter issues leaves open the question of whether 
such a probing analysis would be implemented in a judicial review of a professional 
licensing decision.  A strong argument could be made that the judicial trend in recent 
years to view professional licensing as attracting very high levels of procedural fairness 
bolsters the argument that a Kozak-type analysis would be warranted in judicial review of 
professional licensing decisions. 
The legal analysis set out under Chapter 6.2 brings us back to the underlying 
theme throughout this thesis, regarding the deeper fundamental issues at play in patent 
agent governance and what this tells us about our patent system generally.  Specifically, 
this brings us back to the question of public interest, and beyond the narrow question of 
patent agent regulation, who is responsible for protecting the public interest with respect 
to governance of the patent system generally?  Is CIPO the defender of the public 
interest?  If so, how does it view its role as protector and promoter of the public interest?  
Patent offices were established to play a public interest role in the patent system.  
Historically, patent offices have viewed this responsibility narrowly- patent examiners 
examine patent applications in accordance with substantive law and publish patent 
applications to disseminate invention information.  As the technological landscape has 
begun to change, disrupting our long-held notions of what innovation means, how 
knowledge is disseminated and how professional services are delivered, patent offices are 
left in a position of trying to figure out how they must evolve along with society. 
As seen herein, CIPO now engages in new forms of service delivery, services 
which less than a decade ago would have been completely foreign to patent offices.  In 
the U.S. context, the USPTO now undertakes a significant patent hearing process which 
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has divided the perception of not only the proper role of the patent office within the 
patent system, but also the very nature of patent rights within our society.729   
What this demonstrates is that CIPO, much like patent offices around the world, is 
now struggling with an identity crisis brought on by changing social, economic and 
technological trends.  As with the discussion of self-governance and public interest under 
the Chapter 2.2, our notions of public interest and the patent system are likely changing 
along with these trends, and as well as struggle to define what the public interest is, or 
should be, in relation to the patent system, CIPO struggles to define itself vis-à-vis what 
it believes is the public interest. 
Similarly, the future of the patent agent profession is threatened by technological 
disruption, a challenge facing all professions going forward.  In the case of patent agency, 
the technological advances and the unbundling of professional patent agent services 
threatens to bring to the forefront the shaky foundation upon which patent agent 
regulation rests.  Patent agent regulation demonstrates a deeply entrenched form of 
epistemic and cultural capture between CIPO and the Canadian patent agent profession.  
To put it simply, CIPO has adopted the profession’s conception of public interest and 
competency as its own.   
While it is easy to view this discussion as a simple analysis of a poorly 
administered licensing examination, this would be missing the forest for the trees.  As 
discussed herein, patent agency competency in many ways represents the lynchpin of a 
patent discourse, of the foundation of an ideology upon which much of the patent system 
rests and ironically, an ideology which we have come to believe is set stone.  Patent 
offices and patent agents historically have mutually reinforced one another, and the 
historical hyper-proximity between the two has substantially contributed to the perception 
of permanence in our patent institutions.  But the reality is that this discourse was 
authored by interest groups with a deep interest in influencing its development. 
                                                           
729 At the time of writing this thesis, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Oil States Energy Services, 
LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC (584 U.S. ___ (2018)). The issue in Oil States was the narrow question of legality 
of certain patent office hearings pertaining to patent validity.  However, in its decision, the United States Supreme 
Court ruled that the granting of a patent is a public right, and specifically, a public franchise.  While the implications of 
this ruling are yet to develop, this has opened a debate as to whether patents can even be considered ‘property’ rights 
and whether the entire patent system should be properly viewed entirely as an administrative framework. 
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Challenging the notion of competency in many ways challenges the foundation of this 
discourse. 
The regulation of Canadian patent agents teaches us far more about our patent 
system than would appear at first glance.  It demonstrates that our patent discourse has in 
many ways been authored by those exclusively entitled to participate in the dialogue.  
The fact that those within this this discourse have not appreciated this reality is not a 
matter of intentional impropriety, rather, it demonstrates how deeply entrenched this 
discourse has become.  As social, economic and technological factors are beginning to 
disrupt this discourse, it is inevitable that both CIPO and the profession must eventually 
confront this reality.   
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APPENDICES  
APPENDIX ‘A’ – 2014 CIPO PATENT AGENT EXAMINATION HIGH-LEVEL 
ANALYSIS (EXAM  VALIDATION COMMENTS) 
The following is a collection of comments from 2014 Canadian Patent Agent 
Examinees regarding the exam.  The sample comments set out below are several example 
responses taken from the set of provided feedback: 
The Exam should be shortened, or time to write lengthened. There is no 
value to adding time-pressure into the Exam. Time pressure merely 
results in answers that are less well thought out. Answers year-to-year 
are inconsistent (e.g. what is expected in the Background section of 
Paper A varies from strict descriptions of the prior art, to discussions 
of the failings of those prior art over the present invention).The 
material to memorize should be provided, like it is in the Bar exam. 
There are a plethora of cases, and it is impossible to determine which 
of these cases is considered relevant to the Examining board, or what 
meaning the Examining board derives from these cases. 
 
Historically, the short answer questions tend to focus too heavily on 
'trick' questions and even where the question is straightforward, the 
model answers tend to assign marks for responding to issues that were 
not raised in the original question (and ignoring other issues that 
would be at least as relevant). Many of the long answer questions are 
designed to elicit a single 'correct' answer but inevitably leave areas 
open for multiple interpretations. This causes problems when the exam 
is marked against a rigid and detailed marking guide. Excessive length 
has also been a problem, particularly where the question book exceeds 
50 pages (often due to prior art documents containing extraneous 
information). This leaves little time for answering the questions within 
the 4 hour time slot, particularly since 'skimming' the art is not a viable 
strategy in view of how these exams are now structured. The weighting 
of marks on the exam also adds to the difficulty, as the mark 
distribution in both the long and short answer sections often doesn't 
reflect the level of effort required to answer the question. 
 
You require processes to ensure exam consistency between years. The 
exams seems to change entirely when a new examination board is 
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selected. Perhaps only 1 person should change on the board every year 
rather than the entire board. I practiced using the last 4 years of exams 
but this year, the exam seemed totally different. 
 
Preparation material for writing the exams is lacking. The only 
preparation material that I have found useful is the 2010 to 2013 
marking guides. The IPIC Tutorials and Clinics are disappointingly not 
in tune with the actual exams, most Patent Agents that prepare those 
sessions have not studied the latest marking guides and rely on their 
personal experiences back when they were preparing for the exams. 
 
There were multiple errors on the admission letter received from 
CIPO.We are close to last in G8 and G20 for innovation and we 
seriously lack patent professionals in Canada. Why having pass rate of 
7% or 10%? Why Canada is so different than the rest of the world? 
Suggestions: The Exam Papers should be shorter and predictable. I do 
not suggest that the Examination should be easy. Anyone should be able 
to sit for the exam more than once a year.  There should be mock up 
Exam Papers provided every year as provided in Europe. All we have 
are past Exam Papers for which the format has changed over the years. 
 
Provide ability to type exam on computer. Answers provided for 
previous exams are not consistent. Took IPIC training course (2010), 
but advice on how to write exam did not align with marking scheme. 
Accordingly more coordination between IPIC instructors and grading 
committee would be beneficial. Grading of paper A seems too 
subjective - only seem to get marks if claims exactly match the model 
claim despite providing an equally broad/Effective claim. Maybe 
provide more flexibility with awarding marks for paper A. Bottom line - 
exams (paper B & D in particular) now feels like a test of writing speed 
and time management, rather than professional skill. 
 
The exam format and mark allocation appears to change year to year 
making it difficult to determine what sort of answer will be awarded the 
optimum number of marks. This year's Paper D is a good example 
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wherein the format and mark allocation was quite different from the 
previous couple of years. Candidates are left to determine at the time of 
writing the exam what amount of time and analysis is required to obtain 
the marks allocated for a particular question/analysis. An attempt to 
clarify the type of answer expected was made on Paper D - but the 
directions were still somewhat vague. This makes the exam results 
arbitrary. Perhaps the best evidence of this is in the IPIC training 
courses which frequently advocate candidates to adopt a particular 
approach which may have worked a couple of years ago, but which 
would now result in suboptimal performance. 
 
This is my third year taking the exams. I passed paper C my first year. 
During my second year, even though I was 7 marks (out of 240) short of 
passing all papers combined, I did not receive enough marks on any 
one paper to keep any of my scores. I appealed, and the result was that 
my marks were LOWERED. I understood that this was a risk of 
appealing, but, in my case, I truly did not understand the motivation. 
The lowering of my mark had absolutely no effect on my standing (I still 
had to take all three exams again BEFORE the appeal). Also, without 
receiving any kind of feedback from the appeals process, I was not able 
to learn from my mistakes. I wasn't even informed which question 
resulted in the reduced mark (how is this helpful?). Instead, the result 
of my appeal was that it effectively discouraged me for continuing in 
this field. Without any transparency in the appeals process (and without 
more transparency in the exam marking process), I'm beginning to 
wonder if there is any way for me to improve my chances of passing 
(other than just hoping for "better luck" next year). I have taken almost 
all of the courses offered, and have consistently received positive 
feedback from the instructors. So, I'm really not sure what else I can do. 
 
While I understand that general knowledge of varying fields is an asset 
to IP practitioners, the subject-matter at issue in Papers B and C of this 
year was very different from the subject-matter of previous years, and 
especially in the case of Paper C, somewhat esoteric…. if the subject-
matter for the exams is decided sufficiently ahead of time, people sitting 
for the exams be informed prior to the exam of the subject-matter to 
which the exam will relate, allowing them to do some preparatory 
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reading, so that the subject-matter be at least somewhat more familiar 
when the time comes to sit for the examination. 
 
The marks allocated per question are not consistent from year to year. 
Also, the marking guides are inconsistent in terms of acceptable 
answers from year to year. 
 
To whom it may concern, Thank you for offering this opportunity to 
submit feedback. As an electrical engineer and patent attorney, these 
are by far the most unfairly difficult examinations I have ever written in 
my life. I appreciate the effort that you have taken to try and improve 
the marking guides; however, they are still very unhelpful. Not only are 
mistakes routinely made in the marking guides (in terms of page 
numbers, incorrect figure references, etc) but more egregious ones such 
as a complete failure to explain the reasoning behind the answer are 
discouraging, to say the least. Even the examinations contain blatant 
errors (this year, there was a clear mistake in the date format on Paper 
B). Nowhere in the world are such draconian examinations 
administered, and rightfully so. A brief review of CIPO's 2012 Report 
serves as a very sad indicator of the utter difficulty of passing, and one 
will clearly notice that in instances of 4% pass rates where the highest 
mark is 66.5/100 (Paper D), there is obviously a clear problem with 
both the administration and content of the exams. Also, when the 
average mark in ALL exams is below a pass rate (as was the case in 
2012 and surely again in 2013 if not every single year), it is a strong 
indicator that something is wrong. Bearing this in mind, CIPO needs to 
find a way to assist candidates to understand the answers in the answer 
guide. The goal of the examinations should be to test candidates on 
their knowledge and application of the relevant law and principles. 
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APPENDIX ‘B’ - 2016 CIPO PATENT AGENT EXAMINATION HIGH-LEVEL 
ANALYSIS (EXAM  VALIDATION COMMENTS) 
The following is a collection of comments from 2016 Canadian Patent Agent 
Examinees regarding the exam.  The sample comments set out below are several example 
responses taken from the set of provided feedback: 
“Paper D was a bloodbath. The pass rate is horrendous during the 
years that this "marking style" of Paper D has been instituted.” 
 
“More consistent marking from year to year. Sample marking guide 
answers from one year are not helpful for following years.” 
 
“don't even know where to start; but for somebody involved so many 
times in litigation and licensing discussions, this exam is a joke and 
lacks fairness. actually the only thing you seem to evaluate is the 
understanding of the invention and use of keywords in the analysis, I do 
not believe the reasoning is considered at all. for anybody involved in 
litigation, he would understand that different lines of arguments can be 
taken and rightly so as long as we can sustain the 
validity/invalidity/infringement from that point of view. now for the 
exam board to limit the analysis to few points or keywords shows a lack 
of understanding of real life patent trials or licensing.” 
 
“The answers given to the previous years' examination are arbitrary, 
no clear standards, especially in Part B and Part D. There is no way to 
know how to write a right answer. One particular case is the claim 
construction, how does the meaning 'purposive' apply? no criterion can 
be found.” 
 
“Paper D was very different than previous years. The difficulty of the 
exams is acceptable. However, changing the format and style of the 
exams in a drastic way feels unfair.” 
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“I can't believe my experience so far with the exams. I don't what you 
are trying to test as it is not clear. It is almost like you are purposely 
trying to have people fail.” 
 
“Paper D should be less lengthy and complicated… The guide keeps 
changing constantly. For claim construction, the guide required the 
candidate to identify the following: mapping, purpose, inventor's intent 
from claim language and specification, material effect.” 
 
“Marking guides for one year give little to no guidance as to what is 
expected in subsequent years, which makes the correct answers seem 
like moving targets.” 
“Paper D was very unfair this year and has been unfair for the last 2 
years as well. Significant changes need to be made to Paper D so that 
candidates that have studied and have experience can actually pass 
Paper D. Claim construction on Paper D is significantly different than 
on Paper B, yet there should only be one construction according to 
Free World Trust (SCC). The "essential feature" analysis in the claim 
construction question in Paper D should be removed from the exam.” 
 
“The training material and courses provided do not really provide a 
clear guidance how to tackle the exam... The quality of the exam's 
guides of last years is very different and sometimes not at all helpful.” 
 
“No clear guide as to what material should be studied, or how response 
should be structured. Marking guides from recent years indicate a 
model answer structure that fluctuates significantly in form and scope.” 
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APPENDIX ‘C’ – CIPO/IPIC COMMENTS REGARDING PATENT AGENT 
EXAMINATION PSYCHOMETRIC VALIDATION 
Each year CIPO releases annual statistics and data regarding the Patent Agent 
Qualifying Examination, including candidate numbers and pass rates.  Until 2014, 
CIPO’s annual report stated that “the Examining Board participates in a coaching session 
provided by a consultant versed in best practices for the setting of professional 
accreditation exams”(emphasis added).  A request to CIPO for information and details 
surrounding the work of this consultant and the nature of these sessions prompted a 
response that further details would be provided in the upcoming 2015 annual report. 
When released, the 2015 Annual Report had been changed from previous years’ reports 
to state the following: 
Prior to preparing the examination, the Examining Board meets with 
the IPIC Patent Agent Examination Standards Committee to discuss 
best practices for the setting of professional accreditation exams. The 
IPIC Patent Agent Examination Standards Committee reviews the 
development and administration of the qualifying examination for 
patent agents in order to assist the Examining Board in maintaining 
recognized standards for certification, including the security, 
practicality, fairness, scoring, reporting, technical analysis and 
documentation of the exam. The Committee is assisted by an expert in 
measurement and evaluation of competence, Dr. Gary Cole, who 
coaches members of the Examining Board in setting and marking 
examination papers that meet recognized standards in measurement of 
competencies. (emphasis added) 
This revised statement creates considerable confusion as to whether it is the 
Examining Board, the statutorily mandated body responsible for development and 
administration of the patent agent exam, or the IPIC Patent Agent Examination Standards 
Committee, that is ‘assisted’ by Dr. Gary Cole. This statement is unclear as to the 
respective roles of each of the Examining Board and the IPIC Standards Committee in 
Exam development. 
Furthermore, CIPO again changed information regarding Dr. Cole’s involvement 
in its 2016 Annual Report, which reads:  
Prior to the preparation of the examination, a Joint Meeting was held 
in November 2015 between the Examining Board and the IPIC Patent 
Agent Examination Standards Committee (“Committee”) to discuss the 
administration of the 2015 Exam and discuss best practices for the 
administration of the 2016 Exam. The Committee reviews the 
 224 
 
development and administration of the Patent Agent Examination in 
order to assist the Examining Board in maintaining recognized 
standards for certification, including the security, practicality, fairness, 
scoring, reporting, technical analysis and documentation of the Exam. 
The Committee is assisted by an expert in measurement and evaluation 
of competence, Dr. Gary Cole. As in previous years, the Committee 
invited Dr. Cole to share his expertise in setting and marking 
examination papers at the Joint Meeting. (emphasis added) 
This only exacerbates the confusion regarding the respective role of the 
Examining Board and the IPIC Standards Committee in development and administration 
of the Patent Agent Exam.   
A further Access to Information request sought clarification regarding the role of 
Dr. Gary Cole. The response stated that “Dr. Cole is retained directly by IPIC, and as 
such, CIPO is not in a position to provide information regarding the matter.” (emphasis 
added) Furthermore, CIPO advised that such inquiries should be sent directly to IPIC.  
Requests for further information from IPIC resulted in being told by IPIC that the 
requested information is confidential and would not be disclosed.730 Two further Access 
to Information requests were filed, the first of which stating:  
I am currently conducting regarding the Canadian Intellectual 
Property Office’s (CIPO) development and administration of the 
Canadian Patent Agent qualifying examination, CIPO’s website states 
that: Prior to preparing the examination, the Examining Board meets 
with the IPIC Patent Agent Examination Standards Committee to 
discuss best practices for the setting of professional accreditation 
exams. The IPIC Patent Agent Examination Standards Committee 
reviews the development and administration of the qualifying 
                                                           
730 In an attempt to clarify the matter and receive further information, I contacted IPIC on 
October 25, 2016 and spoke with Anne-Josee Delacorde.  I informed her about the previous 
Access to Information requests (which I understood from her that she was already aware of) 
made to CIPO for information regarding the consultant’s role in the patent agent examination 
process and other IPIC material relating to development and administration of the Patent Agent 
Exam. During our telephone call, I requested any available information regarding the 
consultant’s role in the patent agent exam development and administration process, as well as 
any other information available regarding exam development and validation, information I was 
easily able to receive from patent offices in several other jurisdictions.  I was told by Ms. 
Delacorde that the information I was requesting was confidential and that my requests must be 
directed to CIPO. To date, I have not been provided with any of this information.   
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examination for patent agents in order to assist the Examining Board in 
maintaining recognized standards for certification, including the 
security, practicality, fairness, scoring, reporting, technical analysis 
and documentation of the exam. The Committee is assisted by an expert 
in measurement and evaluation of competence, Dr. Gary Cole, who 
coaches members of the Examining Board in setting and marking 
examination papers that meet recognized standards in measurement of 
competencies.  I would like to request all documentation, including 
contracts, but excluding emails, detailing Dr. Gary Cole’s role in the 
development and administration of the Canadian Patent Agent 
Examination, including details regarding the coaching sessions 
conducted by Dr. Gary Cole. 
A second Access to Information request stated:  
I am currently researching the regulation and governance of patent 
agents in Canada, with a particular emphasis on the Canadian Patent 
Agent Exam.  In previous Access to Information requests (requests no. 
A-2015-00626 and A-2016-00068), I requested information and 
documents pertaining to the development of the Canadian Patent Agent 
Exam.  I have attached to this request copies of this information I had 
received pursuant to that request.  In the attached documents, reference 
is made on a number of occasions to the role of the Intellectual 
Property Institute of Canada (IPIC) Standards Committee and the IPIC 
Exam Revision Committee in the development process for the patent 
agent examination, including (but not limited to) development of 
‘Templates for Exam Setting and Marking’ for the exam.  I would like 
to request all documents (excluding emails) pertaining to the IPIC 
Standards Committee and the IPIC Exam Revision Committee in the 
development process for the patent agent examination, including (but 
not limited to) the involvement in the reformation of the exam taking 
place in 2009 as well as copies of the ‘Templates for Exam Setting and 
Marking’ for the exam.  As the Canadian Intellectual Property Office 
(CIPO) is statutorily responsible for the development of the patent 
agent exam, through the Patent Agent Examination Board, these 
documents should be considered to be under the custody and control of 
CIPO and therefore acquirable if CIPO does not already have 
possession. 
This request received the following response:  
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We regret to inform you that we were unable to locate any records 
responsive to your request.  Program officials with the Canadian 
Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) completed a thorough search and 
have confirmed that no relevant records were located.  The work of Dr. 
Cole is in relation to a contract between himself and the Intellectual 
Property Institute of Canada (IPIC).  The coaching was provided to 
IPIC members.  No CIPO board members received coaching from Dr. 
Cole. (emphasis added). 
This information apparently conflicts with the information CIPO has published in 
its Annual Reports.  The provided information states that no CIPO Board members have 
met with Dr. Cole, while the Annual Reports set out above state that it is ‘the Examining 
Board’ with the IPIC Standards Committee that meets with Dr. Cole at the “Joint 
Meeting”.  It appears that contrary to CIPO’s assertion, it is only IPIC committees and 
IPIC Board Members, rather than the Examination Board itself, that historically has had 
any ‘coaching’ with Dr. Cole, the details of which are confidential to both the public, 
CIPO and the Examination Board itself despite being publicly funded by CIPO. 
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APPENDIX ‘D’ – CONFIDENTIAL PATENT AGENT EXAMINATION MARKING 
TEMPLATES 
Below are copies of the confidential templates provided to Canadian Patent Agent 
Examination markers, received as part of an Access to Information Request. As seen 
below, practically the entirety of the templates have been redacted. 
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APPENDIX ‘E’ - 2014 CIPO PATENT AGENT EXAMINATION HIGH-LEVEL 
ANALYSIS (PERCEPTION OF BIAS COMMENTS) 
The following is a collection of comments from 2014 Canadian Patent Agent 
Examinees regarding the exam, which comments highlight examinees perception of bias 
in the examination development and administration process.  The sample comments set 
out below are several example responses taken from the set of provided feedback: 
As I'm sure you know, in 2012, exactly one candidate out of 231 writing 
the exam passed on his or her first attempt. Ten years ago, nearly 10% 
of candidates passed on their first attempt. Over the same period, the 
overall pass rate dropped from 32% to 7%. These numbers are in 
keeping with overall trends in the administration of this examination. 
The number of new members admitted to the patent bar in recent years 
is a small fraction of what it was before the format and marking 
practices for the exam were drastically changed in 2009. This shift took 
place without any notable change in the number of candidates writing 
the exam. There is also nothing to suggest that there has been any 
change in the composition of the candidate pool: most candidates have 
worked in the field for three or more years and have advanced 
technical degrees as well as law degrees. Allowing current patent 
agents -- who have a financial interest in restricting the number of new 
entrants -- to determine the rate of new admissions to the profession is 
a clear conflict of interest, and in most fields it would be considered an 
illegal restraint of trade. Any government body enabling this kind of 
anti-competitive behaviour would generally be regarded as fully 
captured by the industry it is charged with regulating. Industry Canada 
and CIPO should seriously consider the damage they are doing to their 
reputations by allowing this kind of anti-competitive "self-regulation" 
of patent agents to continue unchecked. The examinations should be 
designed and marked by patent agents or examiners who do not have a 
conflict of interest, and pass rates should be normalized year-by-year to 
prevent prejudice to candidates stemming from deficiencies in the 
design of the examination questions or the marking guidelines. 
 
The appeals process is not fair and useless. Many successful patent 
lawyers do not pass the exams, many write many times. Many patent 
lawyers rely on passing the exams for their livelihood - many years of 
writing can push people out of patent agency. The average pass times 
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(4 years) is too long. The overall pass rates seem biased against 
candidates and suspiciously anti-competitive. 
 
this exam is a joke. which criteria are used to mark? it always state 
there is no right answer but at the same time you consider specific 
keywords in your marking guidelines to give points. anybody that has 
been involved in patent and particularly litigation knows that so many 
things can be used to show difference that are not spotted by the other 
side. this exam need reform badly what is the passing rate? are all 
candidates that clueless about patent? 4 hours to go over 1 patent and 
3-4 references for validity analysis and handwrite the analysis? what 
efforts are being made to read candidates writing ? so many things to 
talk about this exam...bottom line it is a joke and a walled-garden that 
somebody is doing everything to guard or limit the access. 
 
Given what I have seen of CIPO and IPIC and the complete lack of any 
true desire to change this process in a positive way, I don't expect that 
proper changes will be made ... however, I always remain hopeful 
 
The exams do not reflect patent agent practice in real life. Paper B of 
2014 was in the format of a scientific paper submitted as a patent 
application. It was designed to confuse and disorient the candidates. I 
accept that this situation occurs in real life but in real life, I am not 
limited to 4 hours to provide the validity opinion. I have not met any 
patent agent who provides an opinion in less than a day let alone, 4 
hours. I do not see how paper B of 2014 can reasonably be justified as 
an evaluation of a candidate's ability to solve problems and provide 
validity opinions. Paper D of 2014 was designed to bogged a candidate 
down by requiring the candidate to understand meticulous details of the 
invention and requiring the candidate to answer ridiculous number of 
questions that clearly no patent agent can possibly answer within 4 
hours. I accept that the patent agent field is complex and require 
special skills but I failed to see how paper B and paper D of 2014 
evaluate the necessary skills to be a patent agent. These papers were 
testing patience more than ability to solve problems. I believe that 
future exams should be first tested on a random number of patent 
agents that are NOT members of the examination board. The 
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candidates' marks should be adjusted according to the performance of 
the test group. 
 
Correctors must work honestly toward the candidates to obtain 
recognition. Correctors must not be rewarded with a free lunch paid by 
tax payer money. I should file a complaint with the Auditor general of 
Canada and with I. C. Minister. You would stop this practice right now 
and apologize for it . 
 
I feel that the exams are written so as to keep people out of the 
profession. 
 
It would be good for IPIC to provide receipt of the exam. 
 
Finally, something I would also like to understand is why the pass rate 
over the past ten years has gotten progressively worse. According to the 
information available online, as of 2012, it takes most candidates 
FOUR years to pass all of the exams. However, a few years ago, it took 
most candidates only TWO years. Does the administration truly believe 
that the quality of the candidates is decreasing? Or is this an attempt to 
reduce the number of patent agents in Canada? I really do enjoy 
working as a patent agent, and I very much hope that I am able to pass 
the exams so that I can continue working in this field. However, I feel 
that the current administration of the patent agent exams has some 
significant flaws that are preventing (and discouraging) high quality 
candidates from entering this field. 
 
it appears, from my perspective, that the short answer questions for 
Paper D were unnecessarily, and perhaps unreasonably difficult as to 
provide support for the notion that the patent-agent exams are designed 
to prevent entrance to the profession by all but a few lucky contestants 
each year. Regardless of the true intent of these question, the 
appearance is easily colourable as being suspect. This reflects poorly 
on the profession as a whole. 
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Unfortunately, we are not prepared at all for these exams because they 
do not reflect the practice of a patent agent. Moreover, there is no book 
that can be used to write and SUCCEED exams. The exams are way too 
long and it's a shot of if they are successful and it does not reflect our 
patenting skills. It is a great frustration for many of us and many of us 
leave the profession by discouragement in view of the many failures 
suffered during these examinations…. We do not understand very well 
for whom these examinations are made. Very depressing ... (machine 
translated from French) 
 
Dear CIPO, You have asked for feedback on this issue so I feel that I 
need to be honest with you. I think that there are many feelings, 
including by myself and nearly every person I talk to about this who 
have gone or are going through this process, that arise with respect to 
the patent exams. This includes ambivalence, frustration, and a general 
"protectionist" attitude by those administering / writing / marking this 
exam. This "protectionist" attitude has little to do with the knowledge of 
the individual examinees on the most part, who most are of M.Sc., 
Ph.D., LLB or JD level. With respect to CIPO, I feel it is a simply 
method to control the level of individuals in the marketplace, and for no 
other reason. Many candidates, including myself, feel that they have no 
hope of completing these exams, ever. Many become dejected and just 
move on, which I think is "criminal". It is such a waste of Canadian 
talent. I have spoken to many individuals who tried for 3 and 4 years 
and sometimes longer, and simply give up. Never if my life have I faced 
such a weighted examination against an examinee I am a Ph.D, post 
doctoral and J.D level educated individual. … How come no-one can 
seem to pass these examinations, even the individuals who work for 
CIPO as patent examiners. You may retort, well people do. I say that 
the figure you show in your reports indicate that the pass rate is 
abysmal and has been in decline for the past ten years. The overall first 
try pass rates are 1-2 percent, the overall pass rate has fallen from 30% 
to less than 10% in a decade and the years taken to pass the 
examination has ballooned at the same time. An average of 4-5 years to 
pass is totally ridiculous. That is longer than my Ph.D. and J.D 
combined took to complete. That alone does not make sense to any right 
minded individual…. I want to practice in this country. I am passionate 
about law, and especially patent law. I have never felt passion such as 
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this in anything but this field in my many and varied careers. To turn 
my back on a career in this field after the work and sacrifice pains me. 
As many before and after me, there will be a time when turning my back 
on this will be necessary. And it will not be from lack of trying, it will 
be the barrier that s been deliberately placed in front of all candidates 
for the benefits of the current membership. I hope that this feedback 
will be read in a constructive light and do no mean to demean the 
valued service that CIPO does provide to practitioners in this field. 
However, I firmly believe that our uniquely skilled individuals in this 
field need to be nurtured, not excluded by such artificial barriers. 
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APPENDIX ‘F’ - 2016 CIPO PATENT AGENT EXAMINATION HIGH-LEVEL 
ANALYSIS (PERCEPTION OF BIAS COMMENTS) 
The following is a collection of comments from 2014 Canadian Patent Agent 
Examinees regarding the exam, which comments highlight examinees perception of bias 
in the examination development and administration process.  The sample comments set 
out below are several example responses taken from the set of provided feedback: 
Provide IPIC with consistent information on what is expected/required 
for passing each exam, for use during their annual exam prep courses. 
… While I'm sure the process is meant to keep the number of people 
passing low (something I'm sure the industry would want‐ supply & 
demand), it is not particularly fair or provide the best outcome.   
 
Stop having IPIC draft Papers A, B and D (they have a conflict of 
interest and use fail rates as a barrier to entry). CIPO should draft all 
exam questions.  
 
The extremely low pass rate for Paper A relative to the pass rate 10 
years ago is a consequence of the subjective nature of the marking 
guide and the long list of divergences from the model answer that can 
result in points being deducted. The exam administrators are long 
overdue to correct the longstanding trend toward lower pass rates on 
all four papers. The appearance of a conflict of interest should be 
addressed ASAP.  
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APPENDIX ‘G’ - EMAIL CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN CIPO AND IPIC 
REGARDING CIPO PATENT AGENT EXAMINATION HIGH-LEVEL ANALYSIS 
Despite the serious perception of bias expressed in both the 2014 and 2016 High 
Level Analysis reports, in both instances, CIPO sent both draft High-Level Analysis 
reports to IPIC for review and comment prior to completion.  CIPO sent a draft of the 
2014 High Level Analysis to IPIC’s Director of Professional Development, who returned 
a heavily revised version to CIPO, the revised version becoming the final 2014 High 
Level Analysis. 
For the 2016 High Level Analysis, the Chair of the Patent Agent Examination 
Board sent a draft of the Analysis to IPIC, requesting that CIPO and IPIC create a “joint 
statement of summary observations and conclusions” to “summariz[e] our observations, 
and what we commit CIPO and IPIC Standards Committee to exploring in the next 12 
months.” The Chair of the Patent Agent Examination Board requested that IPIC “attempt 
a draft of that [joint] statement” in addition to requesting comments on the draft Analysis.  
The draft 2016 Analysis that was sent to IPIC contained the following recommendations: 
- Publishing the survey results and offering to assist candidates with 
preparation- this section stated that “in the interests of transparency, 
results of the 2016 survey should be made publicly available.  The 
candidates are clearly engaged and would be interested in the findings.  
CIPO should demonstrate that the opinions of its clients are being heard 
and attempts are being made to improve services.” 
- Review Paper D- This section stated that “there were a number of 
complaints regarding Paper D.  There should be a review of the relevant 
comments from the survey and a comparison of the 2016 Paper D with 
previous years in terms of paper length, question clarity, and test 
results” 
- Publish answers from top papers – this section stated that CIPO 
should “seek permission from candidates to publish examples of 
answers which received top marks as a means to inform candidates on 
what types of answers are expected of them” 
- Review exam writing guides – this section had a number of revisions, 
edits and strikethroughs, and stated that candidates identified the ‘CIPO 
and IPIC’ exam writing guides as being “poorly received”, and that 
they “should be reviewed to provide candidates more of the information 
they are seeking” to “gain a better understanding of what information 
candidates need” 
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- Compile a syllabus – this section stated that “a comprehensive 
syllabus should be developed for each paper.  It has been identified as 
something the candidates would like and may help with declining pass 
rates.  A syllabus could help maintain consistency with setting exams 
from one-year to the next.  Syllabi are common in other jurisdictions 
for similar tests. (emphasis added) 
In the revised version sent back to CIPO from IPIC, each of the above referenced 
sections were struck out, which deletions were accepted by the Chair of the Patent Agent 
Examination Board and were not included in the Final Analysis.  Furthermore, in 
accordance with IPIC’s recommendation, the 2016 High Level Analysis was not 
published, and was accessible only through Access to Information request.  Despite all of 
the foregoing, CIPO’s major conclusion in the 2016 High Level Analysis regarding 
reform of the patent agent licensing process was that “further input from the IPIC 
Standards Committee should be sought.” (emphasis added) 
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APPENDIX ‘H’ - 2016 PAPER A (SHOWING -10 MARK DEDUCTION) 
 
For example, in the 2014 Paper A, the marking guide provided a breakdown of scores for 
the independent apparatus claim as follows: 
 
 
 
Similarly, for the 2015 Paper A Exam, referred to in the 2015 Paper A Marking Guide, 
the marking breakdown was as follows: 
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However, the 2016 Exam mark breakdown is as follows: 
 
 
Both the 2014 and 2015 Exams (as well as several years before that) followed 
roughly the same format in that marks were awarded for inclusion of certain elements, 
with approximately 15 marks awarded for highlighting the element considered to be at 
the point of novelty. Approximately 3-5 marks are deducted for superfluous claim 
elements, 5 marks are deducted for elements found in a dependent claim, and 5 marks are 
deducted for unclear language or inconsistencies. 
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However, reviewing the 2016 Exam mark breakdown, it is apparent that the 2016 
marking breakdown deviates from the last several years’ approach to marking.  Rather 
than following the same format as previous years, the 2016 Patent Agent Paper A 
Examination Marking Guide also includes a ‘-10 marks for including the ‘attachment 
member’’ in addition to the standard ‘-5 mark deduction’ for ‘superfluous element’, 
‘element found in dependent claim’, and ‘unclear language and inconsistencies’.  It is 
impossible to know how or why the exact amount of ‘10 mark’ point deduction was 
selected.  This marking approach had never been included in any of previous ten years’ 
Paper A Marking Guides that are made available to candidates, i.e. for the 2005-2015.  
Given that candidates only have previous years’ sample exams to use as study guides, 
this unprecedented shift in marking causes significant prejudice to candidates.  
Furthermore, given the presumption created by the redacted marking templates set out 
under Appendix ‘D’, this creates the perception that the marking grid is being adjusted to 
create an ideal pass rate. 
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